Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.00/6–2854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)¹

secret

[Washington,] June 28, 1954.

Subject:

• Southeast Asian Matters

Participants:

• Ambassador Munro, New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. George Laking, Minister, New Zealand Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

Ambassador Munro, accompanied by Minister Laking, called on the Secretary late this afternoon at his request. He had just come from a meeting with Mr. Eden and Commonwealth Ambassadors at the British Embassy at which Mr. Churchill had been present for about fifteen minutes. The Ambassador said the British side seemed very pleased with the results of the talks over the weekend and that he, Ambassador Munro, was gratified to hear of the progress which had been made on the problem of Southeast Asia.

The Secretary indicated that he was also pleased with the talks and felt progress had been made on Southeast Asia. He added, however, that previously he had also felt that progress had been made and he was somewhat restraining his optimism until we could see how the work of the US–UK team developed. He explained on the ground of not offending the sensitivity of the Philippines and Thailand, the decision to proceed with the work on the next stage on a bipartite basis. He indicated that it was our intention to keep New Zealand and Australia fully informed as this work proceeded. The Secretary explained how one sentence of the Southeast Asian section of the Communiqué² had been inserted in an effort to strengthen the hand of Mr. Mendes-France in his current negotiations following word from him that he would like something along this line. The Secretary also indicated that agreement had been reached on minimum terms which would be acceptable to the UK and US and these had been transmitted today to the French.³

The Ambassador inquired about the ANZUS meeting Wednesday afternoon⁴ and said he and Ambassador Spender had been discussing whether or not it would be desirable to have military representatives in attendance. The Secretary indicated offhand that he doubted if this would be necessary for the Wednesday meeting although it might be advisable later.

Ambassador Munro then raised the question of the “political declaration” part of the plan. The Secretary explained that the feature of the Locarno proposal which was unacceptable to us and which he thought had now been dropped was the cross guarantee idea. We are perfectly willing to agree to a statement that changes should not be brought about by the use of force and to discourage the use of force even to cut off aid to someone on our side if force is used but that we are not willing to guarantee Communist control of areas which they have seized. In this connection the Secretary mentioned North Korea and East Germany by way of example. While a mutual renunciation of force to change the status quo is all right, we are not willing to guarantee the status. The Secretary said he thought it would be possible to draft a declaration renouncing the use of force. Ambassador Munro commented that Mr. Eden had referred to this as a declaration of nonaggression.

Ambassador Munro said he hoped at Wednesday’s meeting the US would review its present thinking on how Cambodia, Laos and Thailand would be treated. He expressed the view that outside of those states Burma is the only Asian state which would be a possibility as a member of any defense organization. He thought, however, that there was no possibility now of India attempting to stop the formation of such an organization.

The Secretary expressed agreement with this thought but observed India had in effect previously stopped its formation. He said he felt a great deal had been lost by the three months’ delay as had the organization been formed three months ago the French could probably have had a much better deal than now would be possible. He added that the offset to this, the value of which it was difficult to measure, was the more tolerant attitude that had apparently developed on the part of India and other Southern Asian States.

Ambassador Munro agreed to this thought and said he thought another offset was probably the development of a more favorable public opinion attitude in the UK and he would not be surprised if the same were true of the public opinion in the three ANZUS States. He concluded by saying that New Zealand was anxious to press on with the creation of the security organization.

1. A handwritten marginal note by O’Connor indicates that the Secretary saw and approved this memorandum prior to distribution.

2. The Southeast Asia section of the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister, issued June 28, reads as follows:

   “We discussed Southeast Asia and, in particular, examined the situation which would arise from the conclusion of an agreement on Indochina. We also considered the situation which would follow from failure to reach such an agreement.

   “We will press forward with plans for collective defense to meet either eventuality.

   “We are both convinced that if at Geneva the French Government is confronted with demands which prevent an acceptable agreement regarding Indochina, the international situation will be seriously aggravated.”

   For full text of the joint statement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954, p. 49.

3. See telegrams 4852 and 4853 to Paris, June 28, vol. xiii, Part 2, pp. 1755 and 1757.
4. Minutes of the informal ANZUS meeting held June 30 are on p. 588.