490.008/8–1452
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)
Subject:
- Arms Traffic in Southeast Asia
Participants:
- Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. Bonsal, PSA
I asked Mr. Tomlinson to come in today with further reference to the British Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of April 21, 1952,1 his conversation of May 2 with Mr. Lacy2 on the above subject and to the material furnished by the British Intelligence Bureau to us on the above subject.3
[Page 207]I told Mr. Tomlinson that the latter material had been carefully examined by our intelligence people. I said that we had been struck by the clear and useful organization of the information contained therein but that we were still not convinced, with particular reference to the Indonesians, that any evidence had been presented to us which would indicate that any Southeast Asian governments were stockpiling arms and munitions in such quantities or at such a rate as to warrant us in setting up the machinery proposed in the British Aide-Mémoire. I said that I thought that in the particular case of Indonesia the question with which we are probably confronted at the present time is one of knowing whether or not the Indonesian Government has the necessary resources including arms and munitions to cope with subversive activities in that country. I added that I, of course, was aware of the possibility of illegal traffic and the theft of government-owned stores but that these possibilities were inherent in the situation and could not be dealt with through international controls at the source of the arms and munitions along the lines proposed by the British.
Mr. Tomlinson asked me whether we proposed to answer the British Aide-Mémoire along the lines set forth above. I said that I hesitated to do so until I was quite sure that we had examined all of the evidence and considerations which led the British to make their proposals. I said that it was difficult for me to explain to myself the apparent divergence in our points of view and that I thought that we would probably both wish to consider the matter further before finalizing the US position.
Mr. Tomlinson agreed that he would communicate further with London on this subject. He added that of course it would be desirable, even if there were no present evidence of dangerous stockpiling by the Indonesian or other Southeast Asian governments, to take measures so that we would be in a position to detect and deal with such stockpiling should it occur.4
(In my discussion with Mr. Tomlinson I had before me a one-page memorandum entitled “Indonesia’s Military Supply Position” dated August 7, 1952, and prepared at the Department’s request by the Production Division, G–2, Department of the Army “at the informal request of the Department of State”.)5 The concluding paragraph of this report reads as follows;
“5. The Indonesian Army at present is estimated to total 217,000 men, but has been unable to maintain an adequate state of internal security, in the face of guerrilla operations by numerous dissident [Page 208] groups, including Communist and Moslem extremist factions. It is of interest to note that internal security problems and normal defense expenses have resulted in appropriating about 35 percent of the total national budget to defense expenditures. In view of the poor condition of most of the equipment and supplies acquired during and immediately after the revolutionary period, the lack of technical experience in maintaining and serving military equipment, and shortages of spares and replacement parts, the Indonesian Army military supply position cannot be considered satisfactory despite the Government’s strenuous efforts to purchase new equipment abroad.”