Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/5–754: Telegram

The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Geneva, May 7, 1954—1 p.m.

Dulte 53. Re Tedul 36¹ and 37.² Following background information is pertinent.

First sentence in second paragraph of initial British draft read as follows: “I am ready to recommend that HM should take part at once with the US, France, Australia and New Zealand in a study to be undertaken by the Five-Power staff agency of the implications of such support for an Indochina Settlement.”

This sentence in latest draft now reads: “I am ready to recommend that HMG should take part at once with the US, France, Australia and New Zealand in a preliminary examination by the Five-Power staff agency of the Indochina and Southeast Asia situation, both now and as it may be after the Geneva Conference, in the light of this statement.”³

It is possible that British desire initially was to change our own proposal, which was intended primarily to start machinery on military levels for general consideration of Southeast Asia and Indochina situation and to improve bargaining position at Geneva, into a proposition amounting primarily to our committing ourselves in advance to association with and support of any Indochina settlement at Geneva no matter how unacceptable to us. This British position probably based on view that British political situation requires that in advance of Geneva settlement of failure, no step be taken indicating possibility of failure and British planning on that basis.

Feel it is clear from comparison of two versions quoted above that British have yielded considerably with respect to their initial position. In this connection, the shift in British position resulted not only from our persuasion and British fear of rift with US but also from pressure by Australians and New Zealanders.

Although current British press stories have apparently been based on original British effort to commit us in advance to support of any Geneva settlement, it is possible British public opinion might now be shifting somewhat because of President’s recent statement.

We think best method of sounding present state of British thinking is to reply to Eden’s proposal on basis of provisions contained in subparagraphs 1 and 2 of Tedul 36⁴ as representing US understanding and basis its acceptance of proposal. In light of foregoing do not see why this might not be acceptable to British provided provision subparagraph 1 is not wholly exclusive.

This reply should, of course, be made informally and orally in the hope that it would produce further favorable development in British position before anything is committed to paper on either side.

What I want to emphasize is that the British propose staff examinations by an already constituted agency as a matter of common prudence. They realize the necessity of this, yet they are caught on the horns of a dilemma, resulting on the one hand from the widespread feeling in Britain that in some way or other the Geneva Conference is going to produce agreements which will solve all of the problems of Asia, and on the other the inevitability of criticism that staff examinations and long-range planning should have been under way long ago. They see developments very much as indicated, the second and third conclusions mentioned in Tedul 37. Eden said “at the proper time you will bring in Thailand and we can probably bring in Burma, although this will take some doing.” They will of course be very sensitive as to the form of any public statement, for the reasons I have just mentioned. I would like as much latitude as possible in discussing this with Eden, as unfortunately it has leaked in all directions and in many distorted forms. As a matter of fact, press speculation has reached the point now that almost any public announcement might be a letdown. It might be just as well to proceed quietly and unostentatiously with the action contemplated and avoid any public statement.

Smith

1. Telegram Tedul 36 to Geneva, May 6, transmitted the text of NSC Action No. 1106–b, taken at the NSC meeting on May 6; see the memorandum of discussion, supra. (790.5/5–554)
2. See footnote 2, p. 451.
3. This draft has not been found in Department of State files.
4. These subparagraphs are identical to subparagraphs 1 and 2 of NSC Action No. 1106–b.