Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 210th Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Thursday, August 12, 1954¹

[Extracts]

top secret eyes only

August 12, 1954

Present at this meeting were The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 4); the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 5 and 6); General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Vice Admiral Gardner for the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Pate for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 5 and 6); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State (for Items 1, 2 and 3); Marshall Smith, Department of Commerce (for Item 1); Walter S. Delany, Foreign Operations Administration (for Item 1); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

6. Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East (NSC 5429; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, Subject: “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia”, dated July 19, 1954; Progress Report, dated July 12, 1954, by the OCB on NSC 171/1; Progress Report, dated July 16, 1954, by the OCB on NSC 146/2; Progress Report, dated July 29, 1954, by the OCB on NSC 5409; Progress Report, dated August 6, 1954, by the OCB on NSC 5405)²

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of NSC 5429 and the reference Progress Reports. He also noted that NSC 5416 (entitled “U.S. Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East”) had been considered by the Planning Board in the preparation of NSC 5429. Mr. Cutler said that NSC 5429 was a new kind of paper in that the action part of the paper was less than eight pages long. He then explained the four parts into which the statement of policy was divided, and briefly characterized Annexes A, B and C. He added that some policies contained in the report were long-range in character, but that a prompt decision was needed on the other paragraphs, particularly those relating to Indochina. Mr. Cutler said that on the basis of Council action on this report, individual country papers relating to the Far East would be revised by the Planning Board from time to time.

The Council then considered NSC 5429 paragraph by paragraph. Secretary Dulles remarked that the formation of a Western Pacific defense arrangement, referred to in paragraph 1–c, would not be easy. We were working toward the conditions which would make such an arrangement possible, but we could not establish those conditions immediately. He felt, however, that the bracketed language in paragraph 1–c should be included in the paper, and Secretary Wilson agreed. Mr. Hughes³ asked whether the policies in paragraph 1 implied a budgetary commitment. Mr. Cutler said that individual country papers on the Far East would contain financial appendices indicating the order of magnitude of our expenditures in each case.

Secretary Dulles then suggested that the order of paragraphs 1–a and 1–d should be reversed. He said that while he favored an increase in the military strength of Japan, such a policy would be no sure cure for our troubles there. We should not build up Japanese military strength unless we had confidence that Japan’s future political orientation would be toward the West. Japan was the heart and soul of the situation in the Far East. If Japan is not on our side our whole Far Eastern position will become untenable.

The Vice President felt that no paper was more fundamental than NSC 5429. He thought it would be unwise to make final decisions on Far Eastern policy on the basis of an hour’s discussion. Indeed, he thought this subject was worth three hours of the Council’s time. He added that he felt things were often adopted without adequate consideration. Perhaps the Council should run through the paper at this meeting, and then restudy it before finally adopting it. Mr. Cutler said it had been felt desirable to bring this report to the Council for action at a time when the President was in Washington. He thought that at the very least it would be desirable to reach a decision today on those paragraphs relating to Indochina. Further consideration might then be given to the remainder of the paper.

Secretary Wilson expressed general agreement with the Vice President, and suggested that the paper should be referred back to the Planning Board for revision.

The President remarked that all the papers that came before the Council were important. He said the Council must not shoot from the hip, but that it was necessary to reach some decisions and that this was the place to reach them. He felt that since his inauguration the NSC had been raised to a higher place in government. While he agreed with much that the Vice President had said, he wanted to continue going through NSC 5429 at this meeting.

The Council then considered Section II, “General Political and Economic Measures”. Secretary Dulles said the great danger in the Far East was subversion, which was furthered by economic weakness and social distress. Delay in getting started on a program which would help alleviate such economic weakness and social distress would be dangerous. He called particular attention to the importance of Japanese trade with the U.S. and with Southeast Asia, and said that Japan had given some indication of an intention to draw back from its pro-Western orientation until it could appraise the effect of the loss of parts of Indochina on Japanese trade. The President said that the Far Eastern nations should get together themselves and form an economic grouping, and only then should ask us for assistance. He thought we sometimes offered too much too far in advance. Governor Stassen agreed that the initiative for a Far Eastern economic grouping should come from Asia.

Secretary Dulles referred to the origins of the Marshall Plan. He said that Secretary Marshall had tipped off Europe that we would render assistance, but that the initiative otherwise had come from Europe. The President said he would prefer that there not be any public tip-off. If we wanted to let the Far Eastern countries know that we would help them, we should pass the word to them through diplomatic channels. Governor Stassen remarked that Asian countries frequently required a great deal of guidance behind the scenes.

Dr. Flemming⁴ asked how the exchange of persons program, referred to in paragraph 5, compared with Communist programs. Mr. Cutler replied that the Chinese Communist program in Asia was much larger than ours. The President suggested that paragraph 5 should begin “Develop and make more effective”. Mr. Allen Dulles called attention to the problem of building up educational facilities in free China. He asked whether paragraph 5 was intended to cover cultural activities. The Vice President asked whether paragraph 5 was intended to cover propaganda. He felt we should devise a dramatic new program rather than make small changes in old programs. Perhaps paragraph 5 should be deleted because it did not deal adequately with the problem, and a new program, covering information, cultural relations, propaganda and education, should be inserted elsewhere.

Mr. Cutler invited the Council’s attention to Section III of NSC 5429. In connection with paragraph 7, relating to a Southeast Asia security treaty, he pointed out that subparagraphs a through d characterized the treaty in layman’s language, but were not an attempt to draft the articles of the treaty. The President asked who would get that kind of treaty through the Senate. Mr. Cutler said that task would presumably fall to Secretary Dulles.

Secretary Dulles was certain the Senate would not approve a treaty which gave a blank check to the President or to any foreign nation to put the United States into war. Secretary Dulles personally agreed with Alternative A of subparagraph a as long as the decision to pull the trigger rested with the U.S. and as long as President Eisenhower’s Administration was in office. However, he thought other countries would not agree to Alternative A, and even if they did he was not sure it was desirable, because countries other than the United States could in effect decide that the United States must go to war.

The President remarked that since the Civil War there had been only one war in which the United States participated which had evoked continuous and vociferous criticism from the American public. This was the Korean war. The President thought that a democracy such as the U.S. could not be led into war unless public opinion so overwhelmingly favored war that a Congressional declaration of war was merely an automatic registering of public opinion. Mr. Cutler pointed out that paragraph 7 referred to overt armed aggression by Communist China. The President said that in the event of Chinese Communist aggression, decisions as to U.S. action could not be reached instantaneously. There would be time to call a special session of Congress and to ask it to make the decision. He was doubtful about the wisdom of Alternative A.

Governor Stassen said that the treaty would condition the thinking of all states concerned, and would clearly indicate that certain territory was regarded as vital. He inquired whether an approach similar to the NATO approach would be desirable. Secretary Dulles said that he had invented the term “constitutional processes” to avoid a repetition of the NATO debate in Congress. Another debate similar to the NATO debate might result in a treaty not being approved. He tended to favor Alternative B. The President said that any President would be foolish to get the country into war without the consent of Congress. He thought that Alternative B might say that each signatory to the treaty would regard an armed attack as dangerous to its vital interests, and would immediately mobilize to take counter action. Secretary Dulles said that if Congress agreed in advance that an attack on a certain area was dangerous to the U.S., the discretion of the President to use armed forces against the aggressor would be enlarged.

Secretary Wilson thought we should not back into a war over Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the line to be drawn in a Southeast Asia security treaty would leave these three states the beneficiaries of united action against an aggressor. He noted that the treaty would not commit us to deployment of troops in these states for local defense. He thought Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam should be included as areas an attack on which would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the treaty signatories.

Secretary Wilson said he did not particularly like paragraph 7–b. The President said paragraph 7–b appears to mean that the President now has the authority to act promptly in an emergency. The President thought, however, that any President who acted on his own in an emergency should subsequently bring the question before Congress. He suggested the clause “without need for further congressional action” might be omitted from subparagraph b. Secretary Dulles pointed out that if an armed attack occurred in Europe we would take counter action under Presidential authority if there was not time for Congressional action. Governor Stassen felt that if we went too far in the direction of placating Congress, we would lead the Soviets to think that they could commit aggression with impunity. The President said he wanted to decide what to do at the time the aggression occurred. He feared that if planning staffs began to plan on their own interpretations of vital interests and automatic counter action, this country might get into a mess. He wanted the term “constitutional processes” retained in the paper, and thought that action without Congressional consent should not be taken unless such action was necessary in order for the United States to survive.

Mr. Allen Dulles wondered whether paragraph 7–c was clear. Secretary Dulles said that a coalition could not be organized after an aggression started; it must be formed beforehand. He suggested that the phrase “in accordance with the treaty” be inserted in paragraph 7–c.

Turning to paragraph 8, relating to local subversion, Secretary Dulles said he preferred Alternative B, but felt that its language could be improved. Did Alternative B imply a commitment to send U.S. military forces into the area, or a commitment to assist the military forces of the state attacked? Mr. Cutler said the intent of the paragraph was the use of U.S. military forces. Secretary Wilson pointed out that if this policy were adopted, U.S. forces would have to be increased. Secretary Dulles noted that paragraph 8 did not propose a treaty commitment for local defense. Governor Stassen said that the policy proposed was that of being prepared to assist a local government to defeat Communist subversion. A decision to act would, however, be taken at the time rather than in advance. As an example, he mentioned Sumatra. He said that if this island should be taken over by local Communists we should be prepared to clean up the situation.

The Vice President called attention to the language “either unilaterally or under the terms of a security treaty” in Alternative B. He asked whether a provision for assistance to a state which was the victim of local subversion would be incorporated in a Southeast Asia treaty. Secretary Dulles said an attempt was being made to include in a Southeast Asia treaty provisions relating to internal as well as external aggression. However, the article on internal aggression would probably provide for no action stronger than consultation among the signatories. Secretary Wilson felt that it was necessary to make a distinction among various countries in the Far East. For example, we might support a military action in the Philippines when we would not support such action in Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam. He thought we had never had a vital interest in the latter countries. Secretary Dulles wished to emphasize the thought that the U.S. policy on helping defeat local Communist subversion would require us to have military forces in combat readiness and be willing to send them to the scene of the subversion. This was not a decision to be taken casually. Dr. Flemming agreed the decision was not a casual one, but asked what the alternative was. The President said paragraph 8 warned the planners to get ready because we might have to take action in the event of Communist subversion. However, the Council would decide, at the time a situation arose, whether or not U.S. forces would be used.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the provisions of paragraph 8 might become operative before the ink in the paragraph was dry. He referred particularly to the dangerous situation in Indochina. Governor Stassen wondered whether the paragraph should not read “be prepared within the level of forces approved by the NSC”. Secretary Dulles felt there was an ambiguity in the word “prepared”. Did it mean we “intended” to take action, or did it mean we were “physically ready” to take action? Dr. Flemming opposed tying our policy to existing force level. He thought paragraph 8 meant we should be prepared to act if necessary and feasible.

The President said we would have to stick to a system of defense that could be sustained for 40 years if necessary, in order to avoid transforming the U.S. into an armed camp. Secretary Wilson believed we should not trap ourselves into going to war in Southeast Asia to save South Vietnam. Mr. Cutler pointed out that the course of action in the paper was required to meet the contingency most likely to arise—namely, local subversion. Secretary Dulles wondered whether paragraph 8 did not add commitments which U.S. armed forces could not carry out at their present levels. The President said he was frankly puzzled by the problem of helping defeat local subversion without turning the U.S. into an armed camp.

Secretary Dulles then speculated on a somewhat different approach to the problem. If feasible he would like to say to the Communists, “If you move into Southeast Asia we will move into Hainan”, rather than commit ourselves to local defense or to general war. Secretary Dulles characterized this as a policy of “tit for tat”, but added that he didn’t know how such a policy could be implemented. The President said that the country would have to be behind any action taken by our military forces. The problem was one of defining the conditions under which the President would go to Congress and ask for a declaration of war.

Dr. Flemming thought the paper might contain a paragraph which said that we viewed local subversion in so grave a light that the President would immediately seek from Congress authority for action along a number of possible lines, including action such as that suggested by Secretary Dulles against Hainan, sending U.S. forces to assist the local government, or war against Communist China.

Secretary Dulles wished an opportunity to review at a later meeting a new paragraph 8, revised in the light of the discussion. Mr. Cutler read a revised paragraph 8, and it was agreed that this paragraph should be reviewed by the Council at its next meeting.

Secretary Dulles was concerned about paragraph 9–a. He had not believed there was any way to bring about a non-Communist victory in any all-Vietnam elections. He thought our real objective should be to avoid having any such elections. Secretary Wilson asked if we were going to undermine the Geneva agreements. Secretary Dulles pointed out that we did not become a party to these agreements. The President agreed with Secretary Dulles that paragraph 9–a might be ended with the language “prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections”.

Secretary Dulles felt that the word “insist” in paragraph 9–b was too peremptory. We have so many of our interests bound up with France that we could not afford to be peremptory. We don’t want satellites; we want allies or equal partners. Secretary Dulles suggested we delete “in every way”, and change “insist” to “urge”.

Secretary Dulles also thought paragraph 9–c should include the words “wherever advantageous to the United States”.

Mr. Cutler read a proposed revision of paragraph 9–f from the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum distributed at the meeting⁵ (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). The President said he felt the paragraph as it appeared in NSC 5429 was all right.

Turning to paragraph 9–g, Secretary Dulles said he preferred Alternative A, with the bracketed words included. Mr. Tuttle⁶ pointed out that under Alternative D the Treasury would be required immediately to freeze assets under the trading-with-the-enemy act.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the JCS memorandum proposed the deletion of both alternatives for paragraph 10–d. Governor Stassen felt it was important to make a dramatic counter move in Thailand. He thought we could cover a withdrawal from Korea and at the same time make such a counter move if we showed the flag in Thailand. Secretary Dulles noted that pursuant to a recent decision the U.S. Fleet would become more active off the China coast. The President thought we should search for ways to give positive evidence of our concern for Thailand. Elimination of paragraph 10–d would be no bar to action. He requested the Secretary of State to study the situation and recommend means of showing the people of Thailand our intention to prevent further Communist expansion.

Mr. Cutler asked whether the Council now wished to approve Sections I, II and III (except for paragraph 8) of NSC 5429, and whether another meeting could be held on Wednesday, August 18, to consider paragraph 8 and Section IV of the paper. The President said this arrangement would be satisfactory to him.

Secretary Dulles was not sure that he would be ready for decisions on this paper by next Wednesday. The President felt that a general discussion would be useful, in any event. Dr. Flemming said he would like to have a decision focussed on where the line against aggression must be drawn. Secretary Dulles said that in the Southeast Asia treaty it was proposed to draw the line to include Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam on our side. The theory of the treaty was that if the Communists breached the line we would attack Communist China. Secretary Wilson felt it would be difficult to include Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam on our side of the line, because their loss would not be a loss to us, inasmuch as they had never belonged to us. Secretary Dulles referred to his public warnings that overt Chinese Communist aggression would result in U.S. counter action. Governor Stassen felt that a gain by the Communists was a loss to us, no matter where it occurred. The President agreed, and said that some time we must face up to it: We can’t go on losing areas of the free world forever.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the statement of policy in NSC 5429, the comments thereon of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (as circulated at the meeting), and the reference reports by the Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in Sections I, II and III (except paragraph 8) of NSC 5429, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Paragraph 1–c: Include the bracketed wording.

(2) Paragraph 1–d: Insert 1–d as 1–a, and reletter other paragraphs accordingly.

(3) Paragraph 5: Reword as follows:

“5. Develop and make more effective information, cultural, education and exchange programs for the countries concerned.”

(4) Paragraph 7–a: Insert Alternative B reworded as follows:

“Commit each member to treat an armed attack on the agreed area (including Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam) as dangerous to its own peace, safety and vital interests, and to act promptly to meet the common danger in accordance with its own constitutional processes.”

(5) Paragraph 7–b: Delete “, without need for further Congressional action,” and add at the end “which endangers the peace, safety and vital interests of the United States.”

(6) Paragraph 7–c: Insert, after “obligated”, the words “in accordance with the treaty”.

(7) Paragraph 9–a: In lieu of “bring about a non-Communist victory in any”, substitute “prevent a Communist victory through”.

(8) Paragraph 9–b: Reword as follows:

“b. Urge that the French promptly recognize and deal with Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam as independent sovereign nations.”

(9) Paragraph 9–c: In lieu of “in every possible way”, substitute “wherever advantageous to the U.S.”, and change “South Vietnam” to “free Vietnam”.

(10) Paragraph 9–g: Insert Alternative A, including the bracketed words.

(11) Paragraph 10–d: Delete, noting the President’s request in c below.

c. Noted that the President requested the Secretary of State to recommend means of providing visible evidence in Thailand of our intention to prevent further Communist expansion.

d. Agreed to reconsider paragraph 8 of Section III and to consider Section IV of NSC 5429 at a Council meeting on August 18, 1954, on the basis of the following rewording of paragraph 8:

“8. If requested by a legitimate local government to assist it to defeat local Communist subversion or rebellion which does not constitute external armed attack, the U.S. should view such a situation so gravely that the President would request Congressional authority to take appropriate action, which might if necessary and feasible include the use of U.S. military forces either locally or against Communist China.”

Note: The statement of policy in NSC 5429 as amended subsequently circulated as NSC 5429/1.⁸ Sections I, II and III (except paragraph 8) of NSC 5429/1 approved by the President, who directs their use as a general guide in the implementation of pertinent policies toward the Far East by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency; pending final Council action on NSC 5429/1 after further consideration of paragraph 8 and Section IV thereof. The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.

Marion W. Boggs

1. Drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator of the National Security Council Board Assistants, on Aug. 13.
2. None printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5405 Series)
3. Rowland R. Hughes, Director, Bureau of the Budget.
4. Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
5. Supra.
6. Elbert P. Tuttle, General Counsel of the Treasury Department, was apparently Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
7. Lettered paragraphs a-d constitute NSC Action No. 1204. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)
8. Dated Aug. 12, not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5429 Series)