790.5/9–2354
Memorandum of Conversation, by Jack K. McFall, Adviser on European Affairs to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
Subject:
- Discussion on SEATO and ANZUS
Participants:
- Ambassador Munro—New Zealand
- Mr. Foss Shanahan—Deputy Secretary of External Affairs of New Zealand
- The Secretary
- Ambassador J. K. McFall
I attended a meeting of the above at the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf at 10 A.M. September 23rd. As Munro and Shanahan had come to their appointment a few minutes early, they were in conversation with the Secretary when I arrived. The following paragraph represents, therefore, their statement to me, subsequent to the meeting, as to the conversation that had taken place prior to my arrival.
Ambassador Munro opened the conversation by saying that he had heard of Australian Secretary of State for External Affairs Casey’s visit to the Secretary the day before and he wished the Secretary to know that he was familiar with the details of the Casey plan which had been outlined to the Secretary and while he had not yet had an opportunity to give it any extensive study, he believed, in principle, that it possessed merit. He had hoped, therefore, that some occasion could be arranged in the near future for a more extensive exploration of the idea. He stated that in his view both SEATO and ANZUS could be given greater vitality by more forward planning and, inasmuch as public opinion in New Zealand was all behind the idea of these two pacts, his country was prepared to move forward in any agreed way that would serve to breathe vitality into these instruments. (At this point, I entered the room and audited further discussion.) Ambassador Munro asked the Secretary, then, what his ideas were about further implementation of SEATO and specifically what his reactions were to the Casey proposal. The Secretary replied that, inasmuch as Casey had only presented his ideas to him the previous day, he had had no opportunity to think them through. The Secretary suggested that Munro and Shanahan might both profitably talk with Doug MacArthur about the idea.
The Secretary then proceeded to develop the matter of his concern with the situation developing in the Far East. He pointed out the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Indo China, repeated his suspicions [Page 919] of the French activities in Vietnam (see page 3, paragraph 2 of my memorandum of conversation dated September 22, 1954 between the Secretary and Mr. Casey)1 and suggested that it appeared that the French were about to “pull the rug out” from under Diem because he was not French-minded enough. He adverted to the fact that the French were still insisting that we pay French troop costs in Indo China and that any financial aid to the Vietnam government should be channeled through the French. He said that if we did not continue to pay the costs of the French troops, they would probably be withdrawn and a dangerous vacuum created.
This pointed up, the Secretary said, that we have not thought through what we do if Indo China is lost and the processes of disintegration then sets in in Indonesia—an area of crucial importance—important to New Zealand and Australia immediately because of their then being placed at once in the path of further communist aggressive design, and important to the U.S. as establishing an unfriendly base that would impede our Pacific Ocean operations and defense. What we do to deal with this aggressive communism that continually casts its shadow before, is, therefore, of prime importance. The forthcoming elections in Indonesia hold the seeds of possible serious trouble. Terrorism may well take place with the communists the beneficiaries and then what do we do? Munro suggested that he believed the key to that situation lay in the direction of working much closer with the Moslems in that country, although admitting that the fact that they were of the extreme right in political complexion did not make the suggestion easier of accomplishment. The Secretary replied that it was in just such instances as this that the need was pointed up for the President of the United States to have in his possession powers to act in order to save deteriorating situations by taking actions short of war. The Secretary then again discussed the question which I reported in detail in the memorandum of conversation of the previous day with Mr. Casey. (See page 2, paragraph 2 of this memorandum dated September 22, 1954.) That we were still thinking too much in the terms of Grotius2—of outmoded Hague Conventions—of a bugle sounding to call the opposing forces to battle—and were not devoting our every energy and thought as we should to how we gear our government to meet the new and unique challenge presented by the modern day concepts and realities of a cold war.
Ambassador Munro asked the Secretary whether the United States had any idea of committing any United States troops specifically [Page 920] to defense purposes envisaged by SEATO. The Secretary replied that it was not our intention specifically to so dedicate any of our troops or to dispose them just to serve the ends of SEATO. Rather we were endeavoring to centralize our troops dispositions (Japan and Hawaii we mentioned as groupment areas) and thus maintain a fluidity of approach in meeting any situation of danger that might arise in the Far East area. The withdrawal of our troops from Korea was in consonance with that concept. The Secretary then asked how New Zealand regarded their military obligations to SEATO in the light of their commitments to the U.K. for military assistance in the Near East. Mr. Shanahan answered this question by saying that he did not regard this question as one presenting any difficulty that couldn’t be solved. He said that the 1949 agreement with the U.K. called for New Zealand military support in the Near East conditioned upon no major change in the general strategic situation in which New Zealand were to find herself. Shanahan intimated that he believed there had indeed been a change in the general strategic situation since 1949 and that, therefore, if future military planning under SEATO were to call for military commitments in the Far East area in conflict with responsibilities of the 1949 agreement, then New Zealand would be entirely justified in assuming her new responsibility and would not anticipate any serious trouble in making her position understood.
The Secretary then mentioned the question of ratification of SEATO by the participating governments and gave it as his opinion that probably only Pakistan might demur at ratification. The Secretary added that he believed some kind of a temporary council meeting of the SEATO powers before the year is out would be profitable for all concerned.
Ambassador Munro said he believed an ANZUS meeting sometime in the near future, with the British present again as observer, would be desirable. The Secretary suggested that that subject be explored with Doug MacArthur in Washington. Munro and Shanahan agreed to do this.