Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 116

United States Minutes of the First Meeting, ANZUS Council: Sixth Session

top secret
HON MIN–6

Kaneohe, T. H., August 6, 1952—3 p.m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (30).]

Continuing Military Machinery

Australian Proposal

The Wednesday afternoon session, August 6, began with a discussion of continuing military machinery (ANZUS Agenda Item B 2). Referring to the Australian paper on this subject which had been circulated earlier (ANZUS 1/7, Annex H),¹ Mr. Casey said that Australia planned to appoint a senior military representative to the military group. Australia bore in mind the U.S. desire to keep the machinery simple but greatly desired a tie-in in order to know about planning. The difficulty in coming to a decision as to whether her effort was to be in the Middle East or in Southeast Asia, involving different types of warfare, was hampering Australian military training. The desire to have a NATO tie-in similarly was a reaching-out for a means of learning about world military planning.

Mr. Casey continued that the tie with Admiral Radford might enable Australia and New Zealand to fulfill their responsibilities under the ANZUS Treaty but would not assist them to meet their responsibilities in other theaters. He argued for a tie with the Pentagon so that they would have knowledge of planning in other theaters. Mr. Casey promised that their representative would not be a nuisance; he would be instructed not to be an added burden to US planners. Australia would feel that it had failed in an effort to establish a sound military relationship with the United States if it was not able to have a link with the Pentagon. He urged that the Australian proposals for continuing military machinery be tried on an experimental basis.

New Zealand Proposal

Mr. Webb said that the New Zealand proposals for continuing military machinery as indicated in the New Zealand paper on this subject (ANZUS 1/4)² faced two problems: First, the employment of resources in the Pacific. There was no difficulty here. We were in agreement. Liaison with Admiral Radford was adequate for this purpose. Second, employment of forces in other areas. This was the real problem. The New Zealand commitment in the Middle East tied in with NATO. If NATO became involved in the Middle East, New Zealand and Australian obligations would be affected. New Zealand did not want to be presented with a paper for comments. They wanted to be in on the planning, to have their viewpoint presented at the outset and to have continuous knowledge of planning and the over-all picture.

General Gentry pointed out that New Zealand was a member of three collective security systems: the UN, the Commonwealth, and ANZUS. New Zealand had a wholehearted commitment to the Commonwealth. In the event of global war New Zealand was planning a total commitment as soon as possible after the outbreak of hostilities. By a total commitment they meant they would contribute the whole army and the air force, although the latter was relatively small. Strategic objectives, however, were not static. Ideas change and because of this changing pattern New Zealand wanted to be in on and informed of plans. The Southeast Asia conference, MEDO and ANZUS did not really solve the problem which was where to employ the greatest resources and make the greatest effort. General Gentry made two further points: First, if the Deputies were meeting in Washington they would need the military advisers there. Second, in the event of global war Washington would run the show; therefore, New Zealand needed someone in Washington.

Mr. Casey added that Australia and New Zealand would welcome the assignment of U.S. officers to their defense departments.

U.S. Proposal

The Secretary said that there was a problem here based on a lack of general understanding. He would speak with the utmost frankness to the Australian and New Zealand Ministers. We understood their dilemma as to whether their effort should be in the Far East or the Middle East. However, the fact that we in the State Department had contact with the JCS did not mean that we knew where our own U.S. effort would be. The JCS had no ready answer to give to Australia and New Zealand.

We were faced with two possibilities: first, the outbreak of general war at any time and second, a series of involvements in a variety of areas. This latter was the “creeping problem.” The JCS had tentative plans in the event of global war but these plans must be revised in the light of the situation as it developed. Admiral Radford knew all about these plans and Australia and New Zealand could learn about them as satisfactorily in Honolulu as in Washington. The scene of the “creeping problem” was most likely to be in the Far East or possibly the Middle East.

Admiral Radford was the center of plans and recommendations in the Pacific. It was not true that Honolulu was an outpost in contrast with Washington as the center. Admiral Radford was in charge of one of the great U.S. commands and dealt with one of the most sensitive areas. The Australian and New Zealand proposals, which contemplated a direct relationship with the JCS in Washington, are unprecedented and undesirable. We wished to avoid confusion and to keep a balanced relationship. We were convinced that Australia and New Zealand would not get what they thought they were going to get from the JCS. No one in Washington was going to tell Australia and New Zealand what the JCS were going to think before they thought it. As soon as the JCS decided, Admiral Radford knew their decision. He knew their past decisions as well as the JCS do. The JCS listened with respect to Admiral Radford, and Australia and New Zealand had their best chance through him to present their views in planning. No country had the setup which Australia and New Zealand sought. The Secretary described the US–UK military relationship, pointing out its limited nature. We proposed Admiral Radford as our military representative as we thought this the best solution. We believe that the Council should give our plan a try. As many of the problems which troubled Australia and New Zealand were primarily political rather than military we thought they could get what they wanted through Admiral Radford and the ANZUS Council. The Secretary said he wished to dispel any misconception as to the role of the Standing Group. He said it worked on problems of raising and supporting the forces under General Ridgway’s command and was not involved in global planning.

Admiral Radford described the U.S. military planning system, tracing the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the war period and explaining the reasons why the Combined Chiefs had never been re-established. At the direction of the President the JCS made broad outline plans. The JCS had such a broad outline plan in the event of a global conflict. From the way we had deployed our forces the nature of this plan is clear. Over-all plans were then sent to theater commanders to work out detailed plans. Admiral Radford was responsible for the Pacific. It was also possible for him to originate a plan and send it to Washington for approval and comment. Australian and New Zealand representatives could help in formulating such plans in Honolulu. He stressed that there was no world-wide allocation of forces and that no global planning machinery is presently contemplated.

Discussion of U.S. Views

Ambassador Spender and Mr. Casey questioned Admiral Radford concerning the areas included in his command and whether his authority extended over other than naval forces. They expressed surprise in learning the extent of his command responsibility, especially the fact that this responsibility included Southeast Asia operations. Admiral Radford said that the larger world interests of Australia and New Zealand could be provided for by the ANZUS Council, with detailed planning being done at Pearl Harbor. The Secretary described the successful operation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, U.S.-Canada, and the easy, comfortable working relationship which was enjoyed there.

Ambassador Spender asked if anything would preclude the Deputies from calling for information beyond the competence of the planners at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Radford replied that appropriate questions could be submitted to the JCS for answers. As far as the Australian and New Zealand role in global war was concerned, it would be appropriate for an ANZUS Council request for information to be transmitted to the JCS for their views. The Secretary endorsed this view and said that the definition of the types of questions which could be raised with the JCS should be flexible and not made hard and fast.

Mr. Casey inquired, with reference to the U.S.-Canadian Defense Board, whether the Canadians had any greater access to the JCS or the Pentagon than Australia and New Zealand now have. The answer was a flat no from the Secretary and Mr. Foster.

Ambassador Spender inquired about U.S.-Canadian production allocations. The Secretary said that some production allocations had been worked out but when the Canadians wanted to talk about raw material allocations it was recognized that this could not be settled on a bilateral basis and that broader discussions were needed.

Ambassador Munro inquired whether we visualized that information from the JCS would be passed to New Zealand through the State Department or through the Military Representatives. The Secretary replied that this could be done through the State Department but that it was most likely that answers to problems on which Admiral Radford was working would be transmitted through the Admiral.

Mr. Casey wanted assurance that questions that Australia poses to the U.S. Government would get answers from appropriate areas of the U.S. Government when they were beyond Admiral Radford’s competence. He also wanted to know whether or not Australia and New Zealand could continue to speak publicly of the “military committee”. Did we have any objection to a link between the senior Australian military representative in Washington and Admiral Radford? Turning to the second question, Admiral Radford said he thought that the Australian military representative in Washington would very likely have reason to visit Pearl Harbor from time to time for discussions. The Secretary added that we had contemplated the mutual assignment of officers who would be military representatives accredited to the Council.

U.S. Paper

At this point, a paper (ANZUS 1/5)³ containing the U.S. proposals as approved by the JCS, was circulated. The proposals were as follows:

1. One Military Representative from each of the governments signatory to the ANZUS Treaty should be accredited to the ANZUS Council.

a. The Military Representatives will:

1) Advise the Council on problems of military cooperation which may arise in connection with the application of the ANZUS Treaty;

2) Consider and make recommendations to their respective chiefs of staff on the measures which might be taken to increase mutual assistance and self-help, looking to the improvement of the defense of Australia and New Zealand and their territories as related to the over-all strategic defense of the Pacific; and

3) Furnish to the Council these recommendations which have received approval of their respective chiefs of staff.

b. The Military Representatives will meet periodically, as required and shall rotate the seat of the meetings between Pearl Harbor, Melbourne and Wellington. When so requested by the Council, they would meet in Washington, Canberra, or Wellington in conjunction with regular annual Council meetings.

c. The Military Representatives will draw up their own rules of procedure.

2. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or an alternate designated by him will be accredited to the Council as the U.S. Military Representative.

3. In order to provide the necessary exchange of information and to provide for continuity of effort among the three representatives, each government may assign to the offices of the Military Representatives of the other, not more than two liaison officers of a rank no higher than field grade.

4. Existing agencies and channels should be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in implementation of the ANZUS Treaty.

Mr. Casey said that Australia accepted the U.S. proposals for continuing military machinery as set forth in the U.S. paper on this subject.⁴ He wanted flexibility in the representation at meetings of the military representatives as Australia might wish to change its representative from time to time. Admiral Radford suggested that the military representatives could meet and decide such details.

In discussing assignment of military liaison officers, Admiral Radford mentioned that it would be desirable for each country to limit the number of officers so assigned to that number which could be fully utilized in the work of the military representatives.

Mr. Casey inquired if the Council could review the operation of this machinery from time to time. Both the Secretary and Admiral Radford replied that they could see no reason why this could not be done. The arrangements were not hard and fast. Mr. Casey then said that the military machinery as suggested by the United States should be considered by the Council to be in effect until changed by mutual agreement. This was agreed.

ANZAM

Mr. Casey said that he wanted to discuss ANZAM.^* Australia would like the United States to take cognizance of the ANZAM area. Sir Frederick Shedden, asked to explain this point, said that the question was how ANZAM was to function in the event of war. The U.K. wanted to know the relation of ANZAM to ANZUS. Did Admiral Radford want to take note of ANZAM and take part in the responsibility for ANZAM planning? Mr. Webb considered that this was a question for the military machinery. Sir Frederick agreed but wanted to note that the question exists. Admiral Radford stated that he and Vice Admiral Collins (Chief of Naval Staff, Australia) had talked about this. He could not see why the U.K. was concerned with having the question raised in the ANZUS Council other than that the U.K. wanted to make sure that planning for ANZAM was not overlooked. We had to know more about what we had to do and how to do it before we knew the answer to what to do about ANZAM. The military representatives could discuss this question.

Relationship of ANZUS to NATO

Mr. Casey asked for the U.S. views on the possible relationship of ANZUS to NATO (ANZUS Agenda Item C 2). As NATO expanded its activities into such fields as allocations and supply, Australia and New Zealand were more and more left out. Their basic reason for wanting a link with NATO was to have a connection with the organization that had such large planning responsibilities. Mr. Watt mentioned that Prime Minister Menzies, in discussing this problem with members of the Australian delegation, had made two points. First, Australia was not seeking NATO membership or associate membership. It wanted information. Second, Australia was not under the illusion that NATO was doing global planning. They wanted information on NATO activities, such as economic plans, that might affect them. Australia already had two links with NATO in NATO planning on shipping and petroleum. If the United Nations should collapse NATO was the only remaining large anti-Communist organization in the world and Australia was not a member.

The Secretary said that one link could be between SHAPE and MEDO. There was no tendency in NATO to expand further in the area of military responsibilities. Rather there was a tendency to withdraw from previous goals. The Secretary had been giving thought to the problem of the division of our total resources. It might be that the European economy was being loaded to the point where it might crack. Perhaps we should give more emphasis to economic aid. We were faced with the problem of the proportion of available aid to be allocated to the Middle East as against the Far East and Europe. These were problems on the solution to which we get little help from our membership in NATO. We could not see how such membership would help Australia and New Zealand. Our problem was how to divide too few resources among too many demands. The best way for Australia and New Zealand to present their claims upon U.S. resources, which were limited, was through their Embassies in Washington. The Secretary said that the U.S. would be glad to take up with NATO such appropriate problems as Australia and New Zealand might bring up in the ANZUS Council and would try to get an answer.

Official communiqué

The draft communiqué was then discussed at length and modified in some of its details (ANZUS 1/6).⁵ During this discussion Mr. Casey pointed out that it should be clear that the three governments shared the responsibility for the decision concerning the possible attendance of a U.N. observer. The communiqué was approved.⁶

Mr. Casey for Australia and Mr. Webb for New Zealand expressed to Mr. Acheson their appreciation of the value of the meeting and their gratitude for the manner in which Mr. Acheson had taken them so fully into his confidence. They expressed also their thanks to Admiral Radford for his contribution to the discussion and the hospitality which he and his officers had extended to the delegations.

The Secretary thanked the Australian and New Zealand Ministers for their remarks and declared that the meeting had been an extremely valuable one for the United States. He joined with them in their expression of appreciation to Admiral Radford.

The sixth and final session of the first meeting of the ANZUS Council was adjourned at 6:20 p.m.

1. Not printed.
2. ANZUS 1/4 has not been found in Department of State files. However, the proposals in it may be identical to those in Annex I to HON D–7, “Proposals of New Zealand Government Concerning Continuing Military Machinery”.
3. Not printed.

4. WAM D–2/2, “Machinery for Military Consultation”, Aug. 26, 1953, a paper prepared in the Department in anticipation of the Second Meeting of the ANZUS Council (held in Washington, Sept. 9–10, 1953), contains a review of this decision.

   According to this paper, “the Australians and New Zealanders were seriously disappointed by the formula and felt that the United States had failed to grant them the degree of consultation at the military level which they had been entitled to expect.

   “The Secretary endeavored by means of the round-up, during which he expounded United States appreciation of major international problems and United States policies and plans concerning them, to cause the Australians and New Zealanders to feel—what was indeed the fact—that we had taken them fully into our confidence and had given them in the ANZUS Council direct access to our thinking at the highest levels.

   “The Secretary succeeded to a considerable degree in this task but he was unable to alleviate all the disappointment felt by Australia and New Zealand over the Joint Chiefs of Staff formula.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 161)

5. This term, which means “Australia, New Zealand and Malaya”, is chiefly used in service parlance and relates to joint Australian, New Zealand, and UK planning for the defense of the Australasian area. The headquarters of this enterprise is in Melbourne. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 244.