Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

772.00/5–2252

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Northern Africa Affairs (Cyr)

secret

[Washington,] May 22, 1952.

Subject:

• Tunisia

Participants:

• The Under Secretary
• NEA—Mr. Berry
• EUK—Mr. Bonbright
• NE —Mr. G. L. Jones
• UNP—Mr. Wainhouse
• WE—Mr. McBride
• G —Mr. Matthews
• UNA —Mr. Hickerson
• S/P —Mr. Ferguson
• S/S —Mr. Mc-Williams
• USUN—Mr. Maffitt
• AF —Mr. Cyr
• Mr. Jernegan—ConGen Tunis

Mr. Bruce welcomed Mr. Jernegan to Washington and asked him to state his views on Tunisia, with particular reference to action that the French should take and any recommendation he might wish to make as to what the United States position should be.

Mr. Jernegan stated that the Nationalist movement in Tunisia started in the early 1920’s—a fact which is too often overlooked by the French. The Neo-Destour Party’s alleged membership of 300,000 may be exaggerated, but recent events have certainly swelled the ranks of sympathizers to much more than that. Current events have brought about a solidarity among the Tunisian people, including even the moderates. This solidarity now reflects a body of opinion which cannot be eradicated by force—it can only be channeled. From this viewpoint, Mr. Jernegan said, he believes the French have made many mistakes in the last few months. They have offered too little too late. The French December 15 note, for example, was very badly framed and offended the Tunisians very deeply.

In answer to Mr. Matthews’ question as to the background of this note, Mr. Jernegan explained that upon becoming disillusioned with the manner in which the February 8, 1951 reforms were being implemented, Prime Minister Chenik went to Paris in October 1951 with three demands: an all-Tunisian Assembly, an all-Tunisian Cabinet, and an all-Tunisian civil service. He remained there until December 15 when the French reply was delivered to him.

In reply to Mr. Bruce’s question, Mr. Jernegan stated that the Tunisian demands did not except financial matters, but he expressed the opinion that the Tunisians undoubtedly would compromise on this point and be willing to leave financial matters in French hands, at least for a time. Mr. Jernegan stated that Resident General Perillier did not like the French note of December 15. He himself, however, was fired for being too lenient.

After receiving the December 15 note, Mr. Jernegan stated, the Tunisians despaired of reaching any sort of agreement with the French and proceeded to appeal to the Security Council. At that point the New Resident General, M. de Hauteclocque, arrived in Tunis and was highly insulted by the failure of the Tunisians to await his arrival before resorting to the Security Council. Mr. Jernegan stated that this point seems to have become an obsession with Hauteclocque, who has therefore been more rigid in his policy than might otherwise have been the case. Hauteclocque came to the conclusion in March that he could make no progress with the Chenik cabinet and it is quite apparent that he intimidated the Bey, by deposition threats, to dismiss the cabinet. His plan was then to submit a rather liberal program to the new cabinet for study and review by a mixed Franco-Tunisian commission. It developed, however, that the Neo-Destour Party did not consider his outline as meeting even their minimum demands and they resolved not to participate in any discussions based on it. They also took the position that no self-respecting Neo-Destour would accept appointment on the mixed commission. There has also been difficulty in finding French members for that commission. In no event would the Neo-Destourians sit on the commission with a French “colon”, and the French have differed among themselves regarding the character of their representation.

Mr. Jernegan indicated that this is where the situation now stands in Tunisia: there is no mixed commission; there has been no elaboration of the outline of reforms; the cabinet is composed of powerless and uninfluential civil servants; it is doubtful whether the cabinet has the confidence of the Bey; Resident General de Hauteclocque has recommended that the French Government abandon the idea of a mixed commission and put into effect immediately, with the Bey’s seal, a more liberal reform program which might appease the Tunisians and cut the ground from under the Arab-Asian group in the United Nations. Mr. Jernegan talked to Mr. Binoche before his departure from Tunis and was told that the French Foreign Office has this recommendation under consideration and had sent him (Binoche) to Tunis to help it arrive at a decision. Binoche tentatively thought that it might be desirable to impose reforms in the executive and civil service fields but to reserve the creation of a national assembly for study by a commission.

Mr. Jernegan expressed the opinion that the Nationalists would not be satisfied by such a step but that it would nevertheless have the effect of lessening tension in Tunisia. He stated that the basic trouble in Tunisia at the present time is that the Tunisians have completely lost faith in anything the French tell them. Whether the Bey would seal such a plan, Mr. Jernegan said, would depend on what it actually contained in the final analysis, but he pointed out that it has been possible in the past to press the Bey.

In answer to Mr. Matthews’ question as to the Bey’s outlook, Mr. Jernegan expressed the belief that if left to his own devices, the Bey would just sit and enjoy life and the fruits of his office.

In response to Mr. Bruce’s question as to the course the French should follow, Mr. Jernegan stated that for the short term he would recommend the course of action proposed by the Resident General, i.e., submission of a liberal reform program to Prime Minister Baccouche without reference to a Mixed Commission. This reform program should go beyond the concessions contained in the March 22 outline of Foreign Office instructions to de Hauteclocque by adding another Tunisian minister or two to the cabinet immediately. That is, it should reflect a definite gain immediately. Mr. Bruce reminded Mr. Jernegan that he had previously indicated that the Neo-Destourians didn’t like this approach. Mr. Jernegan agreed that this was true but that in his opinion the Neo-Destourians would be less militant in the fact of such a proposal.

In reply to Mr. Matthews’ question, Mr. Jernegan indicated that Prime Minister Baccouche has little or no political standing in the community. He does have money, comes from a prominent family, and is close to the Bey.

Mr. Bruce asked what the United States position should be in respect to the Tunisian problem. Mr. Jernegan replied that he had discussed the matter with Messrs. Wallner and Utter in Paris and that he was inclined to agree with the proposal Embassy Paris had put forward in its telegram No. 7195 of May 21.² In short, the proposal indicates that we want concessions from the French and they want concessions from us—we cannot support the French unless they make concessions to us. Mr. Bruce indicated that he did not like this proposal very much.

Mr. Bruce asked how explosive the situation in Tunisia would be if the French did nothing. Are the “colons” jittery about their own personal security? Mr. Jernegan responded that the “colons” are in a nervous state but that there have been remarkably few incidents involving their personal security. How long this situation would persist he did not know. As a result of the situation, some of the “colons” are more amenable but others have become even less so. Mr. Jernegan observed that the type of minor terrorism now going on in Tunisia could go on indefinitely.

Mr. Ferguson observed that he understands the wisdom of sometimes taking unilateral action but he wonders whether the French are deriving maximum benefit by their practice of yielding grudgingly to Nationalist demands. He wondered if they were not by this method merely dissipating their bargaining position. Mr. Jernegan agreed with this general observation, indicating that the French must go faster with more definite and concrete plans in Tunisia, although they need not go as fast as the British had in India. Mr. Jernegan observed that if the French had gone as far last year as they are willing to go now, there would have been no trouble in Tunisia this year. The Tunisians are not a ferocious people and are reluctant to resort to drastic action. It is necessary for the French, he said, to envisage internal autonomy for Tunisia within a few years, but there is no reason why they cannot continue to handle foreign affairs and defense matters indefinitely, provided they act quickly enough in other fields.

Mr. Bruce asked how useful UN action could be in this case. Mr. Jernegan replied that he had had difficulty in seeing what contribution the UN could make. Possibly, it could spur the French to action. From the beginning the French have clearly indicated that they resent pressure from any source in this connection since they consider it an internal problem. The Tunisians, Mr. Jernegan said, have a childlike faith in the United Nations. They seem to think UN action is such a formidable thing that the French would have to fold in the fact of it. Mr. Hickerson observed that in this they are expecting the impossible of the United Nations.

Mr. Bruce asked Mr. Jernegan what the French could do to “appease” Bourguiba. Mr. Jernegan stated that since December 15 Bourguiba has been more adamant. His feeling now seems to be that he cannot trust the French and that the Franco-Tunisian connection must be severed. Despite this, Mr. Jernegan expressed the view that it would be possible to bring Bourguiba around again.

Mr. Bruce asked whether minority interests in Tunisia could be protected if the three Tunisian demands of October 1951 were met (which he doubts will happen). Mr. Jernegan expressed the belief that this would be entirely possible. Various suggestions had been made, including the conclusion of special Franco-Tunisian treaties and the creation of a dual legislative body, one of the chambers of which would include French representatives. Mr. Bruce said he understood that the Tunisians had rejected the idea of the French having the rights of Tunisian citizens. Mr. Jernegan replied that the Tunisians were perfectly willing to have the French residents become Tunisian citizens even while retaining French citizenship but that they objected to their enjoying privileges and protection in Tunisia over and above those granted the Tunisians themselves. In reply to a question, Mr. Jernegan indicated that the tax rates for French residents in Tunisia are the same as those for Tunisians, but, of course, the French pay more taxes because they have more property. Mr. Bruce asked whether it would be impracticable to develop a formula providing for gradual reforms in Tunisia while at the same time protecting minority rights. Mr. Jernegan replied that he thought it would not be impracticable to do this. In answer to Mr. Bruce’s question, Mr. Jernegan stated that the teaching of French is an issue in Tunisia. At the present time, French is the dominant language in Tunisian schools, but Mr. Jernegan did not think a continuation of this system is essential to French interests.

Mr. Bruce expressed the opinion that the two-assembly idea is not a sensible one for Tunisia. Mr. Jernegan agreed and indicated that the old Grand Council had not been liked by the Tunisians.

In answer to Mr. Bruce’s question, Mr. Jernegan replied that the French seem to think that the Bey is opposed to the popular election of officials in Tunisia but that he himself doubts that this is the Bey’s view. In any case, the Bey could not really oppose elections when both the French and his own people call for them.

Mr. Bruce asked Mr. Bonbright for his reaction to the preceding statements. Mr. Bonbright indicated that he still could not see where we are going. He expressed doubt that the French would adopt the three point program mentioned above, and indicated that the recent telegram from Ambassador Dunn sums up the difficulties which face us in Paris.

In answer to Mr. Bruce’s question, Mr. Jernegan indicated that he liked Hauteclocque personally. He considered him a tough-minded man of action. He stated that Hauteclocque likes to beat the opposition into submission and then “offer them a carrot”. Hauteclocque has had no previous North African experience, although he had had similar experience in Damascus. Hauteclocque’s philosophy apparently calls for brutality for Arabs with an admixture of rigid fairness and justice. Mr. Jernegan expressed the view that Hauteclocque really means to put a reform program into effect but the question seems to be whether the French Government will let him and whether the progress made will be adequate.

Mr. Bruce asked Mr. Hickerson how many votes the Arab-Asian bloc would be able to muster in the United Nations. Mr. Hickerson replied that he did not know the actual count at the present time but that the bloc does not seem to be having much luck with the Latin Americans at this time. He said that Security Council action is not being considered by the Arab-Asian bloc, which is pressing for a special session of the General Assembly. He observed that every day the regular General Assembly gets closer and therefore makes a special session that much less practical. In the regular General Assembly a majority would be required for inscription of the item on the agenda and ⅔ would be needed to pass a resolution. His impression is that the Arab-Asian bloc could get the majority but that the French would be able to muster the ⅓ needed to prevent passage of a resolution. He agreed with the idea that they should not fritter away their position but should take definite concrete action in the form of a statement in the United Nations defining clearly their position and future plans. This, he felt, was the best way to make the Arab-Asians discontinue their agitation. Mr. Bonbright wondered if in fact such a course of action would have that effect on the Arab-Asians. Mr. Hickerson discussed the adverse effect that the existence of independent Libya and prospective independent ex-Italian Somaliland have on the feelings of Tunisans and their friends. It is obvious that the Tunisians are more advanced than either the Libyans or the Somalis. A question was raised as to whether the Arab-Asians might not be glad of an opportunity to forget the Tunisian issue and there was some indication that the Asian nations would be more persistent than the Arabs in this connection.

2. Not printed.