790.5/11–1452
Memorandum by the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, Joint Staff (Bradley) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
1. In February 1952, the United States participated in a Five Power Conference with the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand to determine what military measures might be taken collectively in retaliation against a further Chinese Communist aggression. Basic positions brought out but not reconciled at this conference were:
- a.
- The United States considered that direct action against China must be a part of any over-all retaliatory course of action.
- b.
- The United Kingdom considered that direct action against China would have undeterminable political repercussions and would be militarily ineffectual.
- c.
- The French were primarily concerned with obtaining direct military support for operations in Indochina.
2. In view of the political factors which arose in the February conference the United States subsequently agreed to participate with military representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand in a Five Power Military Conference on Southeast Asia restricted to a consideration of those courses of action which, from a purely military point of view, would be possible and necessary to cause the Chinese Communists to cease an aggression. This memorandum summarizes the results of the conference.
3. Pursuant to directives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the U.S. Delegation was guided by the provisions of NSC 124/22 which sets forth current U.S. policy regarding commitments of U.S. forces in event of Communist China aggression in Southeast Asia. The principal courses of action in NSC 124/2 which provided the broad framework of the U.S. position are summarized as follows:
- a.
- Action limited to the area of aggression and contiguous areas of
Communist China, by
[Page 235]
- (1)
- Resolute defense of Indochina.
- (2)
- Interdiction of the lines of communication to include those in Communist China.
- (3)
- A sea blockade of Communist China.
- b.
- General action against Communist China.
- (1)
- This course of action includes all action in a (1), (2) and (3) plus the bombing of all suitable military targets in Communist China.
- c.
- As a component of a and b above, encourage the French to develop to the fullest the military potential of Indochina.
4. It was established at the outset that the examination would be based on the assumption that the Korean war was continuing. Subsequently an additional assumption that a Chinese Communist aggression had occurred in Southeast Asia was agreed upon. Despite the terms of reference which limited the examination to the military aspects of the problem it was obvious throughout the conference that the delegates were influenced by political considerations and operating within the framework of national political guidance. Nevertheless the military representatives of the Five Powers agreed that:
- a.
- Air, ground and naval action limited to the areas of aggression and the contiguous areas of China offers little prospect of causing a cessation of aggression.
- b.
- A combination of all coercive measures including the defense of the area of aggression, a full sea blockade and general air action against China offers the best prospect of causing a cessation of aggression.
5. This agreement among the Five Powers is a step forward from positions established at the Five Power Conference in February. However, it was apparent, both from the discussions at the conference and the full report itself, that the agreement stated above was forced by the terms of reference which limited the examination to the military aspects of the problem. The important matter at attempting to reach an agreement on the strategy against Communist China which could be undertaken with the forces available brought out a wide divergency of views. The British endeavored to rationalize a recession along political lines to a course of action limited to the area of aggression by contending that expanded action would be ineffective and beyond Allied capabilities.
6. It developed at an early stage that the United Kingdom’s primary interest lay in the effect of the various courses of military action on her colony of Hong Kong. In developing its position the U.K. delegation emphasized the vulnerability of Hong Kong to a Communist attack. Their argument ran as follows: A sea blockade [Page 236] would provoke the Chinese Communists to attack Hong Kong. To hold Hong Kong would require sizeable air, land and naval forces, which would not be available if the blockade was undertaken. Furthermore, the sea blockade would, in itself, be relatively unimportant in causing the cessation of Chinese aggression. In the relation of Hong Kong to the over-all strategy of the area, the United Kingdom delegation’s position was unquestionably motivated primarily by economic and political factors, i.e., trade and shipping. These factors led them to the conclusion regarding the sea blockade to the exclusion of the important strategic benefits.
7. The French delegation did not manifest much interest in the blockade problem. Its principal concern was to establish the fact that to hold Tonkin against a Chinese mass attack reinforcements must be forthcoming.
8. In addition the French and United Kingdom delegates, with Australia and New Zealand concurring, stressed the necessity in their view for additional direct military support in Tonkin and Hong Kong both before and after an aggression. Inasmuch as these countries have indicated only a negligible contribution of forces for the defense of Southeast Asia, it would appear that the United States is expected to provide the bulk of this additional military support.
9. The position of the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand at this conference may be summarized briefly as follows:
- a.
- The United Kingdom considers effective implementation of a blockade and air action against China as a whole would require forces beyond Allied capabilities and the results would not justify commitment of forces in the strength required to implement such a course of action.
- b.
- The French recognize the desirability of direct action against China so long as it does not require such dispersion of forces as to jeopardize the retention of Tonkin.
- c.
- The Australian and New Zealand delegations generally concur in the U.K. position.
10. The French and United Kingdom delegates laid particular emphasis on the need for some form of liaison beyond that now in existence for planning for the defense of Southeast Asia. The French delegate expressed himself so strongly for the need of a planning agency that he concluded that absolutely no progress will have been made by military discussions since the Ad Hoc February meeting unless this need if fulfilled. The U.S. delegates contended that, insofar as the United States was concerned, the machinery for coordinating plans was already in existence under the Commander in Chief, Pacific.
[Page 237]11. The employment of atomic weapons against Communist China was not discussed.
12. The foreign delegations indicated from the outset of the conference that they were interested in a discussion of actions to deter further aggression. It was emphasized that it would be more economical to forestall aggression than to combat it. The U.S. delegation, while considering this subject to be outside the terms of reference, agreed to discuss deterrents in order that all viewpoints could be heard. My personal view subscribes to the logic of deterrent action or effort to stop aggression before it starts, but definitely opposes any arrangement for combined liaison or planning agencies prior to concerted retaliatory action or to U.S. ground participation in Southeast Asia.
Conclusion and Recommendation
13. I recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note my conclusion that unless there are agreements reached at high political level or unless there is a decided change in our national policy which would effect the drawing of new terms of reference further military talks by the Five Powers on Southeast Asia will serve no useful purpose.