Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] June 25, 1952.

Background

The NSC 124 has been in negotiation at all levels for many months. It has actually come before the Council itself once before, on March 5, 1952. At that time the Council in NSC Action No. 614¹ considered NSC 124 and: (a) ordered the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare studies on the diplomatic and military courses of action to be followed on the assumption that an identifiable aggression in Southeast Asia had occurred; (b) directed the NSC Staff to prepare a new paper recommending courses of action based on the assumption that an identifiable aggression did not occur and that we would be faced with continued deterioration in Indochina and; (c) referred NSC 124 back to the NSC Staff for redrafting in the light of the above studies.

The studies called for by the Council’s directive were prepared by the Department and the JCS but before they could be considered by the Council itself they were overtaken by the following principal sequence of events:

(a) The Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Secretary of State under covering letter of May 1, 1952, a memorandum from the Joint Secretaries to the Secretary of Defense dealing with Indo-china primarily and Southeast Asia generally.²

(b) A background paper on Indochina (the Stelle paper) was prepared in the Department in S/P, on the Secretary’s instructions and in response to the Joint Secretaries’ memorandum. Its final draft is dated May 21, 1952.³

(c) On May 19, 1952, a White House Conference was held with the President, the Secretary, Secretary Lovett and General Bradley during which the subjects of Indochina and Southeast Asia generally were reviewed and a series of conclusions regarding our future courses of action were arrived at. These included a decision that NSC 124 should be acted upon as soon as possible, that changes to the then existing draft should be made in keeping with the White House Conference decisions rather than, necessarily, the suggestions made by the Department and JCS in response to Council Action 614.

In accordance with the Directive from the White House the Senior Staff Assistants were instructed to prepare a new draft. A new draft was accordingly prepared which provided for courses of action in Southeast Asia whether an identifiable aggression is committed or not. The new draft was agreed to by the Staff Assistants with the exception of portions of paragraphs 8 and 10. Accordingly the paper was referred to the Senior Staff with alternate drafts for those two paragraphs.⁴ One was prepared in the Department by FE and the other in the Department of Defense by Messrs. Hoopes and Noyes. The two drafts were reconciled at a full meeting of the Senior Staff itself on June 19th resulting in the “Buff draft of that date.⁵ (The intermediate phase of clearing through the Steering Group of the Senior Staff had been bypassed to gain time in an effort to make it possible for the Secretary to have an approved document by the time he left for London on June 22.)

Department’s Position on Draft of June 19th as Submitted to the Senior Staff Meeting on June 24th.

When the June 19th draft, as approved by the Senior Staff, was presented to the Secretary he raised objections to portions of it and instructed G, FE, S/P and C to suggest drafting changes to the Senior Staff prior to the Council Meeting of June 25. A Senior Staff meeting was accordingly held on June 24th when the Department’s proposals were presented. They were three in number:

1. Paragraph 10c(3). In the previous draft of NSC 124, dated June 11, 1952, paragraph 10c(1) had a provision in the last sentence to the effect that although the US would “provide air and naval assistance as practicable, no ground forces would be provided”. At the Senior Staff Meeting of June 19th the JCS representative, Admiral Wooldridge, submitted a suggested change calling for striking out the restriction on the use of US ground forces in 10c(1) and adding on to paragraph 10c(3) the final clause “and to carry the burden of providing, in conjunction with the Associated States, the ground forces for the defense of Indochina”. The change was approved by the Senior Staff but without realizing at the time that the new drafting would have committed the UK as well as France to, “carry the burden of providing, in conjunction with the Associated States, the ground forces for the defense of Indochina”. In actual fact it was never anyone’s intention that this burden should be carried by anyone but France, in conjunction with the Associated States. It is therefore suggested that in the fifth line of paragraph 10c(3) the word “France” be injected between the words “and” and “to” so that the last clause of the sentence will read “and France to carry the burden of providing, in conjunction with the Associated States, the ground forces for the defense of Indochina”. This change was accepted by the Senior Staff.

2. Naval Blockade. One of the most controversial provisions of the paper in its various recent drafts has been the handling of the question of a naval blockade of Communist China following an aggression in Southeast Asia. The Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff had been inclined to demand that the institution of a naval blockade be a precondition to US agreement to the joint warning to Communist China proposed in paragraph 7d. The Secretary had suggested that the provision for the naval blockade be tagged on to the end of paragraph 13 of the June 19th draft as a final clause reading: “including the establishment of a naval blockade of Communist China”.⁶ This was argued back and forth in the June 24th Senior Staff meeting and the following compromise was agreed to and accepted by the Senior Staff:

Paragraph 11(1) to be deleted in its present form and replaced by the following: “If agreement is reached pursuant to paragraph 7e, establishment, in conjunction with France and Britain, of a naval blockade of Communist China”.

3. Provocation of USSR by Means of Retaliatory Action Against China. The Secretary was disturbed by the provisions of paragraph 12 on the ground that the last clause stating that the US should avoid “insofar as practicable those targets proximate to the boundary of USSR” was not restrictive enough.⁷ Our policy in the matter of retaliatory action against China in the event of an aggression of Southeast Asia is that although we advocate taking strong and immediate action to oppose an aggression against Southeast Asia from Communist China, including military action against communication lines, supply dumps, marshalling areas, etc., in China itself, our purpose is to combat the aggression where it occurs and whence it is being supplied. It is not to unseat the Peiping regime or take any other steps which would in our opinion cause the Chinese to invoke the Sino-Soviet pact or otherwise bring about the USSR’s direct involvement in the war.

The Secretary had suggested that the following be added to paragraph 12 of the June 19th draft, “or other military actions which would materially increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement”. This was presented to the Senior Staff meeting of June 24. The Joint Chief’s representative pointed out that this change was a caveat of such general nature as to vitiate the main policy decision 124/1. The following compromise was therefore agreed to: The last clause of paragraph 12 of the June 19th draft to be added to, to read as follows: “avoid insofar as practicable those targets proximate to the boundary of the USSR in order not to increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement”.

Other relatively minor changes to the June 19th draft were also agreed to at the Senior Staff meeting of June 24. They are listed in the attached NSC memorandum of June 25, 1952.⁸ They are all self-explanatory with the possible exception of that of paragraph 3, listed as number 2 on the attached NSC memorandum. The second sentence of paragraph 3 of the June 19th draft was deleted and the suggested new wording added at the instigation of the JCS. The new wording is taken verbatim from the Staff Study section of NSC 124. Its purpose is self-evident.

All the suggested changes listed on the attached memorandum from the NSC of June 25th have, therefore, now been accepted by the Senior Staff. In addition the concurrence of the JCS has now been received and is attached.⁹ The Secretary was informed of the major changes to paragraphs 11 and 12 in the Department’s Tosec telegram No. 15, Niact, June 24, to AmEmbassy London.¹⁰ In that message the Secretary was told that in the matter of the suggested change to paragraph 12, although the Department’s suggested wording was not accepted we find the final wording “in order not to increase the risk of direct Soviet involvement” acceptable and believe that there is no question but that the Defense and JCS are in full agreement with us against any unnecessary risk of Soviet involvement.

Unless comment is received from the Secretary today there now remains nothing but to obtain the final approval of the Council itself and the President to NSC 124 as it now stands. It is, therefore, recommended that you give the Department’s concurrence to NSC approval of the paper and its submission to the President today. We are informed that following any favorable action by the Council the President is prepared to consider the paper immediately in order to make it possible for the Secretary to have an approved NSC-Presidential position for the remainder of his conversations with the French and the British in London.

1. See footnote 7, p. 75.
2. For text of the letter with enclosures, see vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 113.
3. For text, see vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 150.
4. Reference is to the draft, June 11, p. 107.
5. Reference is to NSC 124/1, not printed.
6. In an earlier version of this memorandum, dated the previous day, Allison had explained the Secretary’s suggestion as follows: “The Secretary believed that the naval blockade provision was out of place in paragraph 11 and was much better placed in paragraph 13 where it could be included as one of the steps the US could consider taking unilaterally in the event the concurrence of the UK and France to expand military action against Communist China following the actions listed in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 were not obtained.” (751G.00/6–2452)
7. Paragraph 12 of NSC 124/1 is identical to paragraph 12 of the June 11 draft.
8. Memorandum from Lay to the NSC, not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167)
9. Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, June 24, signed by General Bradley for the JCS, is an enclosure to the memorandum of the same date from Lay to the NSC, neither printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167)
10. Not printed. (S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167)