Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

772.00/6–1052: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Department of State

secret

New York, June 10, 1952—7:06 p.m.

915. Re Tunisia. As reported ourtel 910, June 10,⁵ Asian/African group plans meet June 12 or 13 with intention to reach decision to request SYG circulate membership on special session call. This info, if correct, raises urgent important problems.

1. Should US Govt attempt dissuade ASAF group from taking this action?

Dept will be aware rule 9 of GA rules of procedure provides for 30-day period from date of SYG communication during which members may concur in request. If request should be circulated, we might face full month of confusion doubt and agitation with possibly serious impact on Tunisian situation itself.

2. If we do not seek to influence ASAF group from proceeding with request for special session, we would be confronted at once following issuance SYG communication with inquiries from many dels concerning our attitude. Our assumption here is that we would have no choice but to respond frankly that we oppose a special session. There is of course no room for “abstention”, the issue being whether or not we concur in the request.

3. Our position may influence attitude of some members, possibly enough to prevent majority concurrence. It is difficult to see how we can avoid incurring displeasure of ASAFs in any case. However, we may be in better position if we make a successful effort to disuade them from proceeding. If on the other hand we “let nature take its course” and say 25 or more UN members express their concurrence, we would then be in the position of opposing a much larger sector of UN opinion than merely the ASAFs.

4. If it is decided to attempt to dissuade ASAFs from proceeding, we could advise group that we continue to oppose UN debate for reasons set forth in SC in April. We should avoid promises or predictions of any nature. Our approach to them might of course be unavailing but at least we would have told them frankly and in advance what our position would be if they nevertheless insisted upon proceeding.²

Gross

5. Not printed; it reported that at a June 6 meeting of the Asian-Arab group, it was decided that the group would review the prospect of obtaining a special session of the General Assembly. After a count of possible supporters, the group felt it was close to having the 31 votes necessary to call a special session. (772.00/6–1052)
2. Telegram 479 to USUN, June 11, instructed the Mission at the United Nations to inform the Tunisians that the U.S. position was predicated on the hope that the Tunisian problem would be solved by the French reform proposals. Since the French proposals were still unknown, the United States would be obliged to withhold support for a special session. (772.00/6–1052)