772.00/5–2552
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the Embassy in France (Utter)1
Participants:
- François Puaux, Director of Protectorate Division, Africa-Levant, Foreign Office.
- John E. Utter, Embassy, Paris.
Present thinking of the Foreign Office regarding Tunisia and more [Page 764] generally North Africa was brought out during a long conversation I had with François Puaux, Director of the Protectorate Division in the Foreign Office. Following are the highlights:
The conclusions of Emmanuel Temple, Minister of Veterans, and Jean Binoche, Director of the Africa-Levant Section of the Foreign Office, during their recent trip to Tunis confirmed, according to Puaux, the growing conviction in the Foreign Office that the proposed Franco-Tunisian Commission for negotiating reforms was a dead issue and the French must go ahead with their own program immediately. Puaux referred to a telegram just received from Hauteclocque which stated that the Bey had suggested that the matter be dealt with directly between the Resident General and himself. Temple, who held many conversations in Tunis with a wide variety of Tunisians, including former Prime Minister Chenik and Destourians, was referred to by Puaux as well-intentioned but not very shrewd (“malin”). Temple had returned from his exploratory mission, which had been sanctioned by Schuman despite the misgivings of Pinay, completely disillusioned. He had found that Tunisian demands for the recall of Hauteclocque, the re-installation of Chenik, the liberation of Bourghiba, etc. as preliminaries to negotiation so extreme as to rule out the establishment of a Mixed Commission. Puaux remarked that much valuable time had been wasted by the thoroughly unrealistic concept of this Commission.
When I pointedly repeated the necessity of urgent and magnanimous action on the part of the French and the hope that some satisfactory progress would be made in view of the impending conversations between Schuman and the Secretary, Puaux assured me that urgent consideration was being given to the problem, but that the United States could be helpful in affirming its support of its NATO ally. He stated that if the United States Government would unequivocally come out in support of France, the Tunisians would at once cease their clamorings and become reasonable. I again pointed out the virulent attacks to which our Government had been subjected following its action in the last United Nations General Assembly regarding Morocco and more recently in the Security Council over Tunisia, and that we must expect from the French Government an earnest of its good intentions if we were to champion it against domestic public opinion and Asiatic-Arab attacks. I insisted that nothing short of a sincere and definite program which could be implemented without delay would quiet the critics of France.
[Page 765]I then asked Puaux what long term objectives, if any, the French had in mind in respect of all North Africa, quite apart from the more pressing immediate measures which they presumably were prepared to undertake. He replied that in view of the large European population there, the close geographic relation to Europe, the strategic and economic importance of the area, France would never relinquish entirely its control. Referring to the possible dispositions under the French Union, I asked whether they envisaged Tunisia and Morocco eventually as Associated States, and was given a firm No. Puaux said that once French troops left Indochina the three Associated States there would be virtually independent, with only monetary and economic ties to France. This, he emphasized, could not be possible for North Africa. What then would be the future status of Tunisia and Morocco, I asked? Some form of Protectorate status, Puaux replied, must be projected indefinitely. This, of course, bears out the oft-repeated conviction of our Foreign Service officers in North Africa that France has no intention of ever leaving those shores, unless forcibly removed.
In view of this conversation, I venture to surmise that the paper which Puaux has prepared for Schuman for use in his conversations with the Secretary will include the following points:
- 1)
- France is ready to institute reforms in Tunisia and Morocco, providing for wider participation of the native populations in the administration of their affairs and leading to virtual internal autonomy over a period of years, the time depending on the speed with which Tunisians and Moroccans demonstrate their capacities for assuming the tasks of self-government. France will, however, continue to maintain control over foreign affairs and the defense of the countries and will assure the rights of French nationals there.
- 2)
- France expects from the United States full support for its policy in North Africa. In the French view this will deflate the comparatively small group of unrealistic extremists, allow for the development of friendly relationships between France and the moderate elements, and help to preserve law and order to necessary to the security of these highly strategic territories.
- 3)
- France will not be in a position to envisage extension of bases to the United States in Algeria and Tunisia without assurances that the United States shows full confidence in the French handling of the North African situation, and plays an active role in defending France’s policy against critics in the United States and abroad. To this end, the Department of State can use its influence on the American press, which has so unquestioningly accepted the nationalist point of view widely ballyhooed by the irresponsible Asiatic-Arab bloc in the United Nations.
- The memorandum of conversation was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 3106 from Paris, May 26. The despatch informed the Department of State that the interview had been held to elicit the general line Schuman might take on North Africa in his forthcoming conversations with the Secretary of State. (772.00/5–2552)↩