Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341
The Embassy of New Zealand to the Department of State1
Talking Paper
New Zealand would probably be prepared to join with other prospective SEATO members in issuing the proposed “declaration of intent” if satisfactory terms are agreed. The Government would, however, regard United Kingdom participation in such a declaration as essential.
As the Minister of External Affairs pointed out in his speech of 6 July to the House of Representatives, New Zealand considers that the early establishment of SEATO should be pressed on as quickly as possible. It would seem however that the preparation of a satisfactory text and similar practical details would, in any case, make it impossible for the treaty to be formally concluded before settlement on Indo-China is reached—if such a settlement can, in fact, be reached. It is hoped therefore that the United Kingdom and American views on the timing of the treaty will not necessarily be too divergent.
As far as the composition of the proposed treaty organisation is concerned it is presumed that France will be prepared to play her part even if a settlement on Indo-China is achieved at Geneva; but the position on Laos and Cambodia is unlikely to be clarified until [Page 630] it is known whether the Communists will insist rigidly on neutralisation of the two countries as part of a general settlement. It is the New Zealand Government’s hope that as many Asian countries as possible can be included in the proposed treaty organisation either now or later. Nevertheless New Zealand is prepared—not without reluctance—to take the risks inherent in proceeding with the present nucleus of interested countries.
New Zealand is interested in the suggestion made by Mr. Dulles at the meeting of the ANZUS Council on 30 June2 that Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia might be brought within the “economic aspects” of the treaty, although not actually enjoying full membership. They were interested also in the United Kingdom suggestion that Asian countries, while not full members of SEATO, might be “associated” with it in some way possibly under Article VII.
From both psychological and practical considerations New Zealand is somewhat concerned about the inclusion of colonial territories as such in the proposed treaty. They do not believe, in particular, that the treaty should cover French colonial possessions in India, although Malaya must obviously come within the scope of the treaty.
New Zealand is of the opinion that Hong Kong should not be included in the proposed treaty since it is not considered that Hong Kong is within the South East Asian area to which the present negotiations are related. New Zealand and other prospective members of SEATO have, of course, existing obligations towards Hong Kong, but there appears to be no reason why these should not be continued as a completely separate agreement. The Government are gratified to learn that as a result of the recent ANZUS meeting the United States authorities share their view that Japan, Formosa, and South Korea should be omitted.
The question of the best method of resisting infiltration and subversion, to which the countries of South East Asia are particularly vulnerable, has given New Zealand serious concern. We appreciate that the formula put forward by the United States in Article III (2) of the draft treaty,3 based on the Rio Treaty provision, is intended primarily to demonstrate the parties’ awareness of the seriousness of the problem of indirect aggression and their intention to resist it as strongly as open external attack.
New Zealand is not, however, enthusiastic about any specific formula or definition of indirect aggression and would wish to make clear its view that the action to be taken in relation to any particular [Page 631] development in South East Asia would require the most careful consideration of each case and a decision on the merits of the particular circumstances.
New Zealand has noticed for example that the study made by the recent Five-power Military Conference of “possible military measures that could be taken to provide for internal security in certain areas of South East Asia”4 concluded that military measures by themselves were quite futile. Accordingly, while New Zealand would agree that increased military aid in the form of equipment and training facilities would be useful they consider also that the governments of South East Asian countries should be helped to strengthen their “grass roots” appeal by the offer of better material conditions through increased economic and technical assistance.
Finally New Zealand would wish to make it clear that resistance to indirect Communist aggression should not mean that SEATO members must regard any and every threat to the stability of the present regimes in South East Asia (for example, the present military regime in Thailand) as a Communist manoeuvre to be automatically resisted.
- Handed to the Secretary by the New Zealand Ambassador on July 16; see the memorandum of conversation, supra. The source text is attached to a covering note of the same date by Trulock (JSG Memo 12).↩
- For U.S. Minutes of this meeting, see p. 588.↩
- Apparent reference to the draft of July 9. See the comparative texts in SEAP D–2 of Aug. 2, p. 686.↩
- The quotation is from Enclosure A, Annex 2 of the Conference Report, June 11, p. 560.↩