Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 629, CF 341

United States Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Joint United States–United Kingdom Study Group¹

secret
JSG MC–5

[Washington,] July 16, 1954—11–12:30 p.m.

[Participants:]

• UK
  • Sir Robert H. Scott
  • Mr. M. G. L. Joy
  • Mr. D. T. Holland
  • Mr. F. R. MacGinnis
  • Major General C. R. Price
  • Lt. Col. R. G. V. FitzGeorge Balfour
• US
  • State
  • The Under Secretary (Part of the Time)
  • Mr. Douglas MacArthur (Chairman)
  • Mr. C. C. Stelle
  • Mr. L. C. Meeker
  • Mr. W. J. Galloway
  • Mr. E. Gullion
  • Mr. P. J. Sturm
  • Mr. W. R. Tyler
• Defense
  • Admiral Davis
  • Mr. Charles Sullivan

Mr. MacArthur opened the meeting by addressing himself to the UK comments on the draft outline report dated July 14 prepared by the Study Group.²

He said that these comments raised certain fundamental points with regard to the task of the Study Group.

It had been hoped that a report would be submitted of commonly agreed recommendations by the Group, which would at the same time bring out clearly any differences between the UK and US points of view. It was important that the differences should be specified and not be disguised by ambiguous language open to subsequent differences of interpretation. However in the light of the latest UK comments, it seemed that there might no longer be a basis for attempting to submit an agreed report. For example, the UK proposal indicated that the proposed Annexes³ are not to be recommended jointly as a basis for further development, but are simply to be listed as US documents. At the same time paragraph 21 of the UK comments would debar the US from presenting its own views and position as set out in these US drafts to our friends and allies and discussing these matters with them. We considered this unacceptable. We believed therefore that there might be no useful purpose served by submitting annexes which would really be only US versions watered down by UK modifications. Aside from those considerations, Mr. MacArthur said that the US was now withdrawing the draft US declaration on an Indochina agreement (Annex A) since this text was under consideration by the Secretary of State personally and it would doubtless be subjected to further US changes.

Mr. MacArthur mentioned the significance of the amendment by the Congress to the appropriation for Southeast Asia of $800 million to the effect that no Locarno-type declaration should be concluded, and that none of the funds appropriated could be used for any country that signed an agreement which would maintain the territorial integrity of any Communist regimes over the peoples they had captured and thus guarantee the fruits of their aggression.⁴ The position taken by the Congress in this matter had a direct bearing on the type of declaration or agreement which should be made with regard to Southeast Asia.

(General Smith arrived at this point; Mr. MacArthur went over briefly the substance of his remarks.)

Sir Robert Scott said he felt there had been misunderstanding on the US side concerning the question of consultation. The UK position was that consultation of each side with its friends and allies was natural and in order. This, however, did not mean that papers should be passed out to other countries, which would probably receive fairly wide circulation, as though they were agreed joint papers. He felt this would be dangerous and give rise to misunderstanding. He proposed an amendment to the UK paragraph 21, which would specify that copies of joint documents should not be communicated to other powers except after prior agreement.

Turning to the major point made by Mr. MacArthur, Sir Robert Scott apologized if what he was about to say seemed in any way offensive or rude. He said that in his view the UK paper did not change the character of the task of the Study Group. He stated that he felt that the real nature of the Communist danger in Asia was not appreciated by the US. He said that the proposed collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia was not the same kind of exercise as the NATO or ANZUS Treaties. These were primarily military, whereas the proposed Southeast Asia pact was essentially an important move in the cold war whereby certain important Asian non-Communist countries might be persuaded to engage their interests in a common endeavor with the West in the task of blocking further Communist expansion. It was not, he said, a question of getting as many countries together as possible in order to fight the Communists. If this were the problem, we would get all the countries already committed to the Western side together. This however would not bring the other Asian countries who are as yet uncommitted, and are nervous and often suspicious of the West, any nearer to us.

Sir Robert Scott went on to say that the primary task before us in Asia was to block the Communists so as to keep India and Japan out of their hands. A second task of a more immediate nature was to take measures which would halt Communist expansion beyond the point it had already reached in Indochina, after the Geneva Conference. A third task, which must be undertaken now, was to make preparations in the event of overt aggression by the Communists. It was essential, he said, to keep the long-term aim in mind: to find means of bringing in as many of the Colombo powers into the pact or into some form of association with the pact, as possible. He said that if we mishandled this exercise there would be a real danger that an Asiatic non-aggression pact proposed by the Communists would prove irresistibly tempting to the Asian countries.

General Smith said he wished first of all to reassure Sir Robert Scott about any “rudeness” in any US–UK discussion. He said it was essential that we speak frankly with each other and that this was one of the most valuable factors in discussions between our two countries. He said he was impressed by the wisdom of Sir Robert Scott’s words. He felt that we do have the same appreciation of the danger and the objectives before us, though we seem to have different conceptions of tactics, timing, and approach to these problems. He mentioned an account of a press briefing which Mr. Eden had given in which he had mentioned the figure of perhaps 18 months for the conclusion of a Southeast Asia pact. General Smith thought that in the meantime we were faced with a situation which was not standing still and in which we ran the risk of losing the support of countries in the area who were willing to join in a collective defense arrangement. He felt the important thing was to put down the considerable area of agreement which existed and then to pinpoint the issues on which we were not agreed, and to state the differences factually and accurately. There was brief discussion of the possible role of Japan, the Republic of Korea and Formosa, and while it was made clear the US did not envisage them as founder members, General Smith said that we should not bar their possible eventual participation since Formosa and the ROK had a large number of trained men under arms whose contribution would be essential in a shooting war.

Sir Robert Scott then suggested that the Study Group rapidly prepare what might be called a preliminary interim report and which would be in effect an agreed statement of disagreements. He added that he felt that the situation with regard to Indochina suffered from the West having made the same mistake with regard to Indochina as had been made in Korea, i.e.: to treat the local peoples as though they were pawns. He felt that the negotiations had been conducted as though the Vietnamese did not matter and that their opposition or their views would not have to be taken into consideration. He felt that this mistake might have severe repercussions and that Vietnam might be driven by desperation to prefer the unity of Indochina under the Vietminh to continued partition on the side of the West.

Mr. MacArthur said he thought the major difference between the US and the UK positions was with regard to timing. Sir Robert Scott said that this difference could be reconciled by further consideration of the issue. He said that it should not be forgotten that while Japan would be immediately affected by developments in Southeast Asia, the key countries for Japan, in terms of markets and sources of supply, are Burma and Indonesia. He said it was of the utmost importance to win the support or at least the concurrence of these two countries. He felt that the way in which the proposed Southeast Asia pact was presented to the Asian countries was of great importance. We should try to obtain participation wherever possible. Failing this, we should strive for some degree of association, and if this should fail we should obtain, where we could, acquiescence.

Mr. MacArthur asked what the British would feel with regard to the constitution right away of a working group of the seven countries (US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines) in the event of a cease-fire at Geneva.

Sir Robert Scott said that he thought the first step should be to make a simple declaration of intent and to agree to invite the others to make similar declarations. This should be followed by preliminary soundings of other countries. Then the US and the UK must have a meeting of minds on the purposes and essential elements of the Southeast Asia pact and only then would it be desirable to set up the multilateral working party.

Mr. MacArthur recommended that the differences between the US and UK should be spelled out as soon and as clearly as possible, and Sir Robert Scott agreed and said that the report should go out this week end to Geneva.

The UK agreed to the US giving the French the draft text of a declaration of intent, and the US draft treaty text, on the understanding that these would be clearly presented as US working documents. There was some further discussion on procedures and putting down US and UK views on key points, and on whether to keep the annexes which had been considered by the Study Group as working documents or to include them in the report. A decision on these matters was postponed until later. It was agreed that the US/UK drafting group would meet at 9 A.M. on Saturday, July 17,⁵ and that a preliminary report by the Study Group would be sent out over the week end.

1. Drafted by Tyler, and attached to a covering note of July 20 by Trulock. Both documents are at tab 41 of the “Documentary History”.
2. British comments on this report have not been found in Department of State files.
3. Besides Annex B, identified in footnote 2, supra, JSG Memo 10/1 had, at Annex A, a U.S. “Draft Declaration on Indochina”, and, at Annex C, a copy of the U.S. “Draft Declaration on Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific”.
4. The pertinent paragraph of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, approved Aug. 26, 1954, reads as follows: “It is the sense of Congress that no part of the funds appropriated under this section shall be used on behalf of governments which are committed by treaty to maintain Communist rule over any defined territory of Asia.” (68 Stat. 837)
5. No minutes of this meeting have been found in Department of State files.