Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 17, 1954—11:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (28). Of the Chiefs of Staff, only Admiral Radford and General Twining attended. MacArthur led the Department of State group. Gleason attended for the NSC Staff, and General Cabell and Robert Amory, Deputy Director for Intelligence, represented the CIA.]

1. Brief Review of the Manila Conference

Mr. MacArthur opened the meeting by giving the JCS a brief review of the Manila Conference, emphasizing State Department appreciation of the helpful role of the Defense Department representatives. He touched on the main difficulties faced by the US at the Conference: The desire for a precise definition of the type of aggression, that is, Communist aggression, which the US considered to be covered by the treaty; and the area covered. He referred to the problems inherent in developing the Manila Charter, and the statement regarding anticolonization; and to the developments with respect to the “Understanding of the U.S.A.”

Admiral Radford inquired if there had been any trouble in getting agreement for the Charter. Mr. MacArthur indicated the differences of view as between the Colonial and Asiatic powers on this subject.

With respect to Article 5, Mr. MacArthur outlined the problems concerned with the formula setting up the machinery for the operation of the treaty. He said that it was his feeling that we would very soon be approached by other signatories to implement Article 5, which would be considered a test of the Treaty, and that we must be sure that we know where we stand.

Admiral Radford inquired if this meant that we were to take these steps to implement the terms of the treaty even before it was ratified. Mr. MacArthur said that as far as the setting up of a council was concerned, this was so.

Admiral Radford then asked what we had to do in order to prepare for these preliminary talks. Admiral Davis indicated that ANZUS would serve us as a guide.

Reference was made to the fact that Australian Foreign Minister Casey was in Washington, and that he planned to talk to Admiral Radford. There was discussion on the security angle of such talks, and of the need to avoid any appearances of favoring the white, or Colonial, powers against the Asian. In this connection, Admiral Radford referred to the 5–power talks on Southeast Asia which have been taking place from time to time (Australia, New Zealand, France, United Kingdom and the United States), and it was agreed that it would be unwise to continue holding these talks at the present time.

Admiral Davis suggested that the U.S. check with the UK in a discreet, preliminary way on our mutual position with respect to Article 5 of the Manila Pact. Mr. MacArthur agreed, but added that we should also probably have some preliminary talks with Australia and New Zealand as well. To this Admiral Radford countered that it was more essential that we coordinate our position with Australia and New Zealand, who are much closer to us on these matters, than are the British.

Mr. MacArthur informed the JCS that any inquiries that we received on this subject through diplomatic channels would be co-ordinated with Admiral Davis; and he asked the JCS to inform the Department of State if similar information came to their attention through military channels. Admiral Radford agreed.

[Here follows discussion of Korea, Indochina, and MEDO.]

B. Australian Suggestion for Setting up Direct Representation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, With Reciprocal Arrangement for the Australians in the U.S.

Admiral Radford said that he had received a personal communication from Sir Frederick Shedden, Permanent Chairman of the Australian Defense Committee, asking for the Admiral’s views on the idea of setting up in Melbourne a direct representation of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a reciprocal arrangement for the Australians in the U.S.

Admiral Radford indicated that he was opposed to setting up any such organism, which could only lead to complications posed by probable request for similar representation from the Philippines, from New Zealand and from other countries. He indicated that he intended to inform Sir Frederick in this sense and that, although he did not believe there would be any further action necessary on this matter, nevertheless he felt that the State Department should be informed.

1. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of the participants.”