Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 195th Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Thursday, May 6, 1954¹

top secret eyes only

May 6, 1954

[Extracts]

The following were present at the 195th meeting of the National Security Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; General Ridgway for the Secretary of the Army; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

1. Report on the Geneva Conference and the Indochina Situation (NSC Actions Nos. 1086–b and 1104–b)²

After Eden reached Geneva, Secretary Dulles said he had frank talks with him. Secretary Dulles’ irritation had been increased by the fact that when the Korean phase of the Conference opened and the United States was subjected to vicious attacks by Molotov and Chou En-lai, not a single representative of a Western power undertook to stand up and defend the policy of the United States or even to keep the historical record straight.

At this point Secretary Dulles read several paragraphs of the memorandum of his conversations³ with Eden at Geneva. Eden did not undertake to reply to Secretary Dulles’ complaints at this time, but subsequently sent a memorandum⁴ which constituted a reply to that of Secretary Dulles. The Secretary read portions of the Eden memorandum to the Council. In it Eden made much of India’s position and of the desirability of inducing Nehru to take a cooperative attitude, and set forth a proposal for the defense of Southeast Asia.

To this Eden memorandum Secretary Dulles replied on May 2,⁵ stating that he would bring to the President’s attention Eden’s proposal for the defense of Southeast Asia. There was much in the Eden proposal with which we could agree, said Secretary Dulles; but we clearly believe the danger to Southeast Asia to be more immediate than Eden does.

At this point Secretary Dulles said that he had covered for the Council the ground which he had already gone over with the President. Mr. Cutler went to the President’s office, and the President entered the meeting at 10:45 a.m.

Secretary Dulles then informed the Council of the latest developments. Yesterday afternoon he had received a message⁶ from Under Secretary Smith at Geneva, outlining a proposal by Anthony Eden along the lines of Eden’s earlier proposal to Secretary Dulles in answer to the Secretary’s letter to Eden of May 2, which had been mentioned earlier. This memorandum of Mr. Eden to Secretary Smith was read by Secretary Dulles to the Council. Eden said that he would agree to recommend that the UK take part at once with the U.S., France, Australia and New Zealand in an examination by the Five-Power staff agency (Singapore) of the Indochina and Southeast Asia situation. These talks would take place in the light of the Prime Minister’s statement that the UK would not give any undertakings about military action in Indochina until after the Geneva Conference. Eden’s memorandum added that it would be understood that the Colombo Conference powers (Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia), plus Thailand, would be kept advised of the progress of the work of the five powers and, where appropriate and agreed, they would be invited to take part with the five powers. A joint public announcement of intentions was also suggested by the Eden memorandum. Secretary Smith had added the comment that this new proposal represented a considerable British concession, and recommended that the U.S. concur in this proposal and agree to a joint announcement. Secretary Dulles also agreed that the new five-power proposal represented an advance in the British position and placed the UK in approximately the same position which it had occupied before it had backed out of the agreement to take part with the nine other powers in an examination of the possibilities of defending Southeast Asia. Thus the British would now agree at least to include Indochina in their planning, and also agree to do something prior to the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. If this represented an advance, the new British proposal entailed certain difficulties. One of them was the proposal to bring in the Colombo powers. Secretary Dulles said that he had already informed Eden that bringing these powers in would raise serious problems for the United States if we could not likewise bring in South Korea and Formosa, which the British opposed. Secretary Dulles thought that the proposal to include Thailand and Burma was excellent. The British also hoped to keep India benevolently neutral.

At this point the President strongly reaffirmed his anxiety over any arrangement which was confined to the five white nations and left out the Asian states. Secretary Dulles commented that at yesterday’s briefing of the Congressional leaders he had likewise indicated his own opposition to entering into arrangements only with these five powers and not with any of the Asian states themselves. The President suggested, however, that we might cast the purpose of such a five-power examination in such fashion that it would seem to be conferring voluntary aid on a group of Asian states which sought such aid cooperatively.

Secretary Dulles said that he would discuss a reply to this British proposal, at luncheon today following the meeting, with Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson. On that occasion he said he would also point out the need for machinery which would provide prompt replies to the messages which were flowing in from Geneva. He was going to suggest perhaps that he and Radford and Wilson each designate individuals to work together to get quick action on the Geneva messages. From now on out the Conference must largely be run from Washington.

With respect to the joint public announcement of the five-power arrangement, the President stated that it should be phrased along the lines of the suggestions he had made a few minutes ago with respect to the purpose.

Mr. Cutler asked about the possibility of including the three Associated States and the Philippines in the five-power talks. Secretary Dulles replied that the British would undoubtedly oppose associating Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the talks, for fear of getting the UK involved in the hostilities in Indochina.

The Vice President then addressed the following question to the Secretary of State: “Am I to understand that we intend to go along with the new British suggestion to use the Five-Power staff agency as the sole vehicle for concerted action in Southeast Asia? Or do we propose, parallel with exploration in the Five-Power staff agency, to continue to explore the possibility of a regional grouping with Asian nations and not merely with the five white powers?”

Secretary Dulles replied by stating his feeling that while he favored accepting the British proposal with respect to the Five-Power staff agency (whose terms of reference would be enlarged and its personnel upgraded), he thought this should only be done as one element in a broader political framework which would include more than the five powers. The Vice President commented that in his opinion the five-power arrangement would be almost as bad for the United States as would be unilateral U.S. intervention, since it would be interpreted by the Asian nations as sheer colonialism.

After the Vice President had repeated his question in slightly different wording, Secretary Dulles again assured him that the Five-Power staff agency would not be the top body, but would be merely a mechanism through which to try to create a broader grouping including Asian states. The broader grouping would be in a position to draw on the intelligence information which was available to the Five-Power staff agency. This, in short, would be a subsidiary body rather than the heart of a coalition. The great question, said Secretary Dulles, was whether the British would accept this view of the function of the Five-Power staff agency.

The Vice President then inquired whether anyone had given thought to bringing General Templer or Mr. MacDonald to Geneva as advisers. The Vice President thought both these men had a keen understanding of the realities of the Communist threat to Southeast Asia.

Secretary Dulles then asked Admiral Radford for his views with respect to the British five-power proposal. Admiral Radford replied that of course the proposal would require a careful appraisal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At first glance, however, he thought the British were laying the groundwork for a set-up which would be very much in their favor but not in ours if the proposal excluded Asian nations. Furthermore, he predicted that it would take a very long time to work out the British proposal—so long, in fact, that it would be of no use in meeting the current emergency in Southeast Asia. The Five-Power staff agency was already pretty well agreed on the military requirements for the defense of Southeast Asia, but if it was now proposed to add the political and economic problems, these would take months to resolve.

The President said that he well understood the points Admiral Radford had made, but he nevertheless felt that the psychological appeal of the British proposal was important, despite the substantive difficulties. The Five-Power staff agency would at least provide a good facade behind which the real work could be done by the others.

Secretary Wilson queried whether our real difficulty didn’t result from the lack of participation of any Asian nations of large size. Thailand, for example, was too small to carry much weight. The President pointed out that small or not, such nations as Thailand at least provided the semblance of Asian participation.

Secretary Dulles reminded the Council that in Molotov’s Geneva speech,⁷ referring to the proposed Southeast Asian regional grouping, he had charged that not a single respectable Asian nation would agree to join the coalition. The President replied by asking why no one ever took such occasions as this to stand up and blast Russian colonialism. In any event, said the President, the new British proposal represented such a significant advance from their previous position that the United States should certainly follow it through.

Mr. Cutler then said that this seemed an opportune moment to brief the Council on the report which was being made by the Operations Coordinating Board with respect to the possibility of setting up an international volunteer air group for combat operations in Southeast Asia. While, said Mr. Cutler, he thought that the creation of such a volunteer air group came within the existing U.S. policy on Southeast Asia, he felt, nevertheless, that the progress of study of this problem should be reported to the Council. Mr. Cutler said he believed that the air group was to be equipped with three squadrons of F–86 planes.

The President commented that the volunteer air group ought to have in it a certain number of multi-trained pilots so that if, for example, the question of using B–29’s ever came up again, such planes could be provided without involving us in the danger of having to use U.S. Air Force pilots in combat operations.

Mr. Cutler then inquired whether it was advisable to ask CIA to provide an intelligence estimate as to the probable Chinese Communist reaction to the creation of such an international volunteer air group. U.S. citizens, of course, might volunteer for combat action, and the question whether this was feasible would presumably be studied by the Department of Defense. Mr. Allen Dulles agreed to provide such an intelligence estimate.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether the proposed volunteer air group would be under the ultimate control of the President. Mr. Cutler replied in the negative, indicating that we would have no responsibility for the group, which would be developed along the lines of General Chennault’s “Flying Tigers” in the second World War. This would mean, said Secretary Dulles, that our volunteers could join the air group without Congressional approval. The answer seemed to be in the affirmative.

With respect to Chinese Communist reaction, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists would intervene if they wanted to, but the use of a volunteer air group rather than regular U.S. combat forces would enable the Chinese, if they wanted to, to avoid intervention without loss of face.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Discussed the situation with respect to Indochina in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of State on the Geneva Conference and the Indochina situation.

b. Agreed that the United States should be willing, in response to a British proposal, to participate in an examination by the existing Five-Power staff agency (US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand) of the situation in Southeast Asia (including Indochina); provided that:

(1) The purpose of such examination is to explore means by which these participating governments may assist the countries of Southeast Asia in a cooperative effort to defend themselves.

(2) It is made clear that such an examination is supplementary to continued efforts by the United States to organize a regional grouping pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086–b or 1104–b, and is neither a substitute for nor the nucleus of such a grouping.⁹

c. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, would recommend to the President means for promptly answering questions raised by developments at the Geneva Conference.

d. Directed the NSC Planning Board to study urgently the implications of the latest proposal on Indochina which the French are contemplating presenting to the Geneva Conference.

e. Agreed that the Operations Coordinating Board should proceed with its proposed further study of an international volunteer air group for combat operations in Southeast Asia for consideration by the Council, including an estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency of probable Chinese Communist reaction.

f. Noted that the Secretary of State had presented to the recent NATO meeting in Paris a statement on the United States position regarding nuclear weapons, a copy of which was made available for the Council files.

g. Noted, as read at the meeting, the statement which the Secretary of State had made to the Soviet Foreign Minister at Geneva in response to the latter’s reply to the President’s proposals for peaceful uses of atomic energy.

h. Requested the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, to report to the Council as soon as possible and not later than June 3, 1954 on the desirability of an international moratorium on further tests of nuclear weapons.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action. The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense. The action in e above subsequently transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board. The action in h above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Gleason on May 8.
2. Dated Apr. 6 and Apr. 29, respectively. They are included with the memoranda of discussion at NSC meetings held on those dates in vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 1250 and Part 2, p. 1431, respectively.
3. See footnote 2, p. 438, for an extract from a memorandum of a conversation with Eden, Apr. 30.
4. Included in telegram Dulte 30 from Geneva, Apr. 30, p. 437.
5. See telegram Dulte 45 from Geneva, May 3, p. 444.
6. Telegram Dulte 51, supra.
7. Probably a reference to the address delivered on Apr. 29 by Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister. Regarding this speech, see telegram Secto 41, Apr. 29, vol. xvi, p. 157.
8. The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1106. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95) Sections of this action unrelated to the extracts printed here are not annotated.

9. In a memorandum of a conversation held between himself, President Eisenhower, and Secretary Dulles at the White House on May 7, Cutler wrote that among the topics discussed was:

   “1. Whether the President should approve paragraph lb of the tentative Record of Action of the 5/6/54 NSC Meeting, which covers the proposed answer to the Eden proposal. The Secretary of State thought the text was correct. Wilson and Radford preferred the draft message to Smith for Eden prepared yesterday by MacArthur and Captain Anderson, and cleared by the JCS, which included in the Five Power Staff Agency Thailand and the Philippines. Radford thinks that the Agency (which has hitherto been not disclosed in SEA) has really completed its military planning; that if it is enlarged by top level personnel, its actions will be necessarily open to the world; that therefore some Southeast Asian countries should be included in it, and he fears Eden’S proposal as an intended delaying action.

   “The President approved the text of paragraph lb, but suggested that Smith’s reply to Eden’s proposal should make clear the following:

   • “1. Five Power Staff Agency, alone or with other nations, is not to the United States a satisfactory substitute for a broad political coalition which will include the Southeast Asian countries which are to be defended.
   • “2. Five Power Staff Agency examination is acceptable to see how these nations can give military aid to the Southeast Asian countries in their cooperative defense effort.
   • “3. The United States will not agree to a “white man’s party” to determine the problems of the Southeast Asian nations.

   “I was instructed to advise Wilson and Radford of the above, and have done so.” (Memorandum of May 7, attached to a memorandum of May 11 by Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff; PPS files, lot 65 D 101. The memorandum of May 7 is printed in Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 436–438.) The “draft message” Cutler referred to has not been found in Department of State files.