Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/7–1554

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] July 15, 1954.

Mr. Secretary: Tomorrow morning at 11, I will meet with Rob Scott to work out the final report of the US–UK Study Group on Southeast Asia. Today we discussed the unilateral US declaration and the draft declaration of intent. We also discussed paragraph 15 of the first draft of the final report,¹ the consensus being this should be beefed up in the sense that it is imperative to proceed with the issuance of the declaration of intent and the establishment of ad hoc machinery for collective defense at the earliest possible time. I also intend to do my utmost to get common language indicating that it is equally important to get a working group going of the countries which will join in Southeast Asia collective defense even if there is agreement at Geneva. If the British will not agree to such language (and I am informed by reliable American correspondents that Mr. Eden told British correspondents when he was here for the Churchill visit that it would probably take about 18 months to work out a SEATO), I will, subject to your approval, at least insert a statement of the US position in this respect.

I attach the first draft of the final Working Group report, together with the draft text of the proposed treaty.² It would be of greatest help to me if you could read these over this evening or early tomorrow morning and mark them up and let me have your comments prior to the 11 a.m. meeting with Rob Scott tomorrow.³

Douglas MacArthur II

1. Apparent reference to the first joint draft report (JSG Memo 10/1) dated July 14, rather than to a U.S. draft dated July 12, tabled at the Fourth Joint Study Group Meeting held July 13 (JSG Memo 10), neither printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341, “Documentary History”, tabs 32 and 27, respectively)

   Paragraph 15 of the first-mentioned document follows: “The Group agreed that the failure of negotiations at Geneva would lend greater urgency to the requirement for a Declaration of Intent and the formation of ad hoc machinery by the potential founding members of a security pact.”

2. Neither found attached. The U.S. draft mentioned, not printed, is Annex B to JSG Memo 10/1.
3. This memorandum bears a notation by O’Connor stating that Dulles had seen it. However, record of comment by the Secretary in response to it has not been found in Department of State files.