Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/7–1552

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

top secret

[Washington,] July 15, 1952.

Subject:

• Proposed Tripartite Conference on the Defense of Southeast Asia

Reference is made to the paper dated July 11th from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense¹ on the above subject. This memorandum was furnished to the Department on an informal basis by Mr. Charles Noyes. It is my understanding that it has not yet received the approval of the Secretary of Defense and that in fact Defense would welcome an opportunity for further informal discussion with us prior to a final firming up of Defense’s position.

The Joint Chiefs position may be summarized as follows:

1. The Joint Chiefs do not believe that the draft working paper² agreed to tripartitely at London furnishes a basis for military conversations.

2. Useful military conversations would result only from expanded joint agreed political guidance.

3. Every effort must be made to obtain tripartite agreement on at least the minimum course of military action referred to in paragraphs 7e and 10c of NSC 124/2.³ When this has been achieved the Joint Chiefs would agree to a purely military tripartite meeting in accordance with certain agreed terms involving the following major variations from those contained in the London draft:

a. Australia and New Zealand would appear as observers rather than as participants.

b. Instead of “alternative military courses of action” the military conference would come up with “recommended courses of action”.

c. The joint action to be taken in the event of further Chinese aggression “would not necessarily be the limit of actions taken by the governments concerned” (i.e., we, and the others, would have a sort of blank check to go unilaterally beyond tripartite agreement).

d. The Joint Chiefs wish to spell out the issuance of “a joint warning to Communist China” whereas the London draft merely stated that “It may be necessary to demonstrate in advance that aggression will not pay”.

e. The Joint Chiefs in speaking of the possible overthrow of the Chinese Communist Government state that this would not be the primary objective of the action contemplated and add that “such an overthrow incident to the attainment of the primary objective would not be precluded”.

f. The Joint Chiefs wish to use the language contained in NSC 124/2 regarding the risk of Soviet intervention i.e., “by avoiding insofar as practicable those targets in areas near the borders of USSR”.

g. The Joint Chiefs entirely eliminated the language from paragraph e of the London draft which states that “action at any rate to begin with should if possible be confined to areas of aggression and support areas in Chinese territory”. Thus their proposed draft is far less restrictive than the London draft.

4. Thereafter a high-level conference of “heads of state or their representatives and the Chiefs of Staff of the US, Great Britain and France” is proposed to achieve the agreements believed necessary “for the successful defense of Southeast Asia and the prevention of limited war” (sic).

5. This high-level meeting would be designed to obtain agreement of the governments concerned to take all necessary measures without geographic limitation or the exclusion of any capability and also to determine the sequence and extent of necessary military action to repel further Chinese Communist aggression and restore peace and order to the area.

To sum up, the Joint Chiefs propose three steps:

a. A political agreement on terms of reference for a military meeting. This agreement would involve reopening of the London negotiation.

b. A meeting of military representatives in accordance with the expanded terms of reference.

c. A very high level politico-military meeting presumably designed to pass upon and reach final agreement on the recommendations formulated by the military in accordance with the expanded terms of reference.

I can see no prospect of agreement on the above either between ourselves and the Pentagon or between this Government and the British and French. I submit the following general comments:

1. It seems to me that the question of issuing a warning either secret or publicly to the Chinese Communists regarding the consequences of further aggression on their part is no longer timely. As you recall the British have already indicated that, in their opinion, the warning has, for all practical purposes, already been delivered. There can be no doubt in anyone’s mind that such an aggression would encounter prompt reaction on our part and that we are in fact already making a major effort to enable France and the Associated States to resist the aggression already taking place. The fact of tripartite conversation and, presumably, planning is also public knowledge.

2. It is obviously up to us to be prepared for anything which may happen. Nevertheless it is legitimate to ask ourselves how imminent is the danger of a stepped up Chinese aggression in Indochina to a point which would warrant a conclusion that a new military situation justifying new measures on our part exists. I do not believe such a change to be very imminent although we must certainly to the extent possible concert the measures which we would take if such aggression developed.

3. A certain measure of agreement between ourselves, the British and the French as to what we would do in the event of further Chinese aggression already exists. We would certainly supply air and naval support to Indochina and we have tripartitely agreed to ask our military for recommendations regarding action to be taken against the “areas of aggression and support areas in Chinese territory”. There is certainly a considerable field of action for military discussions, planning and possible preparations.

4. Is it desirable at this time to press further on the highest tripartite political level the question of “limited war” (I use the JCS language) versus the almost unlimited war against Communist China which is apparently advocated by the Pentagon in the event of further Chinese aggression? This is not an issue on which we are apt to secure a prompt agreement with our Allies. It is an issue which will generate considerable heat and which will therefore inevitably become public. Is this the time when we wish to encourage publicity in this direction? Would it not be possible at this time merely to enter a general caveat regarding the effectiveness of the measures agreed to by the French and British while at the same time we would proceed to work out those measures in military conversations. While the conversations are taking place, our military people might unilaterally work out the expanded measures which they think should be taken and which I understand would mainly be carried out by us in any case. At some later opportune moment these could be presented to our Allies in a fully discussed and supported form. I have been much struck at the failure on our part to express exactly what we have in mind when we speak of expanded air bombardment and naval blockade in relation to further Chinese aggression. We have not really worked out the military, political or economic angles of our program.

5. If we were to accept the Joint Chiefs position and submit it to the British and French Governments, we would in effect be canceling the effort made at London both by the Foreign Ministers and by the working group to reach an agreed position. We would in fact be back where we were last February. As you are aware, the French Cabinet has accepted the working paper and the French Government is pressing for the military talks. Indications are that the British Government will also accept the paper in the very near future with a reservation urged by the Chiefs of Staff rejecting the setting up of a continuing military organization. In fact, there has been talk as to the desirability of holding the conversations before the end of the month.

Recommendation. It is recommended that you inform the Joint Chiefs that the Department does not believe it feasible, in view of the negotiations which have already taken place at ministerial level with the participation of a Defense representative, to reject the London working paper in its entirety or to make a counterproposal along the lines of the Joint Chiefs thinking. We therefore propose acceptance of the London working paper as a basis for the working out on the military level of certain measures to be agreed on in the event of further Chinese aggression but at the same time we would reserve our right at a later date to submit for consideration both at the political and the military level certain expanded or alternative courses of action.

1. Not printed. (790.5/7–1552)
2. For text, see telegram 5999, supra.
3. Dated June 25, p. 125.