S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5429 Series
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State
Subject:
- NSC 5429—Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East1
This paper represents the Planning Board’s response to a directive from the President to prepare, before his departure from Washington, a review of the main features of our Far Eastern policy in the light of the outcome of the Geneva Conference. While hastily executed, the paper meets our present outstanding requirements by authorizing:
- 1.
- Our encouragement of an organization for Asian economic development;
- 2.
- The negotiation of a Southeast Asian Security Treaty;
- 3.
- Necessary courses of action to strengthen Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam against Communist pressures.
The following recommendations are made with respect to alternative passages offered in the paper:
- Page 3, paragraph 1(c). The bracketed phrase should be retained as recognizing the formidable political difficulties that must be surmounted before the proposed collective defense arrangement can be brought into being.
- Page 5, paragraph 7. Alternative B should be adopted. The UK and other potential signatories would accept the commitment contained in this alternative and would be more likely to agree to the actions called for in Alternative A at a time when such actions would be necessary than they would be to subscribe to Alternative A at the present time.
- Page 6, paragraph 8. Alternative B should be adopted. Alternative A would involve the U.S. in indeterminate commitments in which it would receive little support from its allies.
- Page 7, paragraph 9(g). Neither of the
alternatives suggested is entirely acceptable. It is recommended
that you propose the following language in place of them:
“While recognizing that North Vietnam will probably pass completely under the control of the Communist bloc, and the necessity, therefore, of conditioning our policies and activities according to that assumption, exploit every opportunity which is presented in North Vietnam to make more difficult the absorption of the area by the Communists; in that connection [Page 717] maintain maximum flexibility of U.S. policies which affect North Vietnam until the Haiphong enclave is completely taken over by the Communists.”
- Page 8, paragraph 10(d). Alternative A, which would be harmless if carried out in a good spirit, is to be preferred. We should not at this stage give the Thai government the option of having U.S. troops stationed in Thailand.
- Page 9. Section IV presents four alternative courses of action of progressive stiffness with respect to Communist China. There would, however, appear to be no good reason for substituting any of them for our present policy with respect to Communist China as set forth in NSC 166/1, which is considered adequate to the post–Geneva situation. It would be preferable for the NSC to reject this section of the paper, which would leave NSC 166/1 as the governing directive.
Note: Paragraph e on page 2 is out of place since its subject is not one of the “significant consequences” of Communist successes in Indochina which are enumerated in this paragraph. It should probably be deleted.
Subject to the qualifications set forth above, it is recommended that you approve the adoption of NSC 5429 as a provisional directive pending an opportunity for an adequate review of the changed situation in the Far East and of the policies required to meet it.