790.5/9–1654
The Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Ambassador in Japan (Allison)
official–informall
Dear John: We understand that the pertinent sections of NSC 5429/2, Review of United States Policy in the Far East, which was approved by the NSC on August 20,1 are being transmitted under separate cover. Nevertheless, we believe you should have a little more of the background on the preparation of the paper and, in particular on Section II, 2 d, which reads that the United States should “encourage the conditions which will make possible the formation of, and be prepared to participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Southeast Asia security structure and ANZUS”.
NSC 5429/2 represents the Planning Board’s response to a directive from the President to prepare, before his departure for Denver, a review of the main features of our Far Eastern policy in the light of the outcome of the Geneva Conference. The paper was hastily executed and shows it. The most that can be said for the final paper is that it is some improvement over the original draft which was universally condemned as giving inadequate consideration to the major issues that face us in the Far East today. The paper in other respects is perhaps more realistic, as for example where it recommends the encouragement of an organization for Asian economic development, the negotiation of a Southeast Asia Pact and necessary ad hoc courses of action with a view to [Page 912] strengthening Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam against Communist pressures.
Returning, however, to the point raised in the first paragraph, the original State draft of July 302 read: “Encourage these countries (Republic of China, Japan, Republic of Korea and Philippines) to consult with one another and with us with respect to the formation of a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement to parallel and perhaps eventually be linked with the Southeast Asia defense arrangement.”
As though this were not unrealistic enough the Planning Board (August 3) improved upon it so as to read: “Encourage (with State proposing the insertions of ‘as feasible’) the formation and be prepared to participate in a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Southeast Asia security treaty and ANZUS”.3
The language quoted in the first paragraph of this letter represents the final, more realistic policy and one which represents a considerable victory for us in NA. I am not sure to what extent your reaction to the United Press’s version of the Secretary’s press statement on August 3 (your telegram 270)4 influenced the final decision. I can assure you your views coincided fully with ours.
Even the final language is to be interpreted with moderation. There is no question that the conditions making possible formation of a Northeast Asian pact (or perhaps better, a “horizontal” Western Pacific pact) require a greater sense of interdependence in the area than presently exists. The Secretary, of course, fully appreciates this. Until the Japanese are themselves ready to engage in such a pact, until Japan-Korea relations are placed on a more constructive foundation and until the reparations problem is settled between Japan and the Philippines, it is impossible to foresee any real sense of interdependence or to think of a security organization in the area. The long-term objective simply highlights the necessity of solving these immediate problems.
I hope the foregoing views shed some light on the paragraph in question, for reading it in the cold light of day without a little background might give you the impression that we are embarking on a more ambitious course than actually contemplated.
Sincerely yours,