890.00/8–1354
Memorandum by the Economic Coordinator in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Baldwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)
I have read your handwritten inscription on the letter to Admiral Spruance1 expressing concurrence with the prefatory remarks in the Admiral’s reply2 to the letter about economic assistance for [Page 734] Asia. I would like to have an opportunity at your convenience to discuss this aspect of the matter with you. Before then, perhaps, you will be good enough to consider the following views:
I fully agree in principle with Admiral Spruance’s belief that nations which we are willing to assist should be willing to join with us in the struggle against Communism. I say “in Principle” because I believe that we are confronted in Asia with a situation which may make it necessary, in order to accomplish both our immediate and long range objectives, to make exceptions to what would normally be reasonable and desirable requirements.
It would be a waste of your time to elaborate on the problems presented by the so-called “neutralist” Asian countries. From our standpoint their neutralism is wrong, illogical, and dangerous. The fact that we believe it is wrong however, is not likely to cause them to change quickly enough to suit our purposes. We are therefore confronted by a very fundamental question, viz., whether it is more important to us to wait until they are willing to declare themselves more actively opposed to Communism—as we would like—or whether we will do everything possible to strengthen them in the belief that improvement of their general situation will better enable them to resist Communism. Five of the replies from our Far East Missions to your letter (Tokyo, Seoul, Djakarta, Saigon, Rangoon) believe that no political or defense “strings” should be attached to U.S. economic assistance to Asia.
I am convinced that any economic program for Asia which we might support, and which would continue to require recipients to make commitments with respect to joining in collective opposition to Communism will automatically rule out Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and India. It is not certain that all or some of these countries would go along with any other kind of program, but there seems to be at least a chance that they could be persuaded to attempt, that fact alone might serve to refute the increasingly strong Communist propaganda aimed at the neutralist countries and stressing the charge that we regard armed conflict as the ultimate objective of our opposition to Communism.
This is a tough problem and a distasteful one, but I think it is a problem with which we are forced to come to grips. The decision may well play a vital part in shaping the future trend of Asian events.
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
In his letter to Robertson dated July 30, Admiral Spruance wrote: “I believe that we gain very little by giving aid to countries which are not actively and vigorously opposed to Communist infiltration and control.…
“On the other hand, countries which play with the Communists are apt eventually to go under, and I doubt if our economic aid will do much to prevent such an outcome; it may, in fact, render the country a more valuable prize for the Communists to take over. A country is more likely to fall prey to Communist infiltration, if there are glaring social and economic inequities and injustices and if the legal government is making no effort to remedy these. I do not believe that a low standard of living is, in itself, dangerous, provided there are reasonably good opportunities for earning a living for the mass of the people, and the gulf between the well-to-do and the rest of the people is not too wide.” (FE files, lot 55 D 480)
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