790.5/9–2254
Memorandum of Conversation, by Jack K. McFall, Adviser on European Affairs to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly1
Subject:
- Discussion on ANZUS and SEATO
Participants:
- R.G. Casey—Australian Minister of State for External affairs
- The Secretary
- Ambassador J. K. McFall-USGADel
Mr. Casey called on the Secretary this morning and discussed with him his views on the extreme desirability of a certain system of military planning being inaugurated as a feature of SEATO. He discussed his plan in detail indicating that he had covered the same subject in separate conversations with Under Secretary Smith, Admiral Radford, Prime Minister Churchill and Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Harding. Casey stated that he had received approbatory comments on the idea from three of the above named, but Admiral Radford did not evince any interest therein.
At the conclusion of Casey’s presentation, the Secretary replied that he believed the suggested plan possessed merit.
As the Secretary accepted Casey’s suggestion that he, Casey, send him a private and personal letter2 setting forth in detail the entire plan as he had explained it in this conversation, it was agreed with Mr. O’Connor that the subject matter thereof will not be covered in this memorandum.
After the Secretary explained that under the most favorable circumstances it would not be possible to secure Senate ratification of the SEATO agreement until late February, Casey suggested that a meeting of the signatory countries to be held in the Southeast area “perhaps in November” to “keep the idea moving and give it new breath” would be desirable. The Secretary agreed in principle with this thought and then mentioned his view that some way must be found whereby foreign affairs could be conducted without the necessity of the Secretary of State attending so many meetings held in various areas of the world. The Secretary pointed out that the carrying of this burden was becoming unbearable because of sheer physical limitations and that much as he should like to attend such a meeting (which he thought was a good idea), he could not make [Page 916] any commitment now. Casey then suggested that it would be helpful if it were to be made to appear that the Secretary would attend such a meeting and then, at the last minute, some valid excuse could be offered which would make his attendance impossible.
The Secretary, in developing his thought on the demands made on his time, moved to a more general observation on the lack of organization in our democracy to deal efficiently with “fighting a cold war”. He recalled his first attendance at an international meeting—The Hague Convention of 1907—at which time all of the “niceties” of fighting a war were discussed, and that up to the end of World War II, it was just a question of us being either at peace or at war. If we were at war, everyone pitched in [and] did his part regarding it somewhat in the nature of a “glorified game”. When we were not at war no one worried much about anything. Now, however, we are confronted with a situation where the USSR has, in the Communist Party, a really effective mechanism for fighting a cold war, while we have no similar organization to counter it. He pointed out that the planning of the Defense Department was directed primarily at an all out war—the CIA to “gathering information” and no organization of ours existed really to put forth a continuing, sustained effort in the cold war arena. The Secretary said that while he was confident that the military branch had plans to fight an all out war, the difficulty arose that in this era of neither war nor peace there were political decisions called for which sometimes involved military cooperation if not some military participation that might determine whether we do or do not have to fight a hot war. He observed that just the show of the American flag or a few soldiers at the proper place, at the proper time, might have a profound effect on the preservation or improvement of our position. It was in this field, he said, that the military did not seem to grasp the significance of our efforts or fully to understand the relationship of what we plan and do today in the many areas of the world as it relates to the question of whether we keep out of war or fail in that effort. He said he perhaps should not blame the military as such, however, as they were paid to be prepared to fight and naturally their major interest should be on preparation for that contingency. He added that he assumed this same problem was faced in greater or less degree by all the free world countries.
Mr. Casey asked the Secretary whether in his busy schedule it might be possible for him to have a half hour to talk with himself and Ambassador Munro of New Zealand on ANZUS matters. The Secretary replied that he was going to Washington tomorrow right after his address before the General Assembly of the UN and then to Europe, but that he saw no reason why a discussion couldn’t be arranged in Washington after his return from Europe.
[Page 917]In the course of conversation, Mr. Casey made reference to “my reservation on that matter that we had discussed with Menzies” and he asked the Secretary if he had any comment that he could communicate to Mr. Menzies on the subject. (The only clue as to what this “matter” was may be found in the reply made by the Secretary.) The Secretary replied that when he discussed with Mr. Eden the question of the position that should be taken on the type of aggression to which SEATO arrangements should be directed against, it was pin-pointed to that of Communist aggression. He said, however, that it subsequently developed that Eden had not thought the matter fully through from the British standpoint. The Secretary added that he thought it should be understood that we regard SEATO in the nature of a regional pact and that if the group in the region wished to broaden, by agreement among themselves, the nature of aggressive designs against which it wished to array itself, that might possibly be done. The United States interest in the area, however, was in stopping the aggressions of international communism. If the SEATO countries wished to go further they could then properly act as a regional group. The Secretary mentioned that there would probably be some difficulties with Pakistan, Great Britain and France in this connection. Mr. Casey thanked the Secretary for that observation which he said he would transmit to Prime Minister Menzies.
The Secretary also took occasion to mention that he had received some disquieting information that the French in Indo China may be playing with the Viet Minh.3 He was not sure whether this development involved high officials or only those on a lower level. This led to another observation on his part that in his recent trip to Europe he had encountered a large measure of distrust of Mendes-France, particularly in Italy and in France. (He specifically mentioned Monnet4 as being disturbed.) He said Adenauer5 did not fully share this distrust but rather thought Mendes-France was playing the role of a typical French politician and was trying to maneuver in a way that would redound to the benefit of Mendes-France.