611.90/8–1154

Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Ogburn) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

top secret

Subject:

  • NSC 54291

If you can find time, I think you might wish to read the attached memoranda2 from Mr. Young, Mr. Day, and Mr. Landon on NSC [Page 719] 5429, “Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East” since the views they express give an idea of the thinking of your staff on the problems we face in the Far East.

I think the dissatisfaction they express with the paper is significant particularly since we must assume that the paper is the best the Planning Board could produce in a period of about two weeks. You will note that Mr. Landon writes:

“I have read hastily the above document and am deeply disturbed to think that so inadequate a treatment of U.S. policy could be put forward seriously as solution of the many problems facing us in the Far East.”3

and that Mr. Young writes:

“This is the worst hodge-podge that has ever been submitted to the President and the Council in my span of five years’ experience with NSC papers.”4

I am not far behind them in my feelings about the paper.

  1. Dated Aug. 4, p. 696.
  2. Memorandum from Young to Ogburn, Aug. 6 (611.90/8–654); memorandum from Day to Ogburn, Aug. 6 (611.90/8–654); memorandum from Landon to Day, Aug. 10 (611.90/8–1054).

    The opening paragraph of Day’s memorandum reads:

    “I question the necessity of this paper. No document reflecting disagreements and absence of due deliberation is likely to help determine the specific courses of action to be taken between now and the time it would require to complete a careful review and arrive at decisions based on the careful weighing which their importance requires.”

  3. Landon stated also: “The paper divides the world in two but is not clear as to where the borders are in Asia. I would like to see placed in focus the interests of India, China, USSR, Japan, the U.S., the U.K., and others with an estimate of the stresses and strains of their national interests as they affect favorably or adversely U.S. policy objectives.”
  4. In his memorandum, Young also stated that if it was necessary to have a policy review at the time, it would be better to remove Part IV from the paper and make it the subject of “objective consideration” by a “special task force”. “The parts of the paper not dealing with Communist China are either a reaffirmation of existing policy or additional authorization for courses of action which are urgently required regardless, in my view, of the ultimate decision on Communist China. … With respect to Communist China, I would make the general observation that a really effective well-considered, comprehensive and objective review of Far East policy centering on Communist China is needed. … At the present time, I certainly am in no position to select among the four alternatives [in Part IV].”