Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Memoranda of Conversation”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

top secret eyes only

[Washington,] May 9, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Admiral Radford
• Mr. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Captain George Anderson
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. Merchant

The meeting was called at the Secretary’s request to discuss the Department’s draft telegram to General Smith regarding the Eden five-power proposal.² Admiral Radford earlier in the day had indicated his disagreement with certain points notably the indicated possibility of publicizing the meeting of high level military representatives of the five powers in Washington. It had also developed that Defense had already sent to Admiral Davis in Geneva the text of the NSC decision on this matter arrived at Saturday morning,³ together with Defense comments. At the meeting with the Secretary Admiral Radford did not make available the text of this message. After some discussion in the course of which the Secretary made clear that the contents of the draft cable under discussion dealt essentially with political matters, including the question of publicity or non-publicity for the meeting of military representatives, it was tacitly agreed that a telegram would go forward with one or two minor language changes to meet certain subsidiary points of Admiral Radford.⁴

The conversation then turned to other measures which might be taken in Southeast Asia. The Secretary specifically asked Admiral Radford’s and Secretary Anderson’s views as to the negotiation of a “chip on the shoulder” mutual defense treaty with Thailand which might be open-ended to permit other adherents and which might provide for the stationing of a detachment of US troops in Thailand. It was made clear that on the latter point the Secretary was thinking of the “plate glass window” theory rather than a force sufficiently large effectively to defend Thailand against invasion. Admiral Radford was cool to the idea and strongly asserted that if Indochina fell to the Communists there existed no local military method of preventing the surrender over a period of several years of the rest of the area by Communist infiltration and (he feared particularly in Thailand) political accommodation. The Admiral stated that the only military solution was to go to the source of Communist power in the Far East, i.e., China, and destroy that power. The point was made that the true source of the power of the international Communist conspiracy was Russia, to which the Admiral assented, making the point that three or four years from now the balance of military power between the Soviets and the US will have shifted in the former’s favor because they will then have a sufficient stockpile of nuclear weapons which, although numerically less than the US stockpile, will give them the necessary capability to initiate and carry on general war on favorable terms. The Admiral indicated that he did not believe we would at any point in the future be confronted with as clear-cut a basis for taking measures directly against China as was the case now in Indochina.

The Secretary made clear that he was thinking in terms of increasing deterrents to war. He said he thought there was much to the British point of view that if you draw a line in advance then you serve notice on the enemy. At the same time you give him an opportunity to retreat or stay his hand which is not open to the enemy if you intervene in a war already under way. Moreover, the Secretary indicated that by drawing such a line in advance you have a better chance of rallying to your side the maximum number of allies. The Admiral did not give the impression of being impressed by this line of thought.

The conversation then shifted to Congressional attitudes. Secretary Anderson said that from his conversation on Friday with Senators Ferguson and Bridges⁵ he believed that no additional funds would be appropriated at this session of Congress for foreign economic or military aid, although he did believe that past appropriations would be carried forward. Admiral Radford expressed the view that this would do very serious damage to existing programs and would require extensive cancellation of existing contracts. Mr. Anderson was inclined to discount this but said that he was asking for an immediate study of the effects.

There was then some discussion of the political situation in Vietnam and the meeting broke up.

1. The conversation was held at the Secretary’s residence.
2. Apparent reference to a draft of telegram Tedul 48, infra.
3. May 8. See the memorandum of discussion, supra.
4. Admiral Radford, in a separate memorandum of this conversation dated May 10, wrote that he had told Dulles it had been his understanding the NSC had decided the talks were to be secret, with no publicity. Dulles had replied that he interpreted the decision to mean that while the talks would be secret, there would be a public announcement that they were being held. According to Radford, Dulles pointed out that even if Under Secretary Smith’s advice was followed—to induce uncertainty among the Communist powers by making no public announcement—the decision not to make the announcement would also be political. Radford noted that he had agreed the decision was a political one, but had argued that more thought needed to be given to the choice, particularly with respect to the impact of an announcement on Asian states, and that Dulles had agreed to modify the draft to indicate no decision had yet been made concerning a public announcement. (Department of Defense files)
5. Homer Ferguson of Michigan served on the Senate Appropriations Committee. Styles Bridges of New Hampshire was Chairman of the Committee.