Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

PSA files, lot 58 D 207

¹

Report of the Joint United States–United Kingdom Study Group on Southeast Asia

secret

Terms of Reference

By agreed minute² of the meetings between the President and the Prime Minister a joint UK–US Study Group was established in Washington “to prepare agreed recommendations” with respect to Southeast Asia.

Meetings and Membership

The Study Group held its first meeting July 7, 1954. In all the group held six meetings, the closing meeting being held on July 17.³ Chief US participants were General Walter Bedell Smith and Mr. Douglas MacArthur II. The chief UK participant was Mr. R.H. Scott.

Recommendations

Our recommendations are contained in the enclosed report to which are attached three annexes. The recommendations are submitted by the members of the Study Group without commitment on their respective Governments.

Publicity

The Group agreed that nothing should be said to the press about the work or the recommendations of the Group, and that the line should be taken that these meetings were technical and exploratory, without commitment on either side.

• Douglas Macarthur
• R. W. Scott

Washington, July 17, 1954.

[Enclosure]

The Report

item i

[Here follows discussion of the potential terms of association with an Indochina agreement. For this section, see volume XIII, Part 2, page 1848.]

item ii

Terms of Reference

[Here follows a repetition of numbered paragraph 2 of the Agreed Minute.]

7. a. The study group agreed that drafting a collective security treaty should be a matter for negotiation between all the founder members.

b. The U.S. members submitted an informal draft text of a collective security treaty for Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, as an indication of U.S. thinking. (Annex A).⁴ The US. members stated that they had also made this draft available to certain of the other potential founding members of a collective security arrangement.

c. The United Kingdom members made some preliminary comments on the American draft. The United Kingdom comments are given in Annex B. The United Kingdom members considered that it was premature to submit a text until clear agreement had been reached between the two Governments on the nature and purposes of the proposed treaty, and on the timing and negotiations with other Powers. They were therefore unable to associate themselves with the US members in submitting a text at this stage.

8. Main Features of a Collective Security Treaty

The study group agreed on the main features of the proposed Treaty. These features are indicated in the following recommendations, which, however, do not attempt to use language suitable for inclusion in the Treaty.

a. Purpose. The purpose of the Treaty is to block the expansion of Communist influence in the general area of South and Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. The Group recognized that this might take several forms: overt aggression; infiltration and subversion coupled with Communist assistance to armed rebellions or Communist interference in civil wars; or Communist infiltration and subversion without resort to violence. The group agreed that provision should be made in the Treaty against all these contingencies.

b. Membership

(1) The initial membership of the collective security treaty should include UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, France, Thailand and the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states (Burma and Indonesia) if they are willing. The initial membership could also include other states which, on the basis of informal consultations, indicated their desire to participate.

(2) Cambodia, Laos, and non-Communist Vietnam should be participants if the arrangements at Geneva should permit this.

(3) After entry into force of the treaty, invitations to other states to accede to the treaty, or to associate themselves with it, could be issued upon unanimous agreement of the parties to the treaty.

c. Nature of the Commitment

Each party should agree:

(1) To assist the lawful governments to maintain and develop their capacity to resist armed attack and Communist infiltration and subversion, through help in the military, police, intelligence, information, economic, technical, and other relevant fields.

(2) To consult together in order to agree on the measures which should be taken whenever in the opinion of one of the Parties the territorial integrity, political independence or security of one of the Parties, or the peace of the area, is endangered.

(3) In the event of overt Communist aggression in the area of the treaty, to take in accordance with its constitutional processes such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force.

d. Geographical Scope of the Commitment

(1) The commitment in para c(3) above should cover:

(a) local territory of parties to the treaty in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific;

(b) Laos and Cambodia and non-Communist Vietnam whether or not they are parties to the treaty;

(2) Provision should be made to allow countries not participating in the treaty to be covered by agreement, by the commitment in para c(3) above.

(3) The treaty should permit later enlargement of its geographical scope.

e. Organization

The Treaty should contain no more than a simple and generalized description of a Council; precise organization should be left to discussion with other participating countries and to development by the Council. Among the subjects the Council should consider would be:

(1) establishment of such permanent machinery as might be needed;

(2) interim arrangements pending the completion of (1) above;

(3) arrangements for the association of countries not parties to the treaty with work of the organization.

f. Duration

The treaty should be of indefinite duration with the provision that any party may cease to be a party one year after notice of denunciation.

9. Considerations Affecting Timing

a. The group agreed that any agreements reached at Geneva would register a considerable gain for the Communist bloc in Southeast Asia. In the wake of such agreements there would be left an unstable situation in those areas of Indochina remaining free. At the same time those agreements would increase the tendency of the other non-Communist states in the area to accommodate themselves to the prospect of further Communist encroachment. These considerations underlined the necessity for urgent conclusion of collective security arrangements. The group also recognized the importance of securing the backing of the Colombo Powers in halting the expansion of Communist influence. The attitude of these Powers toward the collective security arrangement would be important. It would be desirable that these Powers should at least acquiesce in the establishment of such an arrangement.

b. The UK members believed that strong efforts to secure the participation of the Colombo Powers in the collective security arrangement or at least their acquiesence in its formation should be made prior to the negotiation of the Treaty. In the long run the general aim of blocking Communist expansion in the area will be governed by the support that can be obtained from the peoples and governments of the area. The UK, therefore, considered that immediate negotiation of a collective security arrangement prior to consultation with the Colombo Powers would prejudice the eventual attitude of the latter thus endangering the ultimate object of the treaty.

c. The US members believed that explorations with the Colombo Powers should not delay the formation of a security arrangement for the area. The US members recognized the possibility that speedy establishment by other countries of a collective security arrangement might engender temporary opposition on the part of some of the Colombo Powers; they believed, however, that in the long run the immediate creation of a strong defense against Communist expansion in Southeast Asia would lead to eventual cooperation by South Asian countries. The US members believed that the political emergency created by a Communist victory at Geneva should be met by immediate action to serve notice that Communist expansion in Asia had reached its limit. The US members believed that delay in the formation of a collective security agreement would probably result in a deterioration in the area of South and Southeast Asia which in the end could well render impossible the conclusion of any effective security arrangement, additional to the U.S. security arrangements with others in the area. The US members believed, therefore, that the collective security arrangement should be negotiated forthwith, with those nations now ready to proceed in the establishment of an effective collective defense system in the general area of the South and Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

10. Declaration of Intention

a. The U.S. members considered that even if there were agreements at Geneva, the urgency of the situation was such, and the probable length of time before a treaty could be signed and ratified was such, that it would be important to have the founding countries issue a statement of intent to conclude a treaty, and immediately to establish ad hoc machinery pending the ratification of such a treaty. The U.S. submitted a draft declaration (Annex C) as an indication of U.S. thinking. The U.S. members stated that copies of this draft had been made available to other potential signatories of such a declaration.

b. The U.K. members doubted whether it would be necessary, in the event of a settlement in Indochina, to issue a declaration of intent, but did not exclude this possibility.

item iii

Terms of Reference

“Assuming no agreement on Indochina—

a. The form of collective defense pact for the purposes outlined in paragraph 2, which would be suitable to the situation;

b. The action to be taken in respect of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.”

11. The group agreed that the main features of a collective security treaty which would be suitable in the event of no agreement on Indochina should be similar to those proposed by the Group in the event of a settlement.

12. Timing

The group agreed that in the event of a failure of the negotiations at Geneva the establishment of a collective security treaty would become more urgent.

a. The U.K. members considered that a strenuous effort should be made to enlist the support of the Colombo Powers and that this consideration should be kept in mind in deciding how to proceed with the negotiation of the treaty.

b. The U.S. members believed that the situation would require negotiation of a treaty with the utmost dispatch by those nations ready to participate in such a treaty.

13. Declaration of Intention

The group agreed that in the event of failure of the negotiations at Geneva:

a. It would be desirable that each of the two Governments should issue a declaration of intent to conclude with other interested countries a collective security treaty.

b. It would be desirable that as many other potential members of the treaty as possible should issue similar declarations, and that they should be consulted urgently to this end.

The U.S. members believed that the issue of a declaration would, in the event under consideration, be not only desirable but imperative and that the declaration should provide for the immediate formation of ad hoc machinery by the potential founding members of a security treaty.

The U.K. members considered that the text of the declaration of intent should be simple and general and drafted with the Colombo Powers in mind.

14. In the event of no agreement being reached at Geneva the Study Group recognized that decisions of high policy on the action to be taken in respect of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam would be required. Among others, consideration should be given to the following:

(a) Invitations to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam to join the security treaty.

(b) Appeals to the Security Council by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

(c) The opening of military discussions with the French.

(d) Further measures to ensure the political stability and defense of Thailand.

Annex B

UK Comments on US Draft Security Treaty⁵

The following preliminary comments are submitted without commitment on the wording of the U.S. Working Draft for a Security Treaty which is attached as Annex A to the Report of the Study Group dated July 17. These comments are not intended to be exhaustive, since detailed matters of drafting cannot be undertaken until agreement has been reached between the two Governments on the main features of the proposed Treaty.

Preamble

The second clause is open to objection. In general nothing should be inserted in the preamble of a treaty which does not explain the purpose of the treaty and the aims of the parties in concluding it. This clause may suggest that the treaty is not solely defensive in purpose. It does not in fact relate to any of the substantive articles of the draft. It also raises questions concerning the good government of territories in the area.

Similar considerations apply to the second half of the third clause, which may also suggest an intention to undermine any settlement reached in Indochina insofar as areas left under Communist control are concerned. The following might be inserted in the preamble as a substitute for the second and third clauses of the present draft:—

“Desiring to promote stability and well-being in the area of South-East Asia and the South West Pacific, to strengthen the fabric of peace and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”

The fourth clause of the preamble has no counterpart in the North Atlantic Treaty and is perhaps more suitable for inclusion in a statement of policy than in the preamble of a treaty.

item iv

Terms of Reference

“The procedure for bringing other interested nations promptly into these negotiations.”

15. The Group noted that consultations have already been undertaken with representatives of Australia, New Zealand, France, Thailand, the Philippines, and the Colombo Powers.

16. The Group recommended that the problem of further consultations concerning a declaration in respect of an Indochina settlement should be dealt with by the representatives of the two Governments at the Geneva Conference. (The respective views of the UK and US members are covered under Item I of this Report.)

17. a. As regards consultation with other powers on the projected collective security treaty, the US members believed that a working group with representatives of the UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, France, Thailand, and the Philippines should be established in Washington immediately to prepare agreed recommendations on the terms of a collective security pact regarding Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, and to prepare agreed recommendations on the terms of a Declaration of Intent. Consultations should be undertaken with the Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese as appropriate.

b. The United Kingdom members believed that such a working group should not be set up until the views of the two Governments on this report were known and that in any case the establishment of the group should be preceded by individual soundings of the views of all potential participants in the treaty. Meanwhile consultation with other powers should be in general terms on an individual and not collective basis.

article ii

There is no precedent for the use in a treaty of the phrase “Communist subversion and infiltration”. These words, both in themselves and when read in conjunction with Article III of the draft, raise serious questions in suggesting that the pact is directed against the Communist powers. The North Atlantic Treaty, for instance, was not, on the face of it, directed against any state or group of states. Asian opinion, in particular that of India and Burma, would be strongly opposed to any implication that the treaty was directed “against” anyone. The words in question are in any case not essential and would be better replaced by a phrase such as:—

“subversion directed from abroad”.

Dealing in a treaty of this type with a question such as subversion and infiltration raises difficult general questions, including that of interference in the internal affairs of States. It may be possible to deal with the point under a more general clause on the lines of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty together with a provision for consultation.

article iii

Paragraph 1.

The clause extending the operation of para. 1 to an armed attack “on any states or territories which the parties by unanimous agreement so designate” could be used to extend the commitment to cover an attack on countries not parties to the Treaty. On political grounds it would be undesirable to do this except on the request, or with the consent of, the country concerned. It would be well, therefore, to insert in this clause a qualification such as:—

“Upon request by the state concerned.”

Paragraphs 1 and 2.

Both paragraphs in this Article use the expression “area”. The area is not defined except in a very loose way as being the general area of South-East Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Unless the area is defined with greater precision it will not be possible to identify with any certainty the territories within this area to which these paragraphs of the Article apply. Furthermore, it will not be possible to identify with any certainty the area the peace of which has to be affected under Paragraph 2 of the Article.

The drafting of this Article is undesirably vague about the scope of the commitments undertaken. The terms of reference of the Study Group speak of a Treaty “regarding South-East and possibly South Asia”, designed to deter Communist aggression. The immediate purpose is to guard against armed attack by the Communists on such countries as the Associated States, Thailand or Malaya. However, it is not desirable or in accordance with precedent and the usual rules of treaty-drafting that it should be specifically directed against the Communist powers. The present wording of Article III, 1 would cover many contingencies other than those mentioned above, e.g. in relation to Kashmir, Pondicherry, or New Guinea. It is therefore necessary to give a more precise and limited definition of the commitment. This might require enumeration of the territories to be covered. In both paragraphs the word “territory” requires further definition and consideration.

Paragraph 2.

In paragraph 2 the expression “an aggression which is not an armed attack” might be omitted or reconsidered. The words which follow the expression relate to any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area. It can be assumed that an aggression which is not an armed attack would also endanger the peace of the area and is therefore covered in the more general following words. As the expression “aggression” has not been authoritatively defined, the phrase in question may also raise difficulties in relation to Article 51 of the Charter of the U.N.

Paragraph 2, by using the general words “any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area”, refers by implication to Article II of the Draft Treaty. The precise relation between these Articles requires to be explained. Certain drafting points also arise, but are beyond the scope of the present paper.

Paragraph 3.

This will require further scrutiny in the light of the texts adopted for the other commitments, since it may not be appropriate to report to the Security Council every type of measure which might be taken; “measures” under Paragraph 2 might include a wide variety of actions, such as the construction of airfields, an increase in the strength of armed forces, etc.

The application of Paragraph 3 to the wide variety of measures which could be taken under Paragraph 2 of the Article might create the undesirable impression that the paragraph had been inserted in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter relating to regional arrangements or agencies.

article iv

It may be politically desirable that the Treaty should contain an explicit provision allowing States which are not parties to it to associate themselves in some degree with the work of the collective security organisation. This point might be met by the addition at the end of the first sentence of this Article of a phrase such as:

“and for this purpose to establish machinery for effective co-operation including co-operation with states not parties to this Treaty”.

However, since a clear distinction will have to be drawn between parties to the Treaty and states associated with it, it may be desirable to cover association in a separate article.

article v

This adds nothing to Article III, 2 except insofar as it makes consultation obligatory whenever “in the opinion of any one” of the parties their territorial integrity etc., is endangered. If that provision were inserted in Article III, 2, then Article V could without loss be suppressed.

article vi

It may be desirable to insert a paragraph, or a separate Article, on the lines of Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which reads:—

“Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.”

article viii

It may be desirable to follow the precedents of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Japanese Peace Treaty which required that certain specified signatories must ratify the treaty before it could enter into force.

review

It is for consideration whether a provision for review or amendment of the Treaty should not be inserted. If thought desirable, the point might be dealt with in the Article defining the powers of the Council.

Annex C

Draft Declaration on Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific⁶

The Governments signatory hereto,

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, and

Convinced that the situation calls for them to be prepared for the exercise in this area of the inherent right of collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Declare

i

That they are actively engaged in creating a collective security agreement which will provide for effective cooperation in defense of the area against aggression, for assistance to the lawful governments of the area in resistance to Communist infiltration and subversion, and for cooperation in measures to meet any situation which might endanger the peace of the area.

ii

Pending the ratification of such an agreement they agree to establish:

A Council composed of the Foreign Ministers or their deputies of the subscribing governments together with their military advisers.

iii

The foregoing Declaration may be adhered to by other nations which share the purposes stated herein.⁷

1. Certain files of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs for the years 1949–1955, containing primarily material on Indochina.
2. Dated June 27, p. 580.
3. No minutes of this meeting have been found in Department of State files.
4. Identical to the draft dated July 9, p. 686.
5. This annex is also headed “Informal and Unofficial British Embassy Working Paper”.
6. This annex is also headed “Informal–Unofficial First U.S. Draft”. It is identical to the draft of July 12 (tabled at the Fourth Study Group Meeting held July 13).
7. Documents in file 790.5 for July 1954 indicate that the Department passed copies of the draft treaty and the draft above to the French Embassy on July 16 and that the Department had given copies of the entire Report to the Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand Embassies by July 19.