790.5/7–1654
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)
Subject:
- Southeast Asia.
Participants:
- Ambassador Leslie K. Munro, New Zealand Embassy
- Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
- The Secretary
- Mr. Raynor, Director, BNA
Ambassador Munro called on the Secretary this afternoon at his request. He was accompanied by Mr. Hunter Wade of the Embassy staff. He first inquired about the talks the Secretary had had in Paris.1
The Secretary said that he felt the results of the talks in Paris had been satisfactory. They had cleared away several points about which he had had doubts, specifically relating to (1) the apprehension that the French were planning a “sell-out”, (2) a fear that if no settlement were reached the French would be inclined to blame this on the Americans and (3) the situation should the Communists indicate that they would offer a liberal settlement if the Americans would undertake to guarantee it. As to (1) above, the Secretary said he felt the French are in a mood to hold out for a decent settlement and if they do not obtain it they will continue to fight. As to (3), he pointed out that we are in no position to guarantee a settlement. The President does not have this authority and it would not be possible to gain sufficient Congressional support to enter into a guarantee. The Secretary said that the French were extremely anxious to reinforce any settlement reached with a declaration of intention to create a Southeast Asian Security Pact. They feel strongly, and we agree, that it is a serious question if any settlement will stand up unless it is so reinforced. The Secretary said that this is where we would probably have difficulty with the British who are preoccupied with the concept of bringing the Indians along with [Page 628] whatever is done and that will take more time than is available. The Secretary said he was favorably impressed by Mendes-France, especially by his sincerity, his determination and his direct approach to subjects, although obviously he was inexperienced in foreign affairs and tended to over-simplify things.
In response to Ambassador Munro’s question as to whether we feel Mendes-France will be able to get a settlement, the Secretary said that he continued to talk strongly about getting a settlement by the 20th. As to whether he will succeed, the Secretary didn’t know but he observed that his experience hat been that deadlines have a way of slipping.
Ambassador Munro then handed to the Secretary a Talking Paper containing New Zealand views with respect to SEATO, which is attached.2 The Ambassador said this had been prepared by the Department of External Affairs and had been approved by the Minister of External Affairs but that its main points are subject to Cabinet review. The Ambassador expressed concern with respect to the Secretary’s observation about possible difficulties with the British.
The Secretary replied by reiterating the strong feeling the British have about associating the Colombo powers and especially India in this undertaking. He said we share the view that this is important, if it is possible, but we are worried over the risk of the delay which this would involve. Without a SEATO or almost immediately without a declaration of determination to create a SEATO, we are apprehensive that any settlement the French make may not be durable and that the result might be the loss of the whole area. The French share this apprehension. The Secretary said that economic assistance would also be needed promptly. He said the British seemed to feel that it is safe to wait for some undetermined period for Colombo states. We do not. We think that a declaration of intent will be necessary within a few days of reaching a settlement because the process of ratifying the treaty will take some time. We ourselves would be willing to sign a treaty quickly but we are willing to wait on this step for appropriate consultation with the Colombo powers provided the declaration of intent is signed and issued almost immediately. The Secretary said that such a declaration would not require Congressional approval here.
Ambassador Munro said that his Government was also anxious to include as many Asian members as possible and thought it might be especially important to associate Indonesia, Ceylon and Burma in the economic aspects of the treaty. He understood the [Page 629] British shared this feeling. He added that New Zealand does not want Hong Kong included in the area of the treaty.
The Secretary said he thought this was correct and that if it should be included in the treaty area it would make the omission, for instance of Formosa and Japan, more noticeable and probably create Congressional problems for us.
Ambassador Munro stressed the importance his Government attached to covering aggression although he said his Government did not favor attempting to define aggression precisely. He said he would like the views of the United States on this question.
On leaving the Ambassador said he wanted to be certain the Secretary knew that his Prime Minister had informed Ambassador Scotten that New Zealand would be against the seating of the Communist Chinese in the Assembly this fall.
- For documentation on the Secretary’s trip to Paris, July 12–15, see vol. xiii, Part 2, pp. 1819 ff.↩
- Not found attached. A text from another file is infra.↩