Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

888.10/4–453: Telegram

No. 323
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Tehran, April 4, 1953—2 p.m.

3898. 1. I saw Prime Minister noon today and gave him reply to his questions outlined in Embassy telegram 3752 repeated London 1249² as directed in Deptel 2514 March 30 repeated information London unnumbered.³

2. I opened conversation by telling Prime Minister that as I had foreseen answers were negative. When I started transmit them he said transmission unnecessary. “It enough for me that they are negative”. I insisted, however, in giving answers with precision since I wished particularly impress upon him inadvisability selling oil Soviet bloc.

3. After I had conveyed answers he asked what in my opinion he should do. I replied that I considered only way for Iran extricate itself economically and financially would be for it come to agreement with United Kingdom re oil. Prime Minister said he had been thinking of writing President setting forth Iran’s situation. It difficult for him believe that if President had full understanding of Iran’s position he would not understand that it necessary for United States Government come to Iran’s assistance. I told Prime Minister that in my opinion it would serve no useful purpose for him address letter to President. United States Government with best will in world could not at this time flout United States public opinion by purchasing from Iran nationalized oil in absence some kind compensation agreement. Prime Minister said Iran prepared pay compensation but no bill had thus far been presented to it re amount compensation due. Iran willing submit budget compensation to International Court provided United Kingdom would indicate maximum amount claimed by it and that amount would not be out of reason. I told Prime Minister thought it would serve no useful purpose for us again to start discussion oil dispute. My terms reference during conversations last three months had been limited to endeavor attain agreement based on international arbitration. On instructions United States Government I presented to him proposals from United Kingdom which United States Government had considered as reasonable and fair. He had not accepted these proposals and had made no concrete counterproposals. United Kingdom Government on its part also showed no disposition make fresh proposals. In such circumstances there was nothing to be gained by our endeavoring to assess blame for failure of conversations.

4. At this point Prime Minister brought up another matter and did not again mention oil problem. Neither did he indicate course of action which he might pursue.

Henderson

1. Also sent to London.
2. Document 321.
3. In telegram 2514 the Department generally supported the views expressed by Henderson in telegram 3752. It also urged that Mosadeq be reminded of the obvious disadvantages of trading with the Soviet bloc. (888.10/3–1853)