Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/8–1552

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Foster)¹

secret

[Washington,] August 15, 1952.

Subject:

• Arrangements for Military Consultation under the ANZUS Council.

Participants:

• Mr. Charles A. Sullivan, Chief, Far Eastern Section, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense
• Mr. Andrew B. Foster, Deputy Director, BNA

Mr. Sullivan, member of the U.S. delegation to the recent meeting of the ANZUS Council at Honolulu, dropped in this afternoon and we talked for three-quarters of an hour about the meeting. Mr. Sullivan said that he had attended a good many international conferences and had never known one that was so successful. He expressed warmest admiration for the way the Secretary had handled things and he said that as far as he was any judge the Australians and New Zealanders went home happy. He said he fully realized that the Secretary had had an extremely difficult problem in persuading the Australians and New Zealanders to accept the arrangements proposed by the Department of Defense in connection with military consultation. He added that he was grateful to have been included in the delegation and felt indebted to the Secretary and all other members for their kindness to him.

Mr. Sullivan remained in Hawaii for several days after the departure of the U.S. delegation on August 8 and engaged in detailed discussions with Admiral Radford and the latter’s staff in connection with the implementation of the arrangements for military consultation. Mr. Sullivan emphasized that in his opinion Admiral Radford intended to establish a really effective relationship with the Australians and New Zealanders and had already taken several steps toward that end. Mr. Sullivan said that the Admiral clearly believed that there should be joint planning with the other two members of the Council and was taking his responsibilities in this connection seriously.

Mr. Sullivan said that he participated in the preparation of a message² which Admiral Radford and his staff had drafted and in which the Admiral put to the JCS his views and recommendations concerning the consultation arrangements. He added that the Admiral had indicated that he considered the JCS formula of May 1952³ inadequate for the job ahead. (Evidently the Admiral’s message urges a more effective arrangement than would be possible under a literal interpretation of the JCS formula.)

Mr. Sullivan said that since his return to Washington he had talked with various interested officers in the Pentagon concerning the Honolulu meeting. He mentioned particularly Mr. Frank Nash (who planned to mention Mr. Sullivan’s report to General Bradley), Admiral Austin and Admiral Burke.⁴ Mr. Sullivan said that these officers were sympathetically inclined and, he believed, would support Admiral Radford’s recommendations. He said he had talked also with members of the Purple (Far East) Team of the JCS organization but was not as sanguine concerning their attitude. (Mr. Sullivan seems to feel that Admiral Radford has his heart in the enterprise and means to do everything he can to further it. The fact remains, of course, that unless the Admiral is successful in persuading the JCS to take a more responsive position it will be difficult for him to accomplish much.)

Mr. Sullivan said that the Admiral had in mind, among other things, discussions with the Australians and New Zealanders concerning military plans for the defense of Southeast Asia. Mr. Sullivan added that Mr. Nash had said that that was fine but that it would be desirable to relate such discussions with the five-power discussions in which Australia and New Zealand would participate. The problem was one of timing, and Mr. Nash thought that Admiral Radford’s discussions should be scheduled appropriately in relation to the five-power talks.

Mr. Sullivan told me that Admiral Radford had said several things to him which indicated the profound impression the Secretary had made upon him. Mr. Sullivan expressed the opinion that the Secretary’s handling of the meeting and particularly the “round-up” was chiefly responsible for the Admiral’s intention to make something real out of the consultative relationship with Australia and New Zealand on the military side.

Mr. Sullivan promised to keep me informed concerning developments in the Pentagon.

I expressed our appreciation to Mr. Sullivan for having brought us so fully up to date and told him how glad we were to have had him with us at Honolulu.

I took the occasion to tell Mr. Sullivan that Mr. Laking, Counselor of the New Zealand Embassy, had told me this morning that the Embassy was sending us a formal note to tell us that the New Zealand Government had appointed Major General W.G. Gentry, Chief of the General Staff (who attended the Honolulu meeting), as its military representative accredited to the Council. I mentioned that Mr. Laking had remarked that the ranking officers of the Royal New Zealand Navy and the Royal New Zealand Air Force are both British officers seconded from the Royal Navy and the RAF, respectively; he, Laking, had said he was glad that a “true New Zealander” had been appointed to this position.

(In view of the obvious embarrassment that would be caused Admiral Radford and Mr. Sullivan if Mr. Sullivan’s very frank statements to me became known to officers of the Department of Defense, it is requested that this memorandum receive special handling and not be distributed or discussed outside the Department.)

1. The source text is marked “Not for distribution outside the Department.”
2. See telegram DTG 090332Z, dated Aug. 9, p. 204.
3. Incorporated in the U.S. notes to Australia and New Zealand of May 13; see the editorial note, p. 86.
4. Rear Adm. Bernard L. Austin, Director for International Affairs in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations); Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, Director for Strategic Plans in the same office.