Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/6–3054

United States Minutes of Informal ANZUS Meeting

top secret

[Washington,] June 30, 1954—2:30 p.m.

Participants:

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. Bowie
  • Mr. Raynor
• Australia
  • Mr. R. G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs
  • Ambassador Spender
  • Mr. J. Mclntyre, Australian High Commissioner’s Office, London
  • Mr. F. J. Blakeney, Minister Australian Embassy
• New Zealand
  • Ambassador Munro
  • Mr. G. Laking, Minister
  • Mr. H. Wade, First Secretary
  • Mr. H.P. Jeffery, Second Secretary

The Secretary after welcoming Mr. Casey and the other representatives said that he thought the United States position on the several matters affecting the area of Southeast Asia had been made clear. Nevertheless, he would review it briefly. In the first place we felt that if there should be open Communist Chinese aggression it would mean the adoption by them of a new line of policy which would threaten the vital interests of the three ANZUS countries in the Pacific. The United States would regard such a threat so seriously that the President would go to our Congress to ask for war powers. The Secretary hoped and believed Australia and New Zealand stood with us on this matter. This matter was so serious that the United States might have to stand alone on it but he hoped this would not be necessary. In particular he felt that a determination on the part of all of us would be a deterrent as there would then be no room for miscalculation on the part of the Communist Chinese.

There are other situations in the area about which the United States is gravely concerned but where it would be difficult for the United States to act alone. The present Indochinese situation is a case in point. On this matter we have made known for some time our willingness to act with others. In early April we made this known to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and also to France but France has been reluctant to see open international intervention and has not been willing to invite it and the United Kingdom has also been hesitant on the matter. Under these circumstances the United States is not willing to “fight its way in” alone. However, the United States is still disposed to make a stand with force at any point where the issues are clear, worth fighting for and if others are willing to stand with us. Recent events have caused us concern. We believe if some agreement could have been reached several months ago while the Geneva Conference was going on it would have been possible for an agreed solution to have been reached at Geneva which we all might find acceptable. Whether under present conditions France will be able to attain a settlement which would be acceptable or, indeed, to assume the risks which would be involved in attempting to attain it is rather doubtful. The Secretary then read the points agreed to in the UK–US talks which are being transmitted to the French Government jointly by the United Kingdom and United States as to the ingredients of an acceptable settlement which the United Kingdom and United States Governments would be willing to respect. These points are that the settlement should:

1) preserve the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and assure the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces therefrom;

2) preserve at least the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible an enclave in the Delta; in this connection we would be unwilling to see the line of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally west from Dong Hoi;

3) does not impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers;

4) does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control;

5) does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate unification of Vietnam by peaceful means;

6) provide for the peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam; and

7) provide effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement.

The Secretary said that an agreement which included these points would leave a defensible position and that he was skeptical as to the ability of the French to get it unless they know they have some support on that position. This was the reason for making these reasons known to the French. The United States would be willing to take a stand on that or possibly on another basis but we have found thus far no one else willing to take a stand with us. He said he did not know whether the Communists would or would not accept these points. He was apprehensive that they might agree to something which looked very much like this but which would omit the necessary safeguards. In other words, there might be a possibility of getting this type of facade but in doing so the French would give away on so many details that the Communists would be able to take over the remaining area within a short time with the result that a situation would be created which would then directly threaten Thailand. The Secretary said he believed that the Communists would stop at a line if it were possible to set a line. On the other hand, perhaps the desire for peace in France is so strong and the feeling in Asia so strong that little if anything can be accomplished.

Mr. Casey said that his Government appreciated and welcomed the interest and concern of the United States Administration in Southeast Asia which was so near Australia’s back yard but he said some points on the matter were not entirely clear. For instance, he assumed that the French were still in touch with the other side and that the results of these negotiations would be known in a few weeks and he assumed we were in close touch with these talks.

The Secretary replied that we were unfortunately not in very close touch with the present French talks. He observed that certain talks which had been scheduled to be held in Indochina itself had just been postponed, the Communist reason of record being the rank of participants but that perhaps there were other reasons.

Mr. Casey inquired if an arrangement on Laos and Cambodia is being negotiated and if an arrangement is reached if it will be an agreement solely between China and France. He thought it was to our advantage that they not be the only participants. He said that based on his own conversation with Chou he had the impression that Chou’s main preoccupation was with the question of bases or airfields. He did not see how France could answer for the United States on that point. He wondered if it would be possible for the United States to make known its position on this point.

He also inquired as to who would be the participants and the signatories on the various agreements which may emerge. He raised this point in connection with what he presumed to be the likely agreement on Vietnam which would provide presumably for a temporary or permanent division of authority with the areas north of the Dong Hoi line less perhaps an enclave going to the Communists. Who would be the signatories to such an arrangement? Is a division of authority in any way to be guaranteed by others than the belligerents? He also asked if, in connection with the drafting of a SEATO, would it be contemplated that there be some form of a temporary SEATO to function until the time ratifications on a permanent instrument could be obtained. He inquired what SEATO would guarantee. He suggested that it might guarantee the autonomy of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, the remnant of Vietnam and possible other named states, with the signatories committed to use force to guarantee the autonomy. This procedure he said could entail the recognition of a Dong Hoi line without necessarily mentioning it by embodying in the instrument a determined intention to guarantee the autonomy of certain named states. He also inquired about the timing of a possible non-aggression pact without teeth which he said would be of a pious nature and have a psychological or public relations purpose and to which he thought India and Burma might adhere.

Ambassador Munro stated that the New Zealand Government recognizes the threat to security of overt Chinese aggression and shares the U.S. concern on this matter believing such aggression should be resisted. He added that he felt New Zealand’s record would indicate that New Zealand would play its part in such resistance. In the event of this happening New Zealand would favor immediate reference to the UN and consultation with the United States and other interested powers.

Ambassador Munro said that New Zealand favors the immediate prosecution of efforts to establish a SEATO and inquired as to our view of the period of time which this would take. He also inquired as to how the political instrument (apparently referring to the so-called non-aggression pact) would proceed. He also inquired how any settlement which the French reach could be implemented. He expressed the view that these matters (i.e., the political instrument and the implementation of a French settlement) should not be permitted to impede the development of a SEATO to which New Zealand attached first priority. He said that in the New Zealand view indirect aggression is the greatest danger and he wondered how this would be defined and what obligation with respect to it would be included in a treaty. He expressed the view that New Zealand was confident that the U.K. would become a party to these kinds of arrangements. He said that there would be a foreign affairs debate next week and that his Minister had been considering mentioning in the debate the need of consultation should there be overt Chinese aggression.

The Secretary said he welcomed the statements with respect to overt Chinese aggression which he believed was unlikely to occur but which if it did occur would constitute a threat of a new and serious character. It would mean that a decision had been taken to attempt to drive the U.S. and its allies out of the Western Pacific and turn the Pacific into a Communist body of water. The Secretary added that he felt overt Chinese aggression would be especially unlikely as we make clear that grave consequences would follow.

The Secretary said the other questions which had been raised involved:

1) the French settlement;

2) the establishment of SEATO; and,

3) the psychological instrument.

Commenting on the psychological matter, the Secretary said that we were not particularly interested in this unless it would result in arousing India’s interest. If it were intended that such an instrument would guarantee Communist conquests and that the signatories would be committed to fight to sustain such conquests the U.S. could not be considered to be a party to such an instrument. In this connection he referred to the overwhelming sentiment in Congress as reflected in the vote yesterday on the amendment to the Mutual Aid Bill on this subject. However, a simple reaffirmation of the UN Charter language such as Article 2 (4) expressed in the locale of Southeast Asia which would not consecrate Communist conquests but merely indicate the intention not to use force might be possible. He added, however, that he felt the initiative on this could come from some country other than the U.S. as we are not especially interested in it.

Turning to the question of a French settlement the Secretary said that in view of the uncertainty as to the nature of this settlement it might be possible to draw up a treaty leaving the area to be covered blank. In answer to Mr. Casey’s inquiry he felt Laos, Cambodia and what is left of Vietnam should be included even if they are demilitarized.

The Secretary agreed that the greatest danger in the area is the danger of subversion. On this question we have had little experience. Guatemala is an example. At Caracas the Organization of American States took a forward step by passing a resolution¹ which said in effect that Communist control of political institutions of any American State is in itself a threat to the hemisphere to be met by concerted action. He said at the meeting which had been planned of the OAS, economic sanctions would have been imposed on Guatemala. He felt that the knowledge that this was coming plus the fact that the UN did not meddle into a situation which was being handled by the OAS, had brought about the present favorable outcome of the Guatemala situation.

The Secretary said a doctrine of the above type could perhaps be applied to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam but he wondered if others would be willing to do so.

Ambassador Spender commented that the kind of action contemplated would in his opinion be the nub of the question.

The Secretary said the action contemplated was left blank at Caracas with the idea of deciding it on a case by case basis as situations developed.

Ambassador Spender inquired what our position would be if Communism spread in these countries following elections.

The Secretary replied that in his view any substantial expansion of Communist sphere of influence is a danger which should be resisted and he felt this should be done even if it resulted from purportedly free elections. He said he realized that was an extreme statement and if elections were adequately supervised and really free would not apply but he felt the danger here was not real as the Communists would not agree to free elections even though in parts of this area they might be able to win such elections. He thought, however, the Communists would refuse to agree to proper safeguards because of the precedent this would set for other areas such as Eastern Germany.

Ambassador Spender inquired if there were not a risk that the French would agree to plans for an election without proper safeguards.

The Secretary agreed that this was possible and that if it happened it would mean a Communist takeover in the area six months hence.

Mr. Casey said that he would feel happier if the U.S. were participating in some way in the current French negotiations.

Ambassador Munro asked if the press was correct in reporting rather rapid French military evacuations.

The Secretary said this was so and that they were retracting their defense perimeter in the Delta and that the Communists were moving into the evacuated areas within 24 hours after the French left. He said he happened to note a picture of some units of the French Fleet standing by at Haiphong which might imply plans for future evacuation.

Mr. Robertson reverted to the subject of elections and observed that in Cambodia we had the situation where the problem was caused by an invading army and that it was rather ridiculous to think that elections would be the solution for the problem which was not an indigenous one.

Ambassador Spender commented that we would fool ourselves if we think that the creation through SEATO or otherwise of a military shield in the traditional sense would be effective.

The Secretary agreed and said the real problem is how to bolster up the governments of the area so that they will not fall. They need to be permitted to have armies for internal security, to have some military advisers and to receive economic and technical assistance aid. He thought these things could be accomplished provided we have the time, the will and the money.

The Secretary said we do not have the slightest desire to have bases in Laos or Cambodia. He said as a matter of fact, the Thais have been pleading with us for a year or more to establish an air base in Thailand. He said this cry against U.S. bases by the Communists was really a slogan meaning Americans go home and reflects a desire on their part to keep the governments of the area weak so that they will collapse. He added that what may come out of a settlement therefore may be a fraud as it may have the color or cover of independence but with details so weak that the governments cannot possibly be strong enough to stand up against subversion.

Mr. Casey expressed himself as being in full agreement on the need for economic and technical aid.

The Secretary referred to the attitude of the governments of the Associated States and said the French apparently wanted us to bludgeon them into accepting whatever the French accept. On the other hand the Associated States are requesting military and other forms of assistance. He said this places us in a very difficult position especially as we do not know the form the settlement may take. Furthermore, should the Associated States be unwilling to accept what the French have agreed to we may have a situation resembling an inoperable armistice.

General Smith said it was most difficult to try to keep track of the talks which apparently were going on on at least three different levels. He had the impression that they were generally talking along the lines of the Molotov proposals which would mean no foreign troops, no foreign assistance of any kind, which would leave the Associated States isolated and weak.

Ambassador Munro inquired if there was really any serious hope of holding any part of Vietnam.

General Smith replied that he thought the French were asking for a free hand south of the Dong Hoi line, the neutralization of the two Catholic bishoprics and a temporary enclave in the Delta for evacuation purposes. He thought the Viet Minh on the other hand were probably demanding an enclave in northern Laos.

Ambassador Spender, supported by Mr. Casey expressed the view that it was essential for the French to inform the U.S. of what was going on. They said they thought the French were so indebted to us that they could hardly see how the French could refuse at least the presence of a U.S. observer.

General Smith commented that the French thus far have not even brought in the Vietnamese and referred to the embarrassment which would be caused to us by being confronted with a fait accompli which we could not accept.

Mr. Casey then inquired if events have overtaken the idea proposed by the U.S. of the ANZUS Minute² on overt Chinese aggression. He wondered if we still wanted a reply or if this would be covered in the SEATO instrument. He said Australia was willing to enter into discussions with us to develop plans, i.e., what each country would do in the event of the occurrence of this contingency but that he felt this might better be done under SEATO.

He then said Australia was prepared to join with the U.S., the U.K. and others in the guaranteeing of an acceptable settlement which would be backed up by force if necessary. He was not clear, however, as to what would be guaranteed, i.e., whether it would be based on the settlement the French make or whether it would be something to be determined by SEATO. He said it would be extremely difficult for Australia to create a breach in the Commonwealth ranks by going into something in which the U.K. did not participate but he said he held the view that the U.K. was now just as committed to SEATO as the rest of us.

General Smith said that one of these days he thought the three ANZUS members should discuss together estimates of what each country would be able to contribute and he hoped at the proper time Australia and New Zealand would be willing to join with us in such a discussion.

The Secretary inquired as to what the position of the ANZUS Treaty would be in the event of the creation of a broader treaty organization, i.e., would the broader treaty replace the ANZUS Treaty?

Ambassador Munro stated that the view of his Government was definite that ANZUS should be preserved no matter what broader treaty is created.

Ambassador Spender said that this was also the firm opinion of the Australian Cabinet.

Ambassador Munro added that New Zealand would be concerned about any idea of supplanting or weakening ANZUS.

The Secretary referred to the question of the ANZUS Minute and said that in some ways this had been overtaken by events as SEATO should cover the matter as to the area covered by SEATO. He said, however, in raising this matter he had been thinking of the peril inherent in the rising power and aggressiveness of Communist China. The Chinese may feel hemmed in by the Island Chain feeling that this line makes the Pacific a Western-dominated area and sometime the Chinese may, therefore, feel they must attempt to break this line. He had really raised this question from that broad angle.

General Smith wondered if the Agreed Minute, therefore, really had been overtaken by events and whether it wouldn’t be appropriate, pending the development of a SEATO for ANZUS to agree to it at this time. He referred in this connection to the provision contained therein for the immediate appeal to the UN for concerted action.

Mr. Casey said he had assumed the Minute was intended to be a confidential one.

The Secretary said this was the case. He had not intended to have it published. He said he had really wanted to know how Australia and New Zealand felt about the matter. He thought now he did know and thought this was, therefore, sufficient for the time being.

Ambassador Munro inquired how long we expected the SEATO discussions would be on a UK–US bilateral basis. He said that this had an effect on ANZUS and his Government didn’t want to see ANZUS weakened.

Ambassador Spender seconded this saying that he believed the ANZUS states had the right to be in on the discussions from the beginning.

The Secretary replied that the bilateral phase of the SEATO discussions were in effect merely a prolongation of the weekend talks and he thought the bilateral phase should last only a few days. Indeed, it might be possible to have concurrent ANZUS talks. He said we would really prefer to be talking on this with our ANZUS partners as we believe our interests were closer to theirs. He said Mr. Eden had originally suggested attaching political personnel to the five-power military staff group but that we had not favored this idea because of the resentment these talks had caused in the Philippines and Thailand. He referred to the complete over-expansion of French commitments and to the fact that the UK was also seriously over-committed. The US does have force which can be employed and it is our desire to work most closely on this with Australia and New Zealand.

General Smith suggested that there should be an ANZUS Deputies meeting as soon as the bilateral US–UK group makes sufficient progress to make it worthwhile.

The Secretary said we must give careful consideration to the formulation of the operative part of a SEATO treaty, i.e., what would “trigger it off” and that we also must give very careful thought to the formulation of the obligations which the members will incur.

Mr. Casey said he assumed in all of this that we were talking about the area of Southeast Asia and not considering the inclusion of Japan or ROK.

The Secretary indicated this was correct.

Ambassador Munro inquired as to what hope we had of Burma being included.

The Secretary said he was quite certain if we had two instruments, i.e., some political non-aggression instrument in addition to SEATO that he felt quite certain that Burma would sign only the innocuous instrument.

Ambassador Spender said in his own thinking he had thought the treaty might include a variety of headings including headings on military, economic aid, technical assistance, peaceful use of atomic energy, cultural relations and internal security.

Mr. Casey inquired if we thought something on the subject of economic aid or technical assistance could be written into the treaty. He said this would be good bait to the Asians as it would be attractive to them.

The Secretary offhand thought the treaty could contain a provision for meetings on various common problems such as for instance the problem of raising the standard of living. He thought the treaty could provide machinery for this but should probably not contain commitments on it. He added that if the treaty contained an economic section it might add to its attractiveness to countries such as Indonesia.

Mr. Casey said he would not expect Indonesia to enter into a SEATO which had any teeth in it. He said he wanted to mention what he regarded as a deteriorating situation in Indonesia and to the fact that the Australians firmly supported the Dutch position on Netherlands New Guinea although they were attempting to do so without unduly irritating Indonesia. He said he believed in the light of developments in Indonesia that the Australian position on Dutch New Guinea was proving to be correct. He said that the Australians had picked up a hint in Djakarta that the Indonesians might attempt to angle for US support on New Guinea by promising better general behavior. He hoped that if this should happen the US would not alter its attitude. He said the position of the government and public opinion on this question in Australia was extremely firm and public opinion on the subject lively.

The Secretary said we had no present intention of altering our position on the matter and certainly would not do so without consulting the Australians.

General Smith commented that from talks he had had at Geneva with Netherlands representatives he understood they would be willing to join in Southeast Asian arrangements. He said he had attempted to explain tactfully why this would not be desirable while at the same time expressing satisfaction that they were contemplating a strengthening of their forces in New Guinea.

Ambassador Munro raised the question of how Korea could be kept off the agenda of a renewed or special General Assembly on the Thai appeal. The question was not pressed.

Mr. Casey inquired as to what would happen if the French reach no agreement and the Viet Minh continue their military successes in the Delta. He also asked if we assume a continuance of the Geneva Conference.

General Smith said that in reply to the first question that it might be necessary to stage a rescue operation in which he thought the British might be willing to participate.

On the second question, the Secretary said that further high-level US participation at Geneva would depend primarily on developments.

There was then a brief discussion of the idea of guaranteeing the Geneva results and Mr. Robertson said that at Geneva the idea was that all participants in the Conference plus the Colombo powers would be invited to enter into such a guarantee.

The Secretary said that it was unlikely that the US would do this and certainly we would not join in a guarantee of a settlement which we regard as unacceptable.

Mr. Casey said he gathered it was the consensus that under SEATO the integrity of certain named states would in some way be guaranteed.

The Secretary closed the meeting by thanking Mr. Casey and Ambassador Munro for attending and expressed a desire on our part for continued close consultation and cooperation with our ANZUS partners.

1. Apparent reference to the “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism”, approved at the Tenth Inter-American Conference held at Caracas, Mar. 1–28, 1954. For text, see Department of State, Tenth Inter-American Conference (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 156–157. For documentation on this Conference, see vol. iv, pp. 264 ff.
2. See Attachment 2 to Raynor’s memorandum of a conversation held between the Secretary and Ambassadors Munro and Spender on June 4, p. 545.