Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

788.00/4–1553: Telegram

No. 324
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Tehran, April 15, 1953—1 p.m.

4027. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Byroade.

1. Ala Minister Court visited me early this morning. He said he had had long conversation yesterday with Shah in endeavor persuade latter take some positive action re internal political situation. Shah had taken definite position he would not take any step remove replace Mosadeq unless Majlis by vote would indicate lack of confidence in Mosadeq or inclination for successor to him. Shah had given two general excuses for taking this position.

(a) He suspected British responsible for present friction between Court and Government and were trying produce situation civil war so they would have pretext divide Iran between themselves and Russians. Although he trusted Americans they had in past been hood-winked so much by British he saw no reason why they should not be deceived again. He did not wish do anything which would result in Iran being torn by strife and disappearing as independent country.

(b) He did not wish be cats paw ambitious unscrupulous Iranian politicians. Members Majlis coming him with one story and going Mosadeq with another. It was clear various members Majlis who were most insistent on his intervention really had no feeling loyalty toward him but merely sought use him to attain their political ambitions. If members Majlis sincerely desired support Court against Mosadeq and advisers they could stand up in Majlis and say so instead asking him take lead in matter. He had no assurance that if he should make move oust Mosadeq members Majlis who were pressing him to do so would back him if such move would encounter serious resistance. It seemed to him therefore that he should remain in background and let politicians fight it out.

2. Ala said he had pointed out to Shah if latter remained quiescent Mosadeq’s henchmen by intimidation and threats might eventually prevail on Majlis to adopt report committee eight² which interpreted Iran constitution in such manner as virtually to deprive Shah such powers as he still possessed. Shah had replied he had read this report and it did not seem so serious to him; in fact it appeared to him to be in spirit constitution. Why should he try prevent its adoption if members Majlis were in favor of it? Would adoption really change anything? Ala had answered purpose adoption was to make it clear to country and particularly to armed forces that Shah was completely subservient to Mosadeq. Adoption would mean Mosadeq or his successor would have complete control armed forces; that Court and armed forces would no longer be element stability in country divorced from politics; that Shah would be nullity and army would develop into impotent political organization. Army officers in future would be tempted advance their careers not by demonstration merit but by political intrigue. During conversation Shah had displayed certain amount impatience and said he was sorry Ala as Minister Court would become involved in this dispute. He regretted that Ala had talked to Kashani and other politicians. Ala had replied that he had no ambition remain as Minister Court. Whether Minister Court or not he intended however to do his utmost to preserve constitution so far as Shah was concerned. Struggle which he was making was not for person of Mohammed Reza but for preservation of institution of Shah which he considered at present necessary for preservation independence Iran. Shah had finally agreed he would give matter further consideration and had promised receive General Zahedi secretly evening April 16.

3. Ala told me April 16 might be extremely dangerous day. It seemed at last quorum deputies were in Tehran. Hitherto national movement group deputies had not desired quorum apparently because they did not believe they could obtain majority vote in favor report Committee Eight. They seemed now to have gained confidence and to desire public session Majlis April 16. It was Ala’s understanding government was arranging large street demonstrations on April 16 in order bring pressure on Majlis. Proclamations being issued calling on all supporters Mosadeq appear on streets. It possible that bazaars would be closed and people from bazaar mobilized in demonstration. Tudeh would of course join even though government supporters might ostensibly endeavor disassociate themselves from Tudeh adherents. He was thinking of recommending to Shah in these circumstances that Shah issue proclamation removing Mosadeq and appointing Director Public Security to maintain law and order pending vote of inclination of Majlis for successor Mosadeq. If Shah should do this national movement deputies would probably boycott Majlis but vote inclination was possible without quorum. Unfortunately it seemed impossible prevail upon Shah appoint Prime Minister without vote inclination. Ala asked what I would think of such plan.

4. After long discussion Ala decided endeavor meet situation of April 16 along following lines provided government did not change its plans for big demonstrations:

(a) Shah supporters would be advised not to make counter-demonstrations since they would be dispersed by armed forces under orders government and could not resist on streets fighting groups mobilized by government and Tudeh.

(b) Endeavor would be made prevail on certain members opposition to absent themselves from Majlis so there would be no quorum.

(c) Attempt would be made prevail on Kashani, President Majlis, to write letter Shah stating that in view lawless conditions in city and threats made against deputies Majlis unable in spite protection supposed to be furnished under martial law to function because no quorum obtainable.

(d) Shah would issue proclamation quoting letter Kashani expressing his appreciation and that of Iranian people for services rendered by Mosadeq in past, stating that Mosadeq, however, had unfortunately fallen under influence advisers who had persuaded him to pursue policies which rendered impossible functioning of free Iranian institutions; that therefore he was authorizing return Mosadeq to private life and appointing Director Public Security to preserve law and order until Majlis could give vote of inclination re new Prime Minister. Proclamation also would call on all Iranian officials to continue performing their duties and upon armed forces and security agencies to obey Director Public Security.

5. Before leaving, Ala told me he would do his utmost to prevail on Shah to see Zahedi today instead of tomorrow evening since quick action might be necessary tomorrow. Ala said he thought if Shah would agree to plan Zahedi or someone agreeable to Zahedi would be choice for Director Public Security and Zahedi would probably receive vote of inclination as Prime Minister. As of yesterday, however, Shah was not certain that he preferred Zahedi as Prime Minister.³

6. I of course have grave doubts that Shah could be persuaded to take kind of bold action outlined by Ala. I furthermore am not sure that Kashani would be willing to contribute to Ala’s plan by sending letter to Shah of kind outlined by Ala.

Henderson

1. Transmitted in two sections; also sent to London eyes only for Ambassador Aldrich.
2. See footnote 2, Document 320.
3. Ambassador Henderson reported on Apr. 19 that he had seen Ala that morning, and that Ala said that the Shah had been daily postponing his meeting with Zahedi. Ala’s explanation for this behavior was that the Shah continued to take a passive and almost detached attitude toward events, possibly because the Shah was receiving a considerable amount of conflicting advice and found it preferable to do nothing rather than decide to adopt a course of action. (Telegram 4093; 788.00/4–1953)