772.00/5–2052: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State
835. Re Tunisia. Hoppenot at his request called yesterday for general review of variety of current matters. Following comments re Tunisia may be of some interest to Dept.
Hoppenot seemed generally discouraged. He referred to two extreme attitudes which we gathered exist in France:
- (a)
- Bourguiba and other nationalist leaders might be released and negots undertaken with them; this would be “yielding to blackmail”, however, and would be most strongly resisted by colonials to maintain considerable political power in France and whose legitimate interests in any event must be protected.
- (b)
- At other extreme, a policy of very great firmness might be continued. In this connection Hoppenot referred to feeling that if US had from beginning taken firm stand that question, exclusively one of internal jurisdiction, nationalists would not have been encouraged to maintain intransigent position. He referred to Secy’s letter to Javits1 which he said had been interpreted in Fr as assurance to Javits that if question raised again US would approve UN consideration. He also referred to last Saturday’s NY Times story from Paris which he seemed to assume was an American leak.
Hoppenot thought that establishment of negotiating commission and solution by this method was out of question. He thought French govt would have to “give” (“promulgate”) reforms. He did not use term “impose”.
Hoppenot anticipated that in French Assembly today Pinay or Schuman would make brief report on Tunisian situation, debate thereupon being postponed. Hoppenot saw no direct or indirect relationship in French situation between Tunisia and EDC treaty or contractual arrangements. Only relationship he saw with other questions was with Indochina where he described situation “like an abcess”.
Hoppenot reaffirmed that if choice of evils must be made SC would be preferable to GA. He had little doubt that in any event question would arise in 7th GA. He did not feel, however, that Moroccan question would necessarily have to come up. He said that Marchal, Director General of North African Affairs in FonOff, believed in making “substantial concessions” to Sultan. He felt such concessions might do trick in Morocco.
- Representative Jacob K. Javits wrote to the Secretary on Apr. 18 expressing concern over U.S. action in abstaining from voting on the Tunisian issue in the Security Council and requesting the reasons for that action. In a letter dated Apr. 30, the Secretary answered that the U.S. decision was made only after the most painstaking assessment of all factors involved. The United States had not intended the statement in the Security Council, or abstention, to be permanent barriers to a UN hearing on Tunisia, but merely meant to provide some time for the French and Tunisians to begin direct negotiations. The letter ended by informing Javits that if U.S. hopes concerning negotiations proved illusory, any UN member was free to bring the case up again. Under those circumstances the United States would reexamine its position in the light of the situation at the time. No copy of Javits’ letter has been found in Department of State files, but a copy of the Secretary’s answer is in the UNP files, lot 59 D 237, “Tunisia—General Correspondence, 1952–54.”↩