Office of the Historian

751G.5/6–2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State1

top secret
London, June 28, 1952—4 p.m.

5999. Meeting held this morning at Foreign Office with Scott and Murray2 as UK representatives, La Tournelle, Offroy, Roux, and Leroy3 French representatives, and Nitze, Nash, Sprouse and Ringwalt for US to formulate policy guidance for ad hoc committee.

Following draft paper, based on original UK draft presented at meeting, agreed upon for submission to respective governments:

“It is suggested that military representatives of USA, UK, France, Austria [Australia] and New Zealand should meet to consider defense SEA and particularly Indochina against armed Chinese aggression. They should be guided in their deliberations by the following provisional conclusions agreed by the governments concerned:

1.

(a) That in event of further Chinese aggression joint agreed action would be taken;

(b) That it will be necessary to demonstrate in advance to Chinese by some appropriate method that aggression will not pay;

(c) That the action taken is not designed to overthrow present Chinese (Commie) Government but to cause them to cease their aggression;

(d) That in action to be taken risk of provoking Soviet armed support to China should be reduced to minimum consistent with effectively carrying out the task in (c) above;

(e) That (if aggression occurs) action, at any rate to begin with, should if possible, be confined to area of aggression and support areas in Chinese territory.

2.
The objects of such a meeting of military representatives should be:
I.
To advise governments on scale, objectives and probable effectiveness of action considered practicable, Tonkin being in particular considered as one of positions of paramount military importance to free world in Asia;
II.
To recommend alternative military courses of action in light of their relative military effectiveness and their relation to likelihood of Soviet involvement;
III.
To make recommendations regarding possible establishment of a military organization to make aforesaid action effective if need arises, and in particular to prepare appropriate military plans for submission to governments.”

Discussion revealed French major preoccupation with defense Tonkin and both French and UK obsession with avoidance action which might lead to Soviet involvement. US representatives made clear they too were equally desirous minimizing risks Soviet involvement but emphasized that any action entailed such risk and that it was essential to take effective action which would lead to attainment objective to causing Chinese to cease aggression. US representatives also emphasized danger ineffective action which would merely lead to continuation present drain and eventually loss of SEA, with attendant increasing pressures on Europe, Japan and Pacific flank. UK representatives also indicated some reservation regarding effectiveness naval blockade and risk Soviet reactions, particularly if extended to Dairen and Port Arthur.

It was preliminarily decided that finalization of paper would take place at Paris between UK–US Ambassadors and French Foreign Office.4

Subsequent to meetings, Scott had brief exchange of views with Ringwalt. Scott felt that substantial progress had been made but warned that in effort meet US position he might have concurred in measures which UK Joint Chiefs would be unwilling support.5

Gifford
  1. Repeated for information to Paris and Saigon.↩
  2. James Murray, Head of the South East Asia Department of the Foreign Office under Scott.↩
  3. Jean Leroy, Counselor of the Embassy in London.↩
  4. Documentation on implementation of this course of action has not been found in Department of State files.↩

  5. Telegram Secto 49 from Vienna, June 29, marked “Eyes Only Matthews”, includes a repetition of the draft text given above, together with this conclusion:

    “Secretary studied paper en route Berlin. He wld change second sentence, first paragraph to read, ‘They should be guided in their deliberations by the following provisional statement.’ (Reason for change is to avoid fact or appearance of secret agreement).

    “Secretary assumes it was not possible to get agreement on mentioning specifically bombing and blockade.

    “Secretary wishes careful study be given to paragraph (c) for reasons familiar to Department in connection revision NSC paper.” (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 116)

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