Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

top secret

Washington, 11 August 1954.

Subject:

• Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East—NSC 5429

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views with respect to a draft statement of policy prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board titled “Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East” (NSC 5429), which is scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 12 August 1954.

2. In their memorandum for you dated 9 April 1954, subject “U.S. Strategy for Developing a Position of Military Strength in the Far East (NSC Action No. 1029–b)”,² the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States formulate a comprehensive policy in which the Far East is viewed as a strategic entity and which would provide definitive direction for the development of a position of military strength in the Far East. NSC 5429 lacks a statement of United States objectives with respect to the area as a whole and broad courses of action for the achievement of such objectives, and hence does not constitute a comprehensive statement of policy as envisaged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that NSC 5429 be returned to the Planning Board with appropriate guidance for derivation and exposition of U.S. objectives in the Far East and delineation of broad courses of action directed toward their attainment.

4. Specific comments of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps³ on the material included in NSC 5429 follow:

• “a. We concur in the view of the Defense, JCS, and ODM Members of the Planning Board, contained in the footnote on page 3 of the draft,⁴ that U.S. policy with regard to China should be considered and determined first, and that the policy with regard to the peripheral areas should be established in light of this determination. We recommend, therefore, that when NSC 5429 is prepared in final form, Section IV, Communist China, be brought forward and redesignated Section I. However, for convenient reference, we have addressed our comments to the sections of the paper in their present order.
• “b. The following detailed comments are addressed to the bracketed phrases and alternative courses of action set forth in the draft statement of policy, as well as to amendments and additions which are deemed desirable. (Changes are indicated in the usual manner.)
  • “(1) Page 3, subparagraph 1c and page 4, paragraph 5. No preference is expressed with respect to including or omitting the bracketed phraseology.

  • “(2) Page 5, subparagraph 7a. Alternative A is favored.

    Reason: It is considered that the treaty should provide for the prompt and positive application of retaliatory measures against Communist China if it is determined that Communist China is a source of armed aggression, either direct or indirect. Any more limited provision would not constitute an adequate response to the aggression.

  • “(3) Page 6, paragraph 8. Alternative B is considered preferable.
  • “(4) Page 7, subparagraph 9f. Amend to read as follows:

    “‘f. Continue to exploit opportunities to further U.S. longrange objectives toward uniting Vietnam under a democratic form of government.’

  • “(5) Page 7, subparagraph 9g. Delete both alternatives.

    Reason: In light of subparagraph 9f, a further statement on this subject is considered unnecessary.

  • “(6) Page 8, subparagraph 10d. Stationing of token forces in or around Thailand is not favored. Accordingly, it is recommended that Alternative B be rejected. While there is no objection to Alternative A, the necessity for its inclusion in a statement of policy with respect to Thailand is not apparent, since the visits of United States forces to friendly countries is a routine and well-established custom.

  • “(7) Pages 9 through 11, paragraphs 12, 13, 14, and 15. Among the four statements of alternative courses of action with respect to Communist China adoption of Alternative C (paragraph 14), amended to read as follows, is favored:

    “‘14. Reduce the relative power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking, war:

    • “‘a. (1) React with forces, if necessary and advantageous, to expansion and subversion recognizable as such, supported and supplied by Communist China.

      “‘(2) React with immediate, positive, armed force against any belligerent move by Communist China.

    • “‘b. Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countries, including the progressive development of the military strength of Japan, to the point where she can provide for her own national defense and, in time, contribute to the collective defense of the Far East.
    • “‘c, d, and e. Same as 13 c, d, and e.’

    Reasons: (1) Alternatives A and B would provide that the United States resort to armed action only in the event that Communist China itself committed armed aggression. Such a policy would be inadequate to cope with indirect aggression which experience indicates will be the most probable form of Chinese Communist aggression in the general area of Southeast Asia in the near future. It should be the objective of United States policy to block the further expansion of Communist China regardless of the methods by which such expansion is attempted.

    (2) The proposed policy contained in Alternative D is considered to be extreme. It could hardly be expected that such a policy would receive the support of our major Allies. If adopted, it would require that the United States, in common prudence, now embark upon a major expansion of military forces, and take such other steps as are necessary to place the United States in a position to conduct large-scale military actions in the Far East. In short, the proposed policy is considered to be provocative and one which inherently would greatly increase the risk of general war.

    (3) The objective set forth in Alternative C, as amended above, is consistent with previously expressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It states a definite goal and provides for a positive approach to the problem of reducing the threat of further Chinese Communist expansion in Asia. It would provide the basis for action against indirect aggression which is lacking in both Alternatives A and B, while avoiding the more extreme measures, with their greatly enhanced risks, contained in Alternative D. Within the context of broader policies with respect to the world-wide threat of Soviet Communism, the steady and consistent application of the courses of action set forth in this alternative hold promise of achieving results advantageous to the security position of the Free World.”

5. The comments of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army on NSC 5429 follow:

• “a. NSC 5429 addresses itself specifically to only the most fundamental aspects of the problem in the Far East, namely: the offshore island chain; general political and economic measures in the Far East; negotiation of a Southeast Asia security treaty; action in the event of local subversion; policy with respect to Indochina, Thailand, Indonesia and Communist China. It is not a comprehensive review of the entire problem.
• “b. Moreover, the problem confronting us in the Far East cannot be stated, except in relation to and as an element in a United States foreign policy of global scope.
• “c. While I do not suggest just what such global policy should be, it seems axiomatic to me that one principal objective therein should be to split Communist China from the Soviet Bloc. Quite aside from the great moral issue involved in the deliberate precipitation of general war the converse of this thesis is equally applicable. From the purely military point of view we must not, by our own act, deliberately provoke war against the combined power of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China, since to do so would be to choose a war against the most potentially powerful enemy coalition with a strong probability of losing the active support of some of our present Allies. This situation would have the most dangerous possible military consequences. We may well find ourselves in such a war, but it should not be our choice without having first, taken every feasible step to increase our readiness to meet an explosion into general war, and second, having mapped out and begun an approach to the objective stated above.
• “d. The execution of no one of the four alternative courses of action with respect to Communist China would properly serve U.S. long-range interests, nor discharge the responsibility which the American people have to mankind for leadership of the Free World. There are elements in each of these courses, which combined, could constitute a preferable and proper course of action. We do not have either to appease Communist China (Alternative ‘A’) or to destroy it (Alternative ‘D’).
• “e. In deciding upon a course of action, the first and basic need, which I think NSC 162/2⁵ does not meet, is for a statement in a single document of a U.S. foreign policy on a global basis, with the principal objectives listed. Assuming that one of these would be the one stated in paragraph c above, it does not follow that its attainment requires the destruction of the military power of Communist China. In fact, I would regard the destruction of such military power as inimical to the long-range interests of the U.S. It would result in the creation of a power vacuum into which but one other nation could move, namely Soviet Russia.
• “f. If then we accept the objective of splitting Red China and the USSR, the statesmanlike approach would seem to be to bring Red China to a realization that its long-range benefits derive from friendliness with America, not with the USSR, which casts acquisitive eyes on its territory and resources; that these benefits could reasonably be expected in time, if Red China would mend its ways, abjure its offensively aggressive actions toward the West, and take steps to remove the stigma of ‘aggressor’ with which it is now branded. The adoption of such a course of action and the employment of such measures dictate the necessity of the prompt strengthening of our military capabilities in order that American diplomacy may have that essential military support without which it cannot hope to succeed.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. Twining
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force

1. Attached to a covering memorandum dated Aug. 13 from Lay to the NSC Planning Board.
2. NSC 5416. See the attachment to the memorandum from Secretary Wilson to Lay, Apr. 10, p. 412.
3. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.
4. Reference is to footnote *, p. 699.
5. Entitled “Basic National Security Policy”, dated Oct. 30, 1953; see volume II.