Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

State–JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

[Washington,] July 16, 1952—11 a.m.

[Here follows a list of the persons present (24). Only General Bradley attended for the Joint Chiefs. The Army, Navy, and Air Force groups were led by General John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff; Admiral Donald B. Duncan, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, respectively. Matthews headed the Department of State group.

[The meeting opened with discussion of Korean matters; for text of this section, see volume XV, Part 1, page 409.]

Southeast Asia

General Bradley: We have studied your paper² and have made a few suggested changes. We changed the expression “foreign ministers” to “heads of states or their representatives” with the idea of giving the representatives more power.

Mr. Matthews: I take it you do not really mean that Queen Elizabeth and President Auriol should meet with President Truman. I suppose you mean heads of governments.

General Bradley: Yes, that is right. In other words, if military representatives went along they would go as representatives of heads of governments. Perhaps they do not want them to have as much authority as that and want to have their views referred back to governments. That is something I am not sure about.

Mr. Nitze: I think there may be a difference between us in our starting points. Your paper³ describes the paper under consideration⁴ as the initial British approach. Actually it represents a considerable revision of the British position. The original British position was wholly negative and was based entirely on the idea of local defense. They originally took the view that our action in the area would not be designed to cause the Chinese Communist government to cease its aggression but only to deter its aggression. We made it clear to the British that we do not now have the power to deter the Chinese Communist aggression locally and that it is necessary to bring pressure on China directly in order to make the Chinese Communists cease their aggression.⁵ In other words, it is not just a problem of deterring but a problem of compelling them to cease aggressive action. The British accepted this point of view.

The second point of importance is that the British originally took the view that our action must be confined to the area in which aggression was taking place and areas adjacent thereto. We took the view that we had no chance of accomplishing our objectives if we placed these restrictions on ourselves. We pointed out again that it was necessary to bring pressure on China. We had a lengthy discussion of a naval blockade in this connection, and we pointed out that we could not exclude the possibility that a naval blockade would be necessary.

There is another major point on which the British have moved in our direction. Their paper⁶ in paragraph D stopped after stating the necessity of minimizing the danger of Soviet intervention. We agreed that we do not want to become involved with the Soviet Union. Our primary objective, however, is to compel the Chinese Communists to cease their aggression. We would minimize the chance of Soviet aggression to the extent consistent with doing whatever was necessary to accomplish this objective.

The British and the French felt that in approving the Working Party’s paper, they exceeded their instructions. In short, we felt that we had gotten them to move quite a long distance. For this reason it seems to me that the JCS comment is inaccurate when it states that there has been no change in the British position. I think the situation is quite different than it was because the Working Party’s paper places primary emphasis on the problem of getting the Chinese Communists to cease their aggression.

There is a point which I should mention about the blockade. Mr. Eden thought that a naval blockade might be appropriate and necessary in certain circumstances. However, the Cabinet would have to approve any British decision to this effect. Cabinet approval would require among other things a military estimate that a naval blockade was necessary in order to get the Chinese Communists to cease their aggression. For this reason also I think that the time is now appropriate for new military discussions and that such discussions might move us one more step forward.

Admiral Duncan: I thought that all the things you have just said were reflected in our comments. I do not find this point regarding the ceasing of aggression.

Mr. Nitze: It is in the agreed Working Party paper which was drafted in London.

General Bradley: We had long discussions of this subject with the British and French last January. At the end of those discussions we were poles apart. They were willing to take some action in Southeast Asia to stop aggression, but they were not willing to do anything more. They would not even entertain the idea of a naval blockade. When we read this new paper, frankly we did not see much change from the positions they had taken in January. Perhaps some of these words you have mentioned do imply a difference but we did not think so.

Mr. Nitze: We thought that the changes in language represented a material change in position. We also thought, however, that the matter could be clarified by the preparation of an interpretative minute. We have a draft of such a minute,⁷ and it is our idea that we might be able to get the British and French to approve this interpretation of the paper.

(Mr. Nitze handed copies of the draft interpretative minute to General Bradley.)

Mr. Matthews: I understand that the Working Party’s paper was not just a British paper. The French participated and on our side Paul Nitze and Frank Nash also participated. Therefore, we did have some influence on the paper.

Mr. Nitze: I am not trying to maintain that we got full agreement on the policy set forth in NSC 124.⁸ I firmly believe that we cannot get that policy accepted right now. Before it could be accepted, it would be necessary for the British to obtain a military view that a naval blockade would be necessary.

Admiral Duncan: According to this memorandum, it was your object to seek agreement.

Mr. Nitze: We sought agreement all right but we didn’t get it.

General Bradley: How can we get agreement on what we are going to do unless we can get agreement on what our objectives are?

Mr. Nitze: That is why we thought it was important to make clear that our objective is to make the Chinese Communists cease their aggression. Having got agreement on that it will follow logically and clearly that we should impose a naval blockade if a naval blockade is necessary to attain that objective.

Mr. Matthews: You will notice that paragraph 2 of our interpretative minute includes language which makes clear that our objective is to get the Chinese Communists to cease aggression. We think it might be possible to persuade the British and French to accept this as an agreed interpretation.

General Bradley: Well, we will take a look at it. I have one drafting comment. I think we might get in trouble with the expression “military committee”. That term usually refers to the 15-man military committee of NATO.

Mr. Nitze: We don’t need to use that expression. Let’s take it out. We can say instead “military representatives” and put that in lower case.

General Bradley: Is there pressure from the French for an early meeting? Somewhere or other I have gotten the idea that they want a meeting on July 21.

Mr. Matthews: There may be some pressure from the French, but there is certainly no agreement on a meeting at that time.

Mr. Bohlen: Are you sure you’re not thinking of the Democratic Convention?

Mr. Nitze: There was some reason why the French wanted an early meeting but I can’t remember what it was.

Admiral Duncan: Judging from a first glance at your memorandum here, I take it that you propose to accept the Working Party’s paper as written and to agree on this interpretation of it. That seems objectionable to me because there are some things in the Working Party’s paper which I do not like at all. For instance, there is a paragraph concerning command arrangements which I don’t like.

Mr. Matthews: The British have already indicated that they want to take that out.

Admiral Duncan: I could not agree to it.

Mr. Nitze: I think we can secure the deletion of that subparagraph 3 which deals with command areas. I am not sure that any military organization is necessary.

Mr. Matthews: The British have said that they do not want it.

Mr. Nitze: I expect we will have some trouble with the French on this point for they do want a military organization.

Admiral Duncan: Have you noticed how we put this matter in our comments? Our language refers to consultation and arrangements for coordination.

General Bradley: (Reads the paragraph in question)⁹ That part about plans seems troublesome.

Mr. Matthews: That is the paragraph which the British chiefs want to delete.

Admiral Duncan: I may not be up to date on the changes in the Working Party’s paper, but I really don’t see a revised basis for discussions by the military representatives.

Mr. Nitze: There aren’t any changes in the Working Party’s paper.

Mr. Matthews: When I say that the British chiefs want to delete this paragraph that is because we have subsequently received a message¹⁰ from London which indicates that this is the desire of the British chiefs and that the Foreign Office will recommend that the view of the British chiefs be accepted by the Cabinet.

Mr. Nitze: I think we can get the whole paragraph deleted after a fight with the French.

General Cabell:¹¹ Isn’t the only terms of reference we need for the military meeting the language embodied in paragraph 4 of your interpretative minute?¹² If the military were supplied that one paragraph as their terms of reference, they could proceed with their business. I think if we just gave them that and made no reference to the Working Party’s paper, the military representatives could get on with their job.

Mr. Bohlen: It has been our feeling that the military should have a clear shot at this problem without any political inhibitions. What we want the military to tell us is what is militarily required to restore peace and tranquility in the area. After they have determined the military requirements, the governments can then decide whether these requirements can be met and whether the risks are acceptable. I think it is important to attack the problem in this way. If we mess up the two problems and consider at the same time not only the military requirements but the political aspects of the problem, I’m afraid that we will not get anywhere.

General Hull: It is possible for us on this side to take that kind of approach, but I don’t think it will work with our allies.

Mr. Bohlen: I know that of course they always have political ideas in the back of their heads. However, if it is our clear mission to determine the military requirements quite apart from political considerations, I think we can force them to justify their recommendations on military grounds. If they have political limitations in their minds, I think we would then be in a position to back them against a wall.

Admiral Duncan: There is another point here which I must mention. The military representatives cannot make their recommendations directly to the governments. They will have to report to their respective chiefs. We would expect our representatives to report back here to the JCS. The JCS would then present the military recommendations to the government.

Mr. Matthews: The language in our minute is taken directly from your own paper. I think the language is identical.

Admiral Duncan: I’m afraid that it has in effect been taken out of context.

General Bradley: No one of us could go over there and represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We would have to report back to the JCS.

Admiral Duncan: The task of the military representatives participating in such a meeting is to advise their chiefs from a military point of view as to the military requirements. We would want the parties to this agreed minute to understand this point. The way the minute reads, I think it would not be understood.

General Bradley: I agree that it is necessary to make that clear. I think that you would want us to do it that way.

Mr. Matthews: That is right. We will be happy to make this clear. Incidentally, General Bradley, you referred to one of the chiefs going “over there”. I think the meeting will be held here in Washington. At least that is our idea.

General Bradley: That will make some difference.

Mr. Matthews: Shall we leave this minute with you so that you can study it?

General Bradley: Yes, we will do that. We are rather skeptical after last January.

Mr. Matthews: We think it is worth another try especially in view of Mr. Eden’s statement about a naval blockade.

General Bradley: We did not know that he had said that. That is encouraging. We will look this over and see if we have any comments which would clear up the points we have mentioned.

Mr. Nitze: From the American point of view, I think it would be helpful if we could forget the whole Working Party paper. I am confident, however, that we cannot do that. There are some people in the French and British governments who think we want to get involved in general hostilities with Communist China and who are not altogether sure that we wouldn’t want to see hostilities extended to the Soviet Union. We have got to get that worry out of their heads before we can get ahead on this problem on an objective basis.

General Bradley: In any new discussions we are bound to be guided by NSC 124/2. We did not have a governmental position at the time of the January talks. The British and French did. Everything they said was based on the position their governments had adopted. We did not know what our government’s position was. Personally, I don’t see what we can accomplish unless their governmental positions have changed considerably. However, perhaps it is worth a try.

Mr. Matthews: I don’t think we can lose anything and we might gain some ground.

Mr. Nitze: There is perhaps one risk in these talks. I have in mind the question of the use of atomic weapons. If it is hard to foresee how we can accomplish much without using atomic weapons, this may lead to new political difficulties. It is undoubtedly true that they will find that a very difficult idea to deal with.

General Bradley: I don’t think anyone here believes that we can get into large-scale action against China and keep all of our atomic weapons in storage. We have been spending billions on them after all, and it seems to be a very effective weapon. I doubt if we can handle the problem without using them. One of the arguments against the blockade has been that it wouldn’t be effective. I think that we could seriously interfere with the use of their main centers of communication if we used atomic weapons. I think we could cut down the traffic very much.

We will take another look at your paper and try to see whether we can give you any more guidance.

Admiral Duncan: Is this moving along at high speed on the basis of the working paper?

General Bradley: Is there an urgent demand for a meeting within 10 days or is it a question of a month or two months?

Mr. Nitze: For some reason or other the French found it difficult to have a meeting after the first of August. I think the rains stop in November. The French feel that it would be helpful to get an agreement among the three of us before that time. I don’t think they made any great point out of it. I think that they just want to get going.

Mr. Bonsal¹³ just tells me that the French have renewed their request for urgency.

Mr. Allison: May I raise one other small point about your comments. I note that it refers to Australia and New Zealand as observers rather than participants. Australia was a full participant in the first meeting, and I think it might be very difficult to try to put them back into observer status in this meeting.

General Bradley: I thought that Australia had been an observer in the first meeting.

Admiral Wooldridge: I re-read the record of the January discussions yesterday, and Mr. Allison is right. Australia was a full participant.

General Bradley: The same question arises with respect to another paper. We agreed last January to participate with the others in intelligence work. We said that we would not go along with the preparation of agreed intelligence estimates. In other words, we agreed that we would all work together, but we did not agree to issue agreed reports. Australia and New Zealand were at this meeting. The French have told us that according to their records we agreed that Australia and New Zealand would be full participants in this intelligence work. Our record on the meeting is not entirely clear. We shy away from it a bit because we are afraid that it might lead the French to request full participation for Vietnam. On balance, I think it is O.K. for Australia and New Zealand to be full participants. We are under some pressure to go along with this.

General Cabell: The French have raised the matter on the basis that they interpret the record as making possible the full participation by Australia and New Zealand. They have asked us whether we agree with this view.

General Bradley: Would that violate any governmental position?

Mr. Matthews: Offhand I don’t think so.

General Bradley: Well, we are going to have a G–2 and G–3 meeting. I think we should have a consistent point of view.

Admiral Duncan: I think Australia and New Zealand should be full participants in the intelligence conference.

I raised the question of urgency because I thought it related to the question whether the British and French regard this paper as being a governmental approved paper.

Mr. Nitze: I think it is very important to get clear on what changes we want to make, etc. The British and French understand that the Working Party’s paper was strictly ad referendum.

Admiral Duncan: Is that understood by them?

Mr. Nitze: I am sure it is. I know that the British and French representatives both felt that they had exceeded their instructions.

Mr. Bonsal: Both the British and French know that the paper is under study in this government and that the Working Party’s work was ad referendum.

Mr. Matthews: In other words, they do not think that our failure to comment means that we have approved it?

Mr. Bonsal: No, not at all.

General Bradley: Does anyone here have any objection to the full participation by Australia and New Zealand in this meeting?

Mr. Matthews: No.

[Here follows discussion of MEDO, Trieste, and Japan.]

1. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”
2. Reference is apparently to a Department of State draft not found in Department of State files.
3. The JCS memorandum of July 11 to the Secretary of Defense, discussed in the memorandum supra.
4. That is, the draft working paper of June 28.
5. The preceding two sentences are printed as altered by handprinted alterations and interpolations. As typed they read: “They originally took the view that our action in the area would not be designed to overthrow the Chinese Communist government but only to deter its aggression. We made it clear to the British that we do not now have the power to deter the Chinese Communist aggression and that it is necessary to bring pressure on China directly in order to make the Chinese Communists cease their aggression.”
6. Not found in Department of State files.
7. See the appendix to the JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense of Aug. 5, p. 186.
8. Apparently a reference to NSC 124/2, p. 125.
9. Apparently paragraph III of the draft working paper.
10. Not further identified.
11. Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, USAF, Director of the Joint Staff of the JCS.
12. “4. The primary objective of any action is cessation of Chinese aggression, and the governments concerned desire to obtain from their representatives a military analysis of the courses of action militarily recommended and feasible to obtain that objective.”
13. Philip W. Bonsal, Lacy’s successor as Director of PSA.