790.5/5–554: Telegram
The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Department of State1
priority
Dulte 51. London eyes only Ambassador. Eden has just given me the memorandum which follows:
“In his statement in the House of Commons on April 27, the Prime Minister said:
“‘Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to give any undertakings about United Kingdom military action in Indochina in advance of the results of Geneva. Her Majesty’s Government have not entered into any new political or military commitments. My Right Honorable friend has, of course, made it clear to his colleagues at Geneva that if settlements are reached at Geneva, Her Majesty’s Government will be ready to play their full part in supporting them in order to promote a stable peace in the Far East.’
“I am ready to recommend that Her Majesty’s Government should take part at once with the United States, France, Australia and New Zealand in an examination by the Five Power staff agency of the Indochina and South East Asia situation, both now and subsequent to the Geneva conference, in the light of this statement, including the implications of any Geneva settlement. In addition to military questions, there will certainly be political and economic problems which will require urgent examination. For this purpose we suggest that political and economic experts should, be attached to the agency as appropriate.
“This study would be of direct interest to a number of other countries, notably the powers represented at the Colombo conference and Siam. It would be understood that these countries would be informed of the intention to initiate the study, kept suitably advised of the progress of the work and, where appropriate and by agreement, invited to take part.
“A joint public announcement of our intentions would be issued. It would, of course, be essential that this should be carefully considered and agreed upon.
[Page 451]“The present terms of reference of the Five Power staff agency would require amendment in order to make clear the circumstances to which the study is to apply.”
This represents a number of redrafts since I received his proposed draft note2 late yesterday evening. We have had lengthy and I believe frank discussions, and I am sure the British understand our position as we understand theirs. The note represents a considerable compromise on their part and includes suggestions made not only by me but by Phleger and Admiral Davis. We believe here that if accepted it will have a good effect on the conference and on the public opinion of both countries, and should produce a coordinated military view, which is now lacking. Eden has suggested informally that the Five Power agency be strengthened by the assignment of some senior and experienced officers. He went so far as to imply that General Templer, who will shortly become CIGS, might take part in the examinations and plans which are proposed. Our recommendation is that you concur in this proposal. If so, please give me your views as to the form of joint public announcement which would be acceptable. This will not be taken up with the French until both London and Washington have concurred.3
- Repeated for information to London.↩
- Not found in Department of State files; for a quotation from it, see telegram Dulte 53 from Geneva, May 7, p. 459.↩
Telegram Tedul 37 to Under Secretary Smith at Geneva, May 6, drafted by Ambassador Matthews, is a summary of the Secretary’s remarks to Congressional leaders on May 5 concerning the Geneva Conference and related developments. According to this text, the Secretary had in part concluded that the “US must push rapidly for development of SEA community, probably without Vietnam but hopefully with Laos and Cambodia. British might come in and they might want Burma and India too. We were agreeable to Burma. This community might offer fair chance ‘insulate’ rest SEA against possible loss of Vietnam.”
The Secretary, later during the briefing, read extracts from telegram Dulte 51. “Judd strongly against Eden ‘plan’, wanted Asians in even without UK and France. Knowland agreed on importance of Asians, as did several others. Knowland said we should have commitments from UK, Australia, New Zealand and others to help us if needed in Korea or Japan, et cetera, if we were to have collective security pact with them for SEA, which he personally favored. Secretary said Burma, Thailand, Philippines plus A.S. would help and that he told Eden he wanted Formosa in if British brought in India. McCormack and Smith supported Secretary on conclusion three [see preceding quotation] and several others did too.” (790.5/5–554) Full text of Tedul 37 is printed in vol. xvi, p. 706. For text of the Secretary’s briefing, see vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 1471.
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