Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Secretary’s Memoranda, lot 53 D 444

¹

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State.²

secret

[Washington,] June 20, 1952.

Subject:

• Pacific Security Council

Participants:

• Prime Minister Menzies
• Ambassador Spender
• Mr. Alan Watt, Secretary, Department of External Affairs
• The Secretary
• Mr. George Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State, EUR
• Mr. John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State, FE
• Mr. Hayden Raynor, Director, BNA

Prime Minister Menzies called this afternoon accompanied by Ambassador Spender and Mr. Alan Watt, Secretary of External Affairs. The entire discussion related to the problem incident to the development of the Australian-New Zealand-United States Security Pact.

[Here follows discussion of arrangements for the ANZUS (then Pacific) Council meeting.]

U.K. Observer Relationship

I told the Prime Minister that I had heard from Ambassador Munro of New Zealand and from Mr. Eden through Ambassador Franks on this question, both of them advocating some form of observer status for the U.K.³ I asked him if he could tell me what his position was on this and something of his conversations in London on it. The Prime Minister replied that Mr. Eden had raised this with him in London and that he had said that while it was a step which Australia would welcome he thought it might create some difficulties, especially for the U.S. as it might result in requests for similar status from other countries in the area such as the Philippines, Indonesia and etc. Mr. Watt added that he had pointed out these difficulties in several conversations down the line in the Foreign Office but had found an absence of appreciation of them in those quarters. I agreed that the proposal created difficulties and expressed the view that it might be better to take no action on the question at the moment in view of these difficulties. The Prime Minister agreed stating that he was apprehensive that if we tried to iron this out now it might mean a delay in the first meeting. I observed that if we all decided this were wise, it was something which might be approached gradually. I said at some point a subject might be on the agenda on which we all felt it would be helpful to have U.K. participation in the discussion. I said at such a time the U.K. might be invited to participate in such a discussion on an ad hoc basis which might set a precedent for some form of relationship. In the meantime, I said there was nothing to prevent and that on the contrary all of us no doubt would desire to keep the U.K. fully informed on all developments. The Prime Minister commented that he felt this was in part a prestige move on the part of the U.K. and in part a political move by Mr. Eden as he had taken the position the U.K. should have been included in the treaty arrangements when he was in opposition. He added, however, that he was sincerely convinced that Mr. Eden believed the U.K. should have some such relationship with the organization. There was full agreement to take no action on this now and to place the item on the agenda of the first meeting for further discussion. I said I would talk to Mr. Eden in this sense when I saw him next week in London.

Pact Machinery

The Prime Minister asked for our views on the question of what machinery we felt it would be appropriate to establish in order to implement effectively the treaty. I said this was a matter we were now studying and discussing with the Defense Department and we hoped to have our views developed shortly. Messrs. Perkins and Raynor explained that we hoped to establish in the next week or so a working group on the agenda consisting of representatives of the two Embassies and of the Department and that this group could develop proposals on the question of machinery. The Prime Minister concurred and agreed that this subject should be on the agenda of the first meeting and that proposals should be developed which could be put to the Ministers at the first meeting for their consideration.

Relationship with NATO

The Prime Minister assisted by Ambassador Spender developed again the Australian concept that they should have a right to be heard in NATO when matters directly affecting their interests were under consideration. I again questioned, as I had at our previous meeting, the fundamental concept on which this thinking was based, i.e., that NATO did not get into global questions and etc. Although the Australians in no sense withdrew their request, there was some indication in the conversation that if the new treaty arrangement is developed so that it can discuss world-wide questions in addition to questions involving only the Pacific that this might satisfy the Australian position. The matter was left that this question would also be included on the agenda of the first meeting of the Council.

1. Chronological collections of the Secretary’s memoranda, memoranda of conversation, and memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1947–1953, as maintained and retired by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
2. Drafted by Raynor. Prime Minister Menzies was in Washington June 18–22.

3. In a briefing memorandum to the Secretary, June 17, Perkins had written:

   “The chief reason why EUR and FE are opposed to the suggestion is that its adoption would open us to pressure from the Filipinos, the French, and others, who would also feel entitled to send observers. It would be difficult to admit a U.K. representative and exclude the others, particularly the Filipino.

   “As a matter of fact, we have reason to believe that the Australians themselves are opposed to the attendance of a U.K. observer. We do not know how Mr. Menzies will put this to you but it is our guess that he will not be surprised or particularly unhappy if you tell him that you think we should hold off, at least at present.” (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 115)