Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 116

United States Minutes of the First Meeting, ANZUS Council: Fifth Session

top secret
HON MIN-5

Kaneohe, T.H., August 6, 1952—10 a.m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (31).]

The Secretary opened the fifth session with a discussion of the Southeast Asian area. He assured the Council that the United States regarded this area as having great strategic importance from every point of view. As an example, he circulated a map which contained data relative to food production in Southeast Asia, showing that from one standpoint alone that area in Communist hands would constitute a very grave problem.

Indochina

The most vital part of the area was Indochina. Sometime ago we had urged the French to move on more quickly in the transfer of administrative power to the three Associated States. Due to the resistance of the French civil servants, progress had been slow. We considered that the best way to make progress was to develop the Viet-Nam army. The difficulty was to convince the people that they possessed the power to oppose the Communists. In the development of the Viet-Nam army we were supplying necessary equipment. We thought of this army as one which was Viet-Namese throughout and was outside the French union forces. This army now had four divisions which it was intended to expand by two divisions in 1952 and two more divisions by 1954. The other two Associated States had at least a division each for which we were also supplying equipment. We had been concerned by the fact that since the death of de Lattre the offensive spirit of the forces appeared to have declined and there were indications that French efforts had become a holding operation. We thought it was a mistake to sit in defensive positions.

The Secretary described the Viet-Minh army, which he said had approximately 315,000 men with some organized Chinese units attached to it. If the Chinese forces were increased by a substantial number, opposition to them would probably not be successful. There was one thing that might be done to deter Communist aggression in South East Asia, namely, the publication of a warning to Communist China. Such a declaration, however, raised serious problems as to the nature of the warning, whether it should be public or private, blunt or vague. Schuman was inclined toward a vague warning. It was our opinion that discussion of this warning should be put off until we knew what we were going to do in South East Asia. It seemed to us impossible to convey a warning unless we had agreed on what we would do, especially if the warning were disregarded. A warning had a certain “preventive” quality. (The Secretary then quoted paragraphs 27 to 32 of the Ad Hoc Committee’s report on South East Asia.)¹ He said that the British agreed with the contents of the Ad Hoc Committee report but had made certain reservations which, in the opinion of the United States, rendered the report useless. We felt that the officers who had participated in the preparation of the Ad Hoc Committee’s report could not talk freely as they had had to confine themselves to a discussion of Indochina. The purpose of the guidance paper which had been prepared last June in London² was therefore to get agreement between the governments so that our military men could talk without restriction. The French and British had approved the London guidance paper but thus far we had not done so as we were not sure that it met the requirements, i.e., that it would permit recommendations on the possible courses of military action.

The Secretary then read the conclusions of the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States for the policy guidance of the Ad Hoc Committee. (London telegram 5999, June 28, 4 p.m.) Regarding the conclusion, that in the event of further Chinese aggression, joint agreed action would be taken, the Secretary commented that this point had been included so that something could be done. Regarding the conclusion that the action taken would not be designed to overthrow the present Chinese Communist government but to cause it to cease its aggression, the Secretary said that the French and British wanted this statement included as they feared the impulsiveness of the United States might draw them into a war with China. With respect to the conclusion which stated that in any action to be taken, the risk of provoking Soviet armed support of China should be reduced to a minimum consistent with effectively carrying out the task of causing China to cease its aggression, the Secretary said that by using the words “reduced to a minimum” it was hoped to avoid a merry-go-round. Finally concerning the conclusion that, if aggression occurred, action, at any rate to begin with, should if possible be confined to the area of aggression and support areas in Chinese territory, the Secretary commented, that this phraseology, which was aimed at not spreading our action, might stop the talks. He added that in our opinion not only the beginning but the end of the action had to be discussed.

Australian Views on Southeast Asia

Mr. Casey then outlined in detail Australia’s direct and immediate preoccupation with the Southeast Asian area. Before the war Australia had dealt with the UK, France and the United States with respect to that area. Now that situation had changed and Australia dealt directly with the nine countries of Southeast Asia. It was Australia’s belief that the great powers had neglected Southeast Asia; therefore, Australia was happy to see evidence of a new interest. Southeast Asia was right on the doorstep of Australia. It was the natural direction in which Australian troops would move in case of war. The source of the trouble was the expansion of Communist China toward the south, an expansion which might turn toward either Indochina or Burma. The Burmese believed that 50,000 Chinese troops would be sufficient to overrun Burma and could not be stopped. Once in the country they could sweep in any direction. They would have a food supply and would control the well-being of all the people of Southeast Asia. Were that to happen the present weak governments in this area could not maintain themselves in power. The death of de Lattre had been a tragedy as he had been responsible for destroying the defeatist attitude in Southeast Asia. The Australians considered Letourneau to be fairly good. The essential point was whether or not the French would toss in their hand and in the opinion of Australia every pressure should be used to keep them from doing that. Australia considered that of the two avenues open to Communist China, Indochina was the most likely as it constituted the last remnant of colonialism and remained in the minds of Peking a great “chop stick” region. Australia was glad that the Ad Hoc Committee would attempt to assess the possibilities for holding the area. The problem was from where the equipment would come. The dilemma was how Communism could be deterred, as we could not take on China proper and therefore there appeared to be no answer in a military sense. Matters such as these constantly engaged the thought of Australian leaders as they had to determine where to send their troops in case of an emergency. Australia would willingly help to induce the French not to throw in their hand.

Mr. Watt reviewed his impressions following an extensive trip through Southeast Asia. He said that on the military side in Indochina he had been somewhat relieved and had concluded that the problem was less a military than a political one. The political problem had two aspects: the destruction caused by the French and Viet-Nam counterattacks—in contrast to the quiet infiltration of the Viet Minh—was misunderstood by the villagers; the real problem, however, lay with the Viet-Nam Government in Saigon which pursued local rather than national aims and thereby drove many into the hands of the Viet Minh. Mr. Watt said he had found many French on the top who had wanted to turn over power but many down the line who resisted this. There was a real necessity to solve the political and economic problems as well as the military ones. The Secretary endorsed the conclusions of Mr. Watt.

Ambassador Munro said Ambassador Bonnet³ had indicated to him last April that unless more sympathy and aid were given by the big powers to the French in Southeast Asia, they would get out. It was a source of satisfaction to the Ambassador, therefore, to see that the French position had changed following the Letourneau talks. Mr. Webb said that UN action in Korea would have a serious effect on the Chinese and accordingly he hoped that some “stiffening up” in Southeast Asia would greatly relieve the danger there. He commented, however, that the French were “unpredictable” allies. The question was how far New Zealand could go in view of its commitments in the Middle East. In any case, New Zealand could be counted on to play its part in Southeast Asia, subject to those commitments.

Need for United Action in Southeast Asia

Mr. Casey raised the problem of British-American relations, stating that he had noticed a perceptible feeling of rivalry between the British and the US missions in Southeast Asia. This rivalry was in part due to the fact that the US had funds to hand out. It was sensed, however, by the local people and this was unfortunate. He asked if anything could be done to make it clear to these people that there was complete unity and friendship between the US and the UK. If the people of Southeast Asia were convinced of this fact, we would enjoy a great moral and psychological advantage. Secondly, he suggested that a stepped-up radio propaganda program might be useful. There were in Southeast Asia inherent schisms and antagonisms which could be exploited when the war in Korea ended. He cited as an example the basically anti-Chinese attitude of the people of Indochina. Ambassador Spender said that it was impossible to agree on any policy until we had an evaluation from the military as to what could be done, with what force, and with what results. The dilemma arose from the fact that the military advisers were presently compelled to recommend “the least provacative action”. He felt that we might lose out in following such a directive.

US. View on Current French Position

The Secretary, replying to the various questions raised, said that there was no categorical answer to the question of the attitude of the French but the evidence indicated that with our help the French would remain in Indochina. The present Government in France, he said, was solid on staying in Indochina, although strong elements outside the Government wanted to pull out. Two factors, however, appeared to be working in favor of the present Government’s attitude: First, it was easy to say that the French should get out but it was a difficult thing to do and second there was a close connection between a French defeat in Southeast Asia and the attitude of the people of North Africa toward France. The Secretary pointed out that the drain on France in maintaining its position in Southeast Asia prevented the French from taking those steps which it would like to take in contributing to the solution of the European problem. Now, however, the French had some hope in that they could at least say they were building an army in Indochina which would enable them to withdraw French forces in time. The Vietnam Army was the “light at the end of the tunnel”. That had a great effect. Moreover, it was important that on every possible occasion the French be assured that what they were doing in Southeast Asia was in the common interest in the defense against Communist aggression.

With respect to the Southeast Asia defense talks, the United States hoped that we would get out of them specific recommendations including a series of plans and a resolution of the difference of views as to whether or not we could stop Communist aggression in that area. Our military advisers believed it was possible to stop China.

Analysis of the Military Situation in Southeast Asia

Admiral Radford then analyzed the situation in Southeast Asia. He said that the US, UK and France thought alike regarding the importance of Southeast Asia but that they were not working together politically and this was known. Progress had to be made in our political thinking but that was impossible unless we were together. The political thought of the UK and France was powerfully influenced by the belief of their businessmen that they could hold on by sitting tight and accepting no risks such as those inherent in any series of recommended military actions. The French feared military talks would provoke a full-scale attack on Indochina; the British, an attack on Hong Kong. He felt that such an attitude was wrong. Despite risks to Hong Kong and Indochina, we should all sit down and talk frankly about military possibilities. We should not forget that the Chinese, too, had serious problems. They had large forces on paper but not many trained divisions; they did not have our mobility; and they were vulnerable logistically. It was easier for us to make a move than for the Chinese. He did not believe that the Russians wanted a global war. Although they could make the greatest advance in the shortest time in Asia, we could stop them if we made up our minds to do so. Even the defensive posture in Formosa, where we are engaged in creating increased strength, would make the Chinese Communists think before attacking Hong Kong or Indochina. So far as Indochina was concerned it could be held but not by landing troops there. If we were to take the course of action necessary to prevent the Chinese from overrunning Indochina we would have to do all sorts of things which might bring about an attack on Hong Kong. The Chinese could not throw the French out of Indochina easily.

Mr. Webb asked if, without precipitating a world war, we could prevent the Chinese Communists from taking Indochina. Admiral Radford replied we could do so without precipitating a land war. Mr. Casey described the situation in Southeast Asia as similar to that of an octopus with tentacles reaching in all directions. The Secretary said the problem was whether or not we would confine military action to Indochina, to Indochina and its approaches, or to China on a broader scale. Ambassador Munro asked whether, in the event the Chinese employed 100,000 troops in Indochina, and we took full retaliatory action against China, this would result in all-out war. Admiral Radford said that the term “all-out war” was misleading. We were already engaged in such a war with the Chinese even though it was limited to one theatre. He said that the situation in Indochina was pretty good and he did not worry about aggressive French-Viet-Nam operations. Next fall the French could take offensive action of a limited nature. They had a strong position in Indochina. This position would be further strengthened if we made it plain to the Chinese that they could not come down without bringing a variety of possible military actions on their heads. Mr. Casey asked if it were true that 10,000 Chinese were fighting in Indochina. Admiral Radford replied that he did not know but that this made very little difference. Ambassador Munro wanted to know if it would be necessary to land forces to hold Indochina in case of a mass Chinese Communist attack. Admiral Radford replied that he thought this would be wrong. Our aid today pretty much approximated what could be absorbed in Indochina. Europeans could hardly live and fight successfully there. Mr. Webb suggested that it would be difficult, if troops were landed in Indochina, to decide whom they should be under. Admiral Radford concurred.

Mr. Casey asked if the US had confidence in Bao Dai.⁴ The Secretary replied that we did not have “too much” confidence in him. Granting French willingness to turn things over to the Viet-Namese, the real trouble lay with the Viet-Namese authorities, who were not attracting the young people, and with many colonial officials who were dragging their feet. Mr. Casey asked if the United States was taking a hand in the training of the Viet-Namese army. Admiral Radford replied affirmatively, and added that U.S. aid was transmitted through the French. Mr. Casey suggested that propaganda programs be stepped up in Southeast Asia through the use of Radio Australia and its integration with programs of the Voice of America. The Secretary asked that Mr. Casey furnish him with a memorandum on this subject.

Ambassador Munro suggested that disintegration occurred whenever Viet-Nam took over full control of army units from the French. The Secretary and Mr. Allison stated that well-trained Viet-Nam authorities were scarce and the Government therefore had difficulty in taking over reconquered areas. However, the problem of training administrators and military leaders was proceeding with US assistance and it was hoped that their quality would continue to improve.

Burma

The Secretary said with respect to Burma that the situation had improved over a year ago. On the military side, there was no force to oppose the Chinese but the Chinese Communists were unlikely to attack Burma because it was not controlled by a colonial power and such an attack would disturb India.

Thailand

Regarding Thailand, the Secretary said that the situation was internally unstable due to the personal ambitions of the leaders. We had MSA and military missions there in order to develop such stability as might be possible. If Indochina fell, however, Thailand would not last.

Malaya

Mr. Casey asked for the Secretary’s opinion regarding Malaya. The Secretary said that we had followed with sympathy the extraordinarily difficult situation there. Large forces were arrayed against the Communist elements. Admiral Radford added that the Mayalan Government had sent officials to the Philippine Islands to study the successful methods followed there in exterminating the Huks. The Secretary said that Letourneau had also been in touch with the Philippine Government regarding this matter.

Indonesia

Mr. Casey asked about Indonesia. The Secretary said that we were troubled by the internal weakness of Indonesia brought about by cabinet struggles. Mr. Allison said that the new cabinet wanted to be completely neutral in the East-West conflict and would not take guidance. However, it was still anti-Communist. We had had difficulty with our aid program, which appeared to tie Indonesia openly to the West.

New Guinea

Mr. Casey expressed Australia’s concern over the possibility of change in sovereignty in Netherlands New Guinea. He said the repercussions would be explosive should such a change occur, whatever might be the merits of the case. The Australian Government would fall if Indonesia gained control of this vital approach to Australia. Australia feared that on net balance, the Dutch might be ready to make a deal. The Secretary said we agreed that this problem should be kept on ice. A point was that in Holland the domestic political situation prevented this problem being considered at present.

Atomic Weapons of the USSR

Ambassador Munro asked about the progress of the Soviets in the field of atomic weapons. The Secretary said that Soviet progress in this line created a very serious problem.

Extension of Council’s Relationships

The Council discussed the draft statement,⁵ for inclusion in the communiqué, concerning the possible creation of relationships with other states and regional organizations, and agreed that the matter should receive further study by the drafting officers.

After approval of the press briefing paper (see ANZUS 1/7 [HON D–7])⁶ the fifth session of the Council meeting was adjourned at 12:40 p.m.

1. For text of the report mentioned here, see the subenclosure to Admiral Davis’ memorandum of Feb. 5 to the JCS, p. 40.
2. Transmitted in telegram 5999 from London, June 28, p. 143.
3. Henri Bonnet, Ambassador of France to the United States.
4. Emperor of the State of Vietnam.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. Annex G, not printed. Brackets in the source text.