790.5/6–2954
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)1
Subject:
- Southeast Asian Problems
Participants:
- Mr. Richard G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, Australia
- Ambassador Spender, Australian Embassy
- The Secretary
- Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
- Mr. Raynor, Director, BNA
The Secretary opened the conversation by indicating that at the informal ANZUS meeting tomorrow he hoped to receive considered Australian and New Zealand views as to how we should proceed on this problem. He indicated that obviously a good bit depended on the form of settlement or absence of settlement achieved by Premier Mendes-France in his current discussions. He indicated we hoped it would be possible for him to make a not less favorable agreement than a line across Viet Nam at Dong Hoi. He said we would then be faced by the problem of building up local defenses in the areas which would remain on the free side of the line and also rendering economic aid to those areas both in an effort to prevent subversion. He said that China may want to neutralize these areas as they seem to be afraid of American influence therein. The Secretary said we have no desire to establish bases in such areas but we do feel it is important to be able to render assistance, to send advisers, etc. We have indicated this to the French as a point we hope they will be able to salvage in whatever agreement they will reach. The Secretary observed that even if such states or areas were demilitarized it would be possible to include them behind the line and to guarantee them. He cited in this connection the status of Belgium prior to World War I.
The Secretary expressed the view that Thailand and the Philippines would almost certainly join in collective defense arrangements. He was hopeful but not certain as to Burma but saw no real hope as to Indonesia. He said that it was too bad that this couldn’t have gone forward three months ago as the French could probably have utilized it in order to reach a better agreement but the problem now is to make the best we can out of the present situation. We must recognize that the French are handling the negotiations and are probably thinking primarily of their own interests. In this connection he cited the fact that as far as we can judge Laniel and Bidault really did not desire to see the struggle internationalized and merely wished to use the possibility of international intervention as a card to play in the Geneva negotiations. The Secretary said we had very sketchy information on the present negotiations.
Mr. Casey said that he had talked with Chou2 at Geneva who had made a strong point about there being no American or Western bases in Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Casey said he had indicated to Chou that he didn’t think this would be a difficulty provided a principle of mutuality applied to which Chou had observed his bases would be for defensive purposes only.
[Page 585]Mr. Casey then said that in his talks with the Foreign Ministers of Laos and Cambodia he had been impressed by their desperate need for technicians of all kinds. He said that Australia would attempt to help in this matter under the Colombo Plan but they had few French-speaking technicians whom they could send and expressed the view that perhaps Canada could be helpful in this respect. He said he had talked to Mr. Pearson on this matter who had seemed interested. Mr. Casey said he intended to pursue this with Mr. Pearson.3 In this connection he said he was impressed by the same need for technicians in East Pakistan. He said he is going to attempt to get additional Australian appropriations for the Colombo Plan and that Mr. Pearson had intimated to him that he would try to do likewise, perhaps attempting to double the present Canadian contribution of $25 million. Mr. Casey wondered as to the Secretary’s views on this question of economic and technical aid.
The Secretary said he realized that it was possible to spend too much money on the military side and inadequate sums on the economic. He felt that while the Communist4 military strength had no doubt been a factor that most5 of their conquests thus far had been by means other than direct military aggression of the Hitler type; the technique of subversion, terror, etc., had been employed. He agreed that it would be necessary to pay more attention than heretofore to the economic and social aspects of the problem in some areas. He observed that if a settlement were reached he does not believe it will be breached by open military aggression particularly if the Communists are made to realize that such aggression would be a danger signal which might bring on a chain of reactions which could be disastrous to them. It is more apt to be a problem of meeting subversion which the Communists could set in motion by fomenting a revolution based on some grievance or other. The Secretary mentioned as an example that our present trouble in Guatemala stems back to the Communists taking advantage of a revolution started in 1944 based on then existing grievances.
The Secretary then commented on the inadequacy of the governing group of Viet Nam and how little in the way of leadership had been found on which to build. The few educated people have largely been educated in France, maintaining close ties with the French and appear to have lost contact with the people of Viet Nam. There is also considerable corruption and what little leadership has been found has largely been in the Catholic element in the Northern part of the country. The Secretary said he felt personally that if a [Page 586] settlement is reached it would be best for the French to withdraw from all of Viet Nam. He thinks should they attempt to maintain a position in the south that we might well have to look forward to a repetition at a later date of the same kind of problem with which we are now faced. He thought the alternative of attempting to develop native leadership in the south might hold more constructive possibilities. He doubted if this leadership could be developed unless the French get out completely. In answer to Mr. Casey’s inquiry as to whether this is what Mendes-France contemplated, the Secretary and Mr. Merchant replied that we did not think so but this point was not clear by any means.
Mr. Casey said that he had been considerably impressed by a long talk he had recently had with Prince Wan of which he would give us his record. He said Prince Wan seems to have the future fairly well plotted out in his mind. Prince Wan welcomes MendesFrance and believes Mendes-France’s plans for the French to withdraw on a phased basis over 18 months to two years. The Prince also thought perhaps the new Prime Minister may be a man around whom strength and leadership can be built.
Mr. Casey then talked of the situation in East Bengal which he said he knew well. He is apprehensive that the situation has the potential of all kinds of unpleasantness. He thinks some kind of an uprising, engineered by the extreme leftwing is possible and said he thought Zafrulla Khan6 agreed with him. He said the economic position of this province is dreadful. There has been a catastrophic decline in the price of jute; the area is short of consumer goods and has no foreign exchange with which to replenish such supplies from the outside. He commented again that he was more and more impressed by the need of economic aid to the South Asian areas.
Mr. Casey then inquired about our views on Mr. Eden’s idea for a non-aggression pact. Mr. Casey said he saw possibilities from a psychological point of view of such a move being effective ideologically as an expression against Communism.
The Secretary indicated that he was not clear as to the necessity for having a dual system unless perhaps it would result in India and Burma participating in the one system but not the other. The Secretary said he didn’t think there would be any objection to repeating in some kind of an agreement the UN Charter language on non-aggression.
Mr. Casey said he thought the repetition could be worthwhile as it would be a repetition with a local significance. Mr. Casey said he would view this kind of an instrument as a public relations gambit [Page 587] without teeth and that side by side with it you could have the collective defense arrangement with teeth.
Mr. Merchant observed that a non-aggression pact would, as we understood the Eden proposal, be directed against overt aggression but not covert subversion.
The Secretary said he could see no harm in a self-denying ordnance embodying UN Charter provisions.
Mr. Casey thought we might need something like this as an antidote to the Chou-Nehru non-aggression pact concept which he thought would be well received in Asia. We will need something to counter this and at the same time get real substance in a SEATO arrangement.
Mr. Merchant and the Secretary explained that while the self-denying ordnance concept might be acceptable here we could not get in a position where we would be cross guaranteeing Communist-held areas. He cited the case of North Korea as a case where it would not be possible for us to have an arrangement which would make it necessary to join with the Communists in fighting Rhee should he attempt to invade North Korea. On the other hand we would discourage and so far discouraged successfully Rhee from that kind of an adventure; we would not support him in it; in fact, we would probably cut off aid to him should he try it but we would not under any circumstances join with the Communists in attempting to destroy him.
The Secretary said that this was what had been read into Eden’s Parliamentary speech by our Congress and our public and this had led to the development of as strong and solid opposition to this concept as he could remember in this country on any matter in a long time.
The Secretary said in his view it was essential to draw a line under some SEATO arrangement which the parties joining in the arrangement would agree to defend by force if the line was breached.
Mr. Casey said he was in full agreement with this.
In connection with the possibility of a non-aggression pact with UN Charter language, Ambassador Spender raised the question as to what our position would be as to Communist China joining in such a pact and the Secretary indicated this might constitute a problem for us. He repeated that we had no preconceived opposition to some kind of non-aggression pact if India and Burma could be brought into it. He repeated that we desire to concentrate on building up economies of the states and area near the line when this is drawn. He questioned whether it would be desirable for Pakistan to participate in a SEATO arrangement after Mr. Casey [Page 588] had expressed the view that he thought Pakistan might be prevailed upon to go into both kinds of arrangements.
Ambassador Spender raised the question of timing and as to priority between the two kinds of proposals.
The Secretary replied that while the final consummation of a SEATO arrangement, meaning the completion of ratification process in various countries would take some time, it was important for at least the executive agencies of the various governments to reach agreement on a line as soon as possible. He said he felt that the Communists will stop where we stand and not before. He thought, furthermore, that if the Communists could see progress on the matter of determining a line that it would help the French to obtain a better settlement. While the Communists might have the potential of taking over the entire area he thought they would hesitate to attempt this if they realized the consequences of breaching the line. The Secretary said he thought it was important to get a SEATO agreement developed which could be signed or initialled on the executive level in a matter of 3 or 4 weeks and that in turn could serve as a basis for the development of an interim ad hoc arrangement for the defense of the area pending the time which would be required for the completion of ratifications.
- A handwritten marginal notation reads: “approved with changes p. 2 R[oderic] O’C [onnor]”. These changes are noted in succeeding footnotes.↩
- Chou En-lai, Premier of the Government Administration Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Head of the People’s Republic of China Delegation to the Geneva Conference.↩
- Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.↩
- On the source text, the handwritten word “Communist” has been substituted for “Chinese”.↩
- On the source text, the handwritten word “most” has been substituted for “all”.↩
- Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.↩