Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/8–552

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)¹

top secret

[Washington,] 5 August 1952.

Subject:

• Proposed United States Position for Five Power Military Representatives Conference on Actions to be Taken in the Event of Chinese Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia

1. In view of informal discussions held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Representatives of the Department of State on 16 July 1952 and of a request for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the positions established in their memorandum for you, subject, “Proposed Tripartite Conference on the Defense of Southeast Asia,’ dated 11 July 1952, on the basis of a “draft agreed minute” submitted on 16 July 1952 by the Department of State (Appendix), the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. The view of the Department of State, that the possible advantages of holding a five power military representatives committee meeting are sufficient to warrant the holding of such a meeting regardless of the fact that firmly agreed joint political guidance has not been obtained, is acceptable, provided it is understood by all participants that only military factors will be considered without unilateral political restrictions.

b. The terms of reference and assumptions submitted by the working group of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Committee are unacceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the degree and for the reasons indicated in the memorandum for you, dated 11 July 1952, referred to in paragraph 1 above.

c. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Department of State, “draft agreed minute” submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 July 1952 (Appendix) had been submitted informally to the Joint Staff on 7 July 1952. These paragraphs were considered and rejected in the preparation of the report contained in the memorandum for you, dated 11 July 1952, referred to in paragraph 1 above.

d. The terms of reference and assumptions previously submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are believed by representatives of the Department of State, to contain elements not salable to the other four powers which will participate in the proposed conference, at least prior to the holding of such a conference.

e. In view of the divergencies which exist between the powers, new terms of reference which are mutually agreeable to the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and which are clearly within the framework of NSC 124/2² are required.

f. There is general agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Representatives of the Department of State with the provisions of paragraph 4 of the “draft agreed minute” of 16 July 1952 (Appendix) which states that the primary objective of any action is cessation of Chinese Communist aggression and the governments concerned desire to obtain from their representatives a military analysis of the courses of action militarily recommended and feasible to attain that objective.

g. The following terms of reference are based on this paragraph. They are clear and concise and are subject to little, if any, misinterpretation. They will permit the military conference to be held; yet they support no particular nation’s views but permit exploration of each course of action possible, both alone and in combination with all others without unilateral political restrictions. They establish no restrictions on the types of operations or the means employed while tending to keep the discussion within the limits of availability of forces. These proposed terms of reference are:

(1) It is agreed that military representatives of the U.S.A., the U.K., France, Australia, and New Zealand should meet to consider the military actions which might be taken to force a cessation of armed Chinese Communist aggression, should it occur.

(2) Based on the assumption that the Governments of the five powers have jointly decided to take action against Communist China in the event of further Chinese Communist aggression and on the assumption that a joint warning has been issued to Communist China regarding the grave consequences of Chinese Communist aggression against Southeast Asia, the Committee will, from a purely military point of view:

(a) Determine the collective military capabilities of the nations represented on the Committee which might be made available to carry out the necessary actions to force Communist China to cease its aggression in Southeast Asia.

(b) Make recommendations to the respective Chiefs of Staff as to the feasible military courses of action for accomplishing the primary objective, which is the cessation of Chinese Communist aggression.

2. It is, therefore, recommended that the Department of State be informed that:

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objections to the holding of an early five power military representatives conference under the terms of reference and assumptions indicated in subparagraph 1 g above, in lieu of the draft tentative agreement by the working group.

b. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand should be notified that the United States feels that joint political agreements are essential and will continue to press for these agreements, but that the meeting of the five power military representatives committee may be conducted as a prelude to the making of such governmental agreements provided it is understood by all participants that only military factors will be considered without unilateral political restrictions.

c. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand should be advised that the draft tentative agreement by the working group has not been approved by the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix

Draft Agreed Minute on “Draft Basis for Discussion By Military Committee’ Dated 16 July 1952

The U.S., U.K., and French Governments agree to the “Basis for Discussion by Military Committee” as drafted by their representatives in London with the following understandings:

1. The “provisional conclusions agreed by the Governments concerned” are working assumptions agreed to by the Governments only for the purpose of providing guide lines for the military talks;

2. The statement “That the action taken is not designed to overthrow the present Chinese (Communist) Government, but to cause them to cease their aggression” is not to be interpreted to mean that military action otherwise considered necessary to compel cessation of the aggression would not be undertaken because such action might bring about the overthrow of the Communist regime or that such action, once undertaken, would be terminated or modified in the event that the fall of the Communist Government appeared imminent;

3. The phrase “support areas in Chinese territory” should not be interpreted so as to exclude the possibility of naval blockade;

4. The primary objective of any action is cessation of Chinese aggression, and the governments concerned desire to obtain from their representatives a military analysis of the courses of action militarily recommended and feasible to attain that objective.

1. File copy attached to a covering note of Aug. 11 by McWilliams to the Secretary.
2. Dated June 25, p. 125.