Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 196th Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Saturday, May 8, 19541
[Extracts]
The following were present at the 196th Meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. Tuttle for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
4. Position of the United States With Respect to the British Proposal for a Five-Power Examination of the Situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia.
Mr. Cutler read the Council’s previous action on this subject and stated that the question was being reintroduced because certain members of the Council remained convinced of the desirability of including some Asian states, such as Thailand and the Philippines, in the proposed Five-Power arrangement. Mr. Cutler also pointed out that if it were now agreed to add these two states there might be a drift away from the original plan for a regional grouping. This might occur because the Five-Power plan plus Thailand and the Philippines would tend to take the place of the original regional grouping proposal made by the Secretary of State.
Secretary Dulles said that since the original Council action on this issue the alternative had become fairly clear to him in his own mind. It was whether we try to make the Five-Power staff agency the nucleus of a regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia, or keep it merely as a subsidiary mechanism and devote our major efforts at the political level to the creation of a regional grouping to include Asian states. The first alternative had been [Page 462] raised at the Pentagon when it was suggested that Thailand and the Philippines be added to the Five-Power staff agency. Secretary Dulles said that he had now become clearly opposed to this course of action. For one thing, the British wouldn’t agree to add Asian nations to the Five-Power staff agency, and especially they would oppose adding the Associated States. Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, he would rather follow the previous NSC action on the subject (NSC Action No. 1106–b), with the understanding that he, Secretary Dulles, should continue his conversations with the other interested powers even if the British would not go along with the attempt to form this regional grouping.
The President inquired of Secretary Dulles whether he was willing to see the personnel of the Five-Power staff agency upgraded and the importance of the agency magnified and advertised. This possibility caused him worry. Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford also expressed anxiety over inflating the authority of the Five-Power staff agency. Admiral Radford commented that if the purpose of the British proposal was to study military courses of action with their political implications, we already had sufficient information on this subject. Whatever further work needed to be done could be done quietly right here in Washington, and he recommended against adding political and economic problems to the agenda or upgrading personnel of the agency.
Secretary Dulles said that while he did not want to expose publicly our differences with the British, it was clear that we must attempt to take a bolder course of action than the British are willing to follow—especially with regard to the Associated States. It was impossible to leave them out, and accordingly he would say that if the British want to discuss military matters secretly in the context of the Five-Power staff agency, that was all right with him; but the matter should certainly be handled with secrecy. The President expressed agreement with Secretary Dulles, and the Council then spent some time in a rewording of the previous Council action on this subject.
Secretary Dulles made the point that while the examination which the Five-Power group would make would be secret, the mere fact that we were talking with the other four powers need not be secret.
Admiral Radford said that the British might well use this examination and the Five-Power staff agency as a means of sabotaging the larger project for a regional grouping.
The President summed up this part of the discussion by stating that we ought to tell the British that the existing Five-Power staff agency is altogether inadequate to discuss anything except strictly military matters. Admiral Radford expressed hearty agreement, [Page 463] and said that the whole discussion would do much better in Washington than in Singapore, and through secret and existing military channels.
The National Security Council:2
Agreed to amend NSC Action No. 1106–b to read as follows:
“b. Agreed that the United States should be willing to participate in an examination by the US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand of the military situation in Southeast Asia (including Indochina); provided that:
- “(1) The purpose of such examination is to explore, through secret and existing military channels in Washington, means by which these participating governments may assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves.
- “(2) It is made clear that such an examination is supplementary to continued efforts by the United States to organize a regional grouping pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086–b or 1104–b, and is neither a substitute for nor the nucleus of such a grouping.”
Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action.