790.5/8–2052: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

top secret

1221. Re London’s 5999 Jun 28,2 rptd Paris 2550, Saigon 47. Fol msg shld be conveyed Brit and Fr FonMins:

“Dept of State has given careful consideration to paper drafted Jun 28 in London on ad referendum basis as polit guidance for proposed ad hoc mil conversations between US, UK, Fr, Austral and [Page 211] NZ to consider mil courses of action to be taken in the event of armed Chi aggression against SEA.

Dept of State is of the opinion that polit factors set forth in paper wld be taken into consideration by this govt in determining, jointly with other interested govts, approp courses of mil action in the event of armed Chi aggression against SEA. Nevertheless, consideration by mil reps of polit factors of this nature in a survey of possible mil courses of action wld run serious risk of removal from consideration at mil level of some possible courses of action.

Govt of US believes that it wld be most useful for five govts concerned to have before them a purely mil analysis of all mil courses of actions which mil capabilities of powers concerned wld make possible in the event of Chi armed aggression to cause the Chi to cease their aggression. This survey shld include a comprehensive statement of the mil advantages and disadvantages involved. The decision as to what mil courses of action will be taken is, of course, one for later governmental determination on the basis of all relevant considerations at the time.

The Govt of US is prepared to designate a mil rep to embark on these mil conversations on the basis suggested herein in the near future and suggests that they begin Sep 8 in Wash. Recommendations of the mil reps will be made to their respective Chiefs of Staff.”3

Dept is briefing Fr and Brit Embs here re above. It is assumed Austral and NZ Govts will be approached by UK.4

Bruce
  1. Sent also to Paris; repeated for information to Canberra, Saigon, and Wellington.
  2. Ante, p. 143. A letter to the Secretary of State, Aug. 22, from Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster indicated that further discussions between State and Defense representatives (concerning the proposed five-power talks) had taken place subsequent to the JCS memorandum of Aug. 5 to the Secretary of Defense (p. 184), and that the formula set forth in telegram 1221 had received JCS concurrence on Aug. 20. (751G.5/8–2252)
  3. In a memorandum of Sept. 9 to the Secretary of State, Allison indicated that France and the United Kingdom had both accepted this proposal formally, and that Australia and New Zealand had done so informally through the United Kingdom. However, the date Sept. 8 had proven inconvenient (the talks began on Oct. 6). Allison concluded: “We are informed by the British Counselor that London’s telegram instructing the Embassy to accept our basic proposal for the conversations expressed keen disappointment at the fact that they were to be held without the diplomatic terms of reference drawn up following the last Foreign Ministers meeting and trusted that this would not prevent the conversations from being more productive than were those of last year.” (790.5/9–952)
  4. In a memorandum to Allison of Aug. 22, Philip W. Bonsal, Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, stated that at the former’s suggestion he had informally furnished copies of this telegram to members of the Australian and New Zealand Embassies. “Mr. [R.H.] Wade [First Secretary of the New Zealand Embassy] raised the question of whether New Zealand would be present at the conversations as an observer as was the case last time or as a participant. I said that I had no definite information on this subject which would be a matter for the determination of the New Zealand Government. I made it clear to Mr. Wade that I was merely furnishing him with information, not conveying an invitation.” (790.5/8–2252)