Office of the Historian

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167

Memorandum by the Department of State Member on the NSC Staff (Schwartz) to the Counselor (Bohlen)

top secret
[Washington,] June 20, 1952.

Subject:

  • Southeast Asia

The Senior Staff yesterday discussed or rather debated the June 11 draft on Southeast Asia.1 John Allison and I are of the opinion that by and large we came back with rather than on Southeast Asia as directed by you.

Both State and Defense argued for a Council meeting on the resultant paper for next Wednesday the 25th, primarily on the grounds that the Secretary of State would be in a rather anomalous position the following day during the tripartite talks2 if this were not done. Admiral Wooldridge3 finally agreed but was most unhappy about what this would mean for the Joint Staff and the Services. Frank Nash is going over to Paris next Thursday and Messrs. Jessup and Nitze are going to accompany the Secretary and cables can be sent to them right after the Council meeting regarding the outcome.

We had quite a battle over the subparagraphs 8d, e and f but though some of the language in the compromise is messy, we felt [Page 116] that it would not do any harm; and it was perfectly apparent that Frank Nash felt that he had to insist on some of the words like “aggressive” in order to get the final paper through the Joint Secretaries and Mr. Foster without too much of an uproar.4 At any rate there is no longer an implication of a quid pro quo and it was clearly understood that State is not to be tied down on its political tactics.

We had complete success with the naval blockade by taking it out of 10c and putting it in 7e and 11 so that it is no longer a precondition to a joint warning. Admiral Wooldridge fought fiercely enough on this point to indicate that the Joint Chiefs’ comments may bring it up again but it is going to the Council without brackets. Our tactical position was that we had no quarrel with a naval blockade with Communist China as a course of action and that the Secretary would strive mightily to gain the agreement of France and the UK for the course prior to the issue of a warning and certainly prior to the events which might make it necessary but that he should not as a negotiator be inflexibly tied down by formal NSC action in such a way that if agreement were per chance not obtained there could be no warning at all.

To our surprise, considering the history of the phrase, Admiral Wooldridge asked that we remove the words “but no ground forces” from 10c(1) and express the same thought in 10c(4) in a positive fashion.5 He said that the Joint Chiefs might reverse him on this but he felt it was entirely too negative a manner in which to state the military position. Needless to say, no one argued with him.

H[arry] H. S[chwartz]
  1. Reference is to the draft of NSC 124, p. 107.↩
  2. Acheson left Washington June 22 and arrived in London June 23 for talks with the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom. After leaving London June 28, he proceeded to Berlin, Vienna, and Rio de Janerio, arriving back in Washington July 9. Regarding his trip, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1544.↩
  3. Rear Adm. Edmund T. Wooldridge, USN, Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Senior Staff, NSC.↩
  4. The paper which resulted from the meeting discussed here is NSC 124/1, June 19, not printed. Paragraph 8 in NSC 124/1 is identical to paragraph 8 in NSC 124/2, June 25, p. 129.↩

  5. In NSC 124/1, the numbered subsections of paragraph 10c read as follows:

    • “(1) A resolute defense of Indochina itself to which the United States would provide such air and naval assistance as might be practicable.
    • “(2) Interdiction of Chinese Communist communication lines.
    • “(3) The United States would expect to provide the major forces for task (2) above; but would expect the UK and France to provide at least token forces therefor and to render such other assistance as is normal between allies, and to carry the burden of providing, in conjunction with the Associated States, the ground forces for the defense of Indochina.”

    The remainder of paragraph 10 in NSC 124/1 is in substance identical to paragraph 10 in the NSC 124 draft of June 11, p. 111.

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