Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108

United States Delegation Minutes of a Meeting at the Quai d’Orsay, May 28, 1952, 4 p.m.¹

secret
SCEM Min 3

[Washington,?] June 3, 1952.

Participants:

• France
• Mr. Pinay
• Mr. Pleven
• Mr. Robert Schuman
• Mr. Queuille
• Mr. Brune
• Mr. Maurice Schumann
• Mr. Parodi
• Mr. LaTournelle
• Mr. de Margerie
• Mr. Bourbon-Busset
• Mr. Binoche
• Mr. Laley
• U.S.
• The Secretary
• Mr. Jessup
• Mr. Dunn
• Mr. Perkins
• Mr. Wallner
• Mr. Knight
• Mr. Utter

Subject:

• North Africa

Mr. Schuman, as the responsible minister, opened the meeting with an exposé of the North African problem, pointing out difficulties and possible joint action. He stressed the importance which France attaches to North Africa, where a special situation exists because of the long occupation by the French and the presence of two million Europeans in the territory. In mentioning the concern of the French not only for the French in North Africa but also for the natives, he pointed out how French attitude had changed after two world wars from the previous 19th Century colonial concept. A résumé of French policy, he declared, was contained in the following sentence of the 1946 constitution: “France intends to lead peoples for whom she has assumed responsibility toward freedom to administer themselves and to conduct their own affairs on a democratic basis.”

The difference between French and nationalist policy was that the latter wished to move on to independence without reforms which they considered secondary, while the French held reforms of primary importance in moving gradually toward the establishment of self government. If necessary stages were not respected there would be anarchy. In maintaining law and order in North Africa the French are convinced they are defending the interest of the Allies as well as their own. Otherwise, there is a risk of communist action behind the nationalist cloak, indications of which have been evident in recent events in Tunisia.

Mr. Schuman defined French policy as one envisaging agreement with two partners, namely the Bey and the Sultan, with whom protectorate treaties were signed. He described the difficulties in convincing leaders who were attached to feudal principles to move toward democratic institutions and the difficulties French were having to find the right men to accomplish democratic development. Mr. Schuman stressed that France is not against nationalism and understands the Tunisian and Moroccan desire and perfect right to obtain internal autonomy. France cannot, however, accept terrorism or systematic agitation for the political role. He referred to the role of the Arab League in promoting agitation and attempts by the League in its almost official status in the UN to obtain intervention in affairs which are the sole concern of France and Tunisia. The Arab League, Destour, and Istiqlal, are all trying to prevent agreement in order to put these questions on an international basis in the UN.

Mr. Schuman thanked the Secretary for having supported the French stand regarding Morocco in the Sixth General Assembly in Paris. He stated that there was at present no tension in Morocco and the Sultan had asked the French to delay their reply to him until the Resident General returned. Mr. Schuman admitted that this did not mean there were no problems and that there would be no difficulties in Morocco. There were indications that negotiations would be opened soon as the result of the memorandum received from the Sultan. The latter had expressed the desire to deal directly with the French Government.

While there is no Moroccan crisis the situation is very difficult in Tunisia. On April 14 France had the support of the United States in the Security Council but subsequently the situation had changed. Through indiscretion extremists had learned that the attitude taken by the U.S. Government had been discussed and that it might change. Henceforth it was believed the U.S. Government would vote for the inscription of the Tunisian question in the UN. Mr. Schuman felt that there would be no special session of the UN for this item but he hoped some agreement might be found so that the extremists would not exploit the U.S. position in the Seventh General Assembly. The Tunisians have systematically avoided commencing negotiations solely because they were speculating on UN intervention.

Mr. Schuman expressed understanding of the difficulties the U.S. Government had to face in connection with U.S. public opinion and the courage required by the Secretary’s decision in the Security Council on April 14. He then referred to the U.S. rejoinder of April 30 and the Moroccan case for the International Court of Justice which he contended questioned the protectorate status in Morocco.² He remarked that repercussions from such errors could be graver than the error itself.

Referring to reforms in Tunisia, Mr. Schuman said that details of these had been conveyed to the U.S. Government and France would institute reforms when the Bey indicates his readiness. He then talked of our common tasks in North Africa. France, in defending its own interests, was defending those of the Allied community. In December of 1950 France had given facilities for American air bases in Morocco and had not asked for any counterpart, feeling that it was the duty of France to give such facilities. However, when further bases were contemplated for Algeria and Tunisia the French had sought to find a mutually satisfactory formula to establish the principle of non-interference in North African political affairs. There must also be agreement on status for U.S. forces in North Africa before consideration is given to a possible increase of U.S. forces in Morocco. The principle of rights and duties on both sides must be clearly defined. The purpose of the exchange of views between the U.S. and French was to determine on what points the French could count on the U.S.

If in the UN a situation developed which the French considered unjust, Schuman declared that France would have to choose between the UN and the interests of France. He sincerely hoped that the French interests will not run counter to UN interests, but he pointed out that in the troubled state of the world France had the duty of defending the interests of France which were those of Western civilization.

Mr. Pleven remarked that nothing can trouble Franco-Moroccan relations more than misunderstanding of North Africa and he felt that some misunderstanding existed at the present time. He referred to a complex of problems existing in North Africa due in large measure to the large French population and the necessity for the U.S. to understand the situation.

Mr. Pinay then requested the Secretary to comment on the problems raised by Mr. Schuman and Mr. Pleven.

Expressing gratification at the frankness of the exchanges, the Secretary stated there was no misunderstanding by the U.S. Government but difficulties lay in the force of public opinion in the U.S. and France. The U.S. Government, he said, believes that continuation and strengthening of the French position in North Africa is basic and essential. Without France in North Africa that territory would disintegrate into quarreling, small, weak states, affording ideal terrain for communism and extreme nationalism. It was the U.S. desire to act in every way possible to strengthen the position of France in North Africa and that is unequivocally the policy of the American Government. After removing this illusory difficulty the Secretary wished to come to the real difficulty, which was unrest and agitation in Tunisia and Morocco. While the U.S. Government was not directly concerned with the substance of the unrest and had no mission or desire to bring about other systems in North Africa, it was interested in seeking a way to lessen that agitation. This unrest was related to similar unrest throughout the world since the war and ranked with a spirit of nationalism in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and the Arab world. The agitation in North Africa found echoes in the rest of the world.

In considering the most effective method to settle the agitation and to bring about order and stability, one must choose between negative and positive attitudes and in doing so it is necessary to examine our public opinion and the democratic setup, together with the nature of the North African problem and similar problems throughout the world. The heart of any solution lies in the French working with authorities in the area. This cannot be brought about by France’s friends, enemies, or an association of both, such as the UN. The problem is to find the best way to create an environment whereby France can work out a solution in Tunisia and Morocco. The negative approach would be to suppress criticism and discussion and work the problem out in an atmosphere of silence. The positive approach would be to take an offensive in which the French Government would declare that it had a solution which was progressive and good and of which it was proud and wanted everyone to know about. France should get her friends to support her program and rally the European and Latin American states to her policy. It is not for France’s friends to suggest what these reforms should be. The U.S. is in no position to know; however, it might be wise for the French to consult with their friends to find out what reception would be given to these reforms by public opinion in other parts of the world. Certain modifications might then be made. The Secretary urged that reforms be put forward at once in order to put an end to the present state of non-activity.

Turning to the public opinion problem in the U.S., the Secretary said he doubted whether the French really understood it. The Government did not fear going against public opinion, but in the North African case its position was drowned out by contrary voices of press, radio, and influential public figures. This attitude sprang from ignorance of the situation in North Africa and certain American habits of thinking. Among these American habits of thinking were:

(1) Traditional sympathy for people who say they are oppressed, which strikes a responsive chord among Americans who liberated themselves from a former oppressed state, thanks to French help;

(2) Deep-rooted belief that anyone has a right to be heard publicly, whether his case is good or bad. The U.S. Government position seems to deny public forum for North Africans, whether in the General Assembly, the Security Council, or in the U.S. Consulates in North Africa, and this bewilders Americans.

The U.S. Government can oppose these habits of thought but cannot change them. It could, however, canalize them satisfactorily if it could point to a substantive French program and say it is a good and fair program, and that the sensible thing to do is to get behind this program and stop sympathizing with the agitators. Absence of such a program is the root of our trouble. This absence rather than any official indiscretion gave rise to the wide belief echoed in the world press, to which Mr. Schuman had referred, that the U.S. Government was about to change its position in the Tunisian case in the Security Council.

Referring specifically to the UN problem, the Secretary said he was hopeful of avoiding a special General Assembly session, but that unless there was some change, inscription of the Tunisian item at the GA next October seemed to be inevitable. On the other hand, if the French had announced their program it might be possible to turn a liability into an asset, to get the UK and other friendly nations especially the Latin American countries behind it, and then to take the offensive in the GA and win.

Mr. Schuman expressed warm thanks for the Secretary’s words. As far as Tunisia is concerned, he said, “We have a program; we have given it to the Bey and to the U.S. Embassy in Paris.” As to substance, the French are not at fault, but they have not published the program because of difficulties of oriental habits of negotiation, which were intensified by the nationalist clamor involving the raising of the ante at every turn. Perhaps, however, the time had come to change tactics and to publish the program. This was a matter which would receive Cabinet consideration within the next few days. Seconded by Mr. Pleven, Mr. Schuman again asked whether misinterpretations of U.S. motives could not be definitely removed from North African minds and he referred to the report of the Veterans Affairs Minister Temple, who has just returned after talking to all shades of Tunisian opinion and which was unanimous in stating the Tunisians would block any French reform program as long as the possibility existed that the U.S. would agree to UN discussion of the case.

The Secretary again analyzed the U.S. public opinion problem and said that while he could again restate the U.S. position to the press this would be of doubtful value unless coupled with the publication of the French program. He asked whether the program we had received was complete and urged the U.S. be shown a program for publication in order to offer drafting suggestions to make it palatable to public opinion in various parts of the world.

Mr. Schuman said the Tunisian program is not complete but was to be completed by a mixed commission. The commission, however, never met, and French plans now call for putting the program into effect without going through the commission. If the French published the plan would the Secretary make a public statement along the lines he had stated at the table today regarding the necessity of French presence in North Africa.

The Secretary replied that this was not impossible. It would be good if the U.S. and the UK could publicly and vigorously support a sound French program, but the U.S. would wish to see it in advance and be able to offer suggestions. He recapitulated: our objectives are identical; there is no misunderstanding between our governments; irritation between French and U.S. public opinion will continue unless we can do something constructive, and the sooner the better.

The conversation then turned to what could be said to the press. Mr. Pinay naively suggested that the Secretary make the statement of support for the French position at once. The Secretary declined this gambit, pointing to the necessity to see the French program and discuss it with the President and the Cabinet. The Ministers agreed that whatever was said to the press should be agreed upon by both sides. They accepted Mr. Schuman’s suggestion that nothing be said to the press Wednesday, but that a communiqué carrying all three meetings should be published at the conclusion of the discussions Thursday afternoon. Such a communiqué should be general in nature.

1. A negotiating paper, entitled “The Franco-Tunisian Problem”, was prepared for the Secretary to use in his talk with Schuman. Attached to the paper was a memorandum, dated May 12, stating that the paper had been approved at the working level. The negotiating paper stated that every device should be used to highlight the importance the United States attached to the Tunisian question. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 110) The Secretary sent a report of the conversation back to the Department in telegram 7425 from Paris, May 29, not printed. (772.00/5–2952)
2. See pp. 189 ff.