Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/9–1554

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)

top secret

[Washington,] September 15, 1954.

Subject:

• Follow-Through on Manila Pact

1. During informal discussions with other Delegations at the Manila Conference, it became quite clear that they were all apprehensive in varying degrees as to what the US contemplated in terms of implementing the Southeast Asia Treaty. It was also apparent that they were fearful that the US might view the Treaty as an end in itself and might not wish to agree to steps which would make it a living reality rather than what one Delegation termed “a mere scrap of paper”. The view of the other seven treaty signatories is that the US took the leadership in working out the Treaty, and therefore they are looking to us to show leadership in implementing it and seeing to it that it becomes a living thing.

2. There are several points on which we must expect our other Manila Pact partners to query us on in the next two or three weeks. These are:

a. When the Council should hold its first meeting;

b. Level of representation;

c. Where the Council should meet;

d. How, organizationally, we envisage implementing Article V of the Treaty providing for military and other planning;

e. Economic cooperation as provided in Article III.

3. The following considerations seem pertinent with respect to the above five points:

a. First meeting of the Council. The first question which arises with respect to this point is whether the Council should meet before or after entry into effect of the Treaty. Since the necessary ratifications to bring the Treaty into effect will probably not be completed for six to eight months, should the US take the position that there should be no Council meeting until after entry into effect of the Treaty, its Manila partners would most certainly view this with alarm and as tending to confirm their suspicion that we did not intend to breathe life into the Treaty. Therefore, it seems most important, if other of our Manila partners suggest an early meeting of the Council, that we take a positive approach by suggesting a first Council meeting perhaps about mid-November. This would give two months in which to shape our own ideas and to consult with our other Treaty partners regarding possible organizational arrangements.

b. Level of representation at first meeting. In view of the desperately heavy demands on the Secretary’s time, particularly with respect to the critical situation in Europe which will probably require his presence in Europe in September-October and again early in December for the NATO Annual Review,¹ it would not seem feasible to contemplate having the Secretary attend the Council meeting. Furthermore, the same considerations would probably govern with respect to the Foreign Ministers of Britain and France. In the light of these considerations, it would seem appropriate, and I believe would be understood by our Asian partners, for the Under Secretary to represent the United States.

c. Place of meeting. Psychologically, it seems very important that the meeting be held in the Treaty area. Bangkok would be a logical place. Not only should such a meeting strengthen the Thai Government, but it should also give the people of Thailand, who are directly threatened by subversion, a feeling of confidence which should strengthen their will to resist Communist infiltration and subversion. Furthermore, Thailand is an Asian partner.

d. Organizational arrangements to implement Article V. This presents a difficult problem in terms of presenting the US in a role of constructive leadership. On the one hand, security considerations would inhibit our ability to get into detailed war planning on an eight-nation basis. On the other hand, any indication to our Asian partners that the white members of the Manila Pact are engaging in secret military planning under the Treaty, to the exclusion of the Asian Members, would have the most profound political and psychological repercussions and might result in the disintegration of the Manila partnership. The Western nations would certainly be charged with undertaking planning to the exclusion of the Asians with the purpose of using Asian bodies as cannon fodder in any hostilities.

What seems to be required is some arrangement of an ad hoc nature whereby military planners of the eight powers could meet together from time-to-time to exchange intelligence information, to effect such coordination and exchanges of views as might be appropriate in the logistical field, and perhaps to engage in other general military planning of a non-Top Secret character, including training and the establishment of a security system for information and documents. On the side, perhaps using the ANZUS framework, any secret military planning or exchanges of views which seemed desirable from the US viewpoint might be undertaken with the UK also included. It would be imperative, however, that this type of activity, under the ANZUS or any other limited umbrella, not be related under the Manila Pact in any way which might become public. In order for us to have the other Manila powers agree to the type of planning and organizational arrangements which we wish, it would seem essential that these four powers take at least more or less the same position. In this connection, it might also be possible for our US military people in the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan to influence the military of these three countries in the direction of our own thinking prior to a Council meeting.

Finally, it is quite clear that the earnest of our sincerity in implementing the Manila Pact will be judged by our other partners in light of our willingness to set up some sort of military planning arrangements of a constructive nature.

e. Economic Cooperation as provided in Article III. Regarding economic cooperation, it is important that the US develop a position in the light of present studies which are taking place within the US Government, and taking into account such views of the Members and other Asian countries as may be ascertained at the Ottawa meeting of the Colombo Plan powers, and through diplomatic channels.

1. Dulles arrived in Paris on Dec. 15 to attend the Fifteenth Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 17–18. The Secretary arrived back in Washington on Dec. 20. For documentation on this meeting, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 549 ff.