Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

788.13/7–752: Telegram

No. 185
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Tehran, July 7, 1952—5 p.m.

98. 1. I have recd conflicting versions pol events of last two days and am submitting outline various stories told to me to enable Dept better appreciate present atmosphere here.

2. Ala told me fol this morning.

(a) On afternoon July 5, Mosadeq called on Shah personally to present ltrs resignation his govt. Conversation lasted about hour. Mosadeq not only friendly but ingratiating. He thanked Shah orally for loyal support which had been given him. He insisted Shah shld have major credit in history for such progress as his govt had achieved and expressed confidence Shah wld continue prove himself to be patriotic sovereign. When Shah asked Mosadeq what he shld say to 2 Houses, Mosadeq suggested Shah tell Majlis that it must itself choose which direction country was to go. Senate, Mosadeq added did not count. When Shah expressed surprise at this statement, referring to pertinent articles constitution, Mosadeq replied “of course you are right. I suppose I had not given proper weight to importance of Senate”.

(b) Early on morning July 6 Shah called in 3 trusted advisers: Ala, Min Court; Yazdanpanah, Min War; and Senator Dashti, former Amb Egypt, one of Shah’s appointees to Senate, and old friend of Shah. Shah informed them that he was about to receive “Bureaus” of Senate and Majlis (Bureaus composed of officials of these two bodies) in order to ask them to help him ascertain what inclination of 2 Houses might be re resignation Mosadeq or appointment possible successor. Shah said he wanted absolutely frank advice. All three advised Shah strongly that financial situation of country was desperate; there cld be no relief in sight so long as Mosadeq continued as PriMin; and therefore Shah in talking with two Bureaus shld make it clear that he thought it wld not be in interest country for Mosadeq to be reappointed. Shah asked if in opinion these three advisers Mosadeq had majority in Majlis or Senate. They replied that they were confident he could not obtain majority in either House. Shah expressed some doubt as to soundness their advice. He said he thought Mosadeq still had powerful hold on sympathies Iran people; that demonstrations in Abadan, thousands communications which had been recd from orgs all over country asking for reappointment Mosadeq, agitation in Tehran bazaar, etc., caused him to believe that Mosadeq was not so dead politically as his pol enemies insisted. He did not know how many members Majlis had signed petition favoring Mosadeq’s reappointment but he thought that possibly petitioners represented almost majority. If he shld make statement indicating his desire that Mosadeq not be reappointed he might outrage popular sentiments of country and might even find majority Majlis against him. Therefore he thought he shld be cautious in his talk with Bureaus 2 Houses. He shld probably limit himself to pointing out that country was financially in desperate sit; and that time had come for constructive measures. Apparently Shah had been influenced by Mansur, one of “middle of road” candidates for PriMin, who had been advocating that new govt shld take position that Mosadeq had accomplished much for Iran; that new govt shld not do anything which wld nullify Mosadeq’s achievements but shld fol constructive policies based on foundations laid by Mosadeq.

(c) Shah dismissed Senator Dashti and asked Ala and Yazdanpanah to remain with him while he talked with two Bureaus jointly. Shah spoke slowly, choosing his words with great care. He spoke as he had said he wld of accomplishments of present govt; but he became more specific than had been anticipated by stating that nationalization of oil had been in interest of Iran and constructive steps which must be taken for improvement of Iran economically shld be based on this nationalization. Shah went on to emphasize deplorable financial sit of country and to insist that any govt coming into power shld endeavor to obtain revenues from Iran oil, to elevate living standards, and to promote social justice. Shah suggested that Senate and Majlis cooperate closely so that there shld not be any differences in their recommendations to him. He pointed out he wld be placed in awkward position if there shld be differences in recommendations of 2 Houses. Both shld therefore give careful consideration to this important prob and shld confer with one another before deciding upon recommendations. Two Bureaus decided while at Palace they wld meet each other morning July 7 after informal convs with members their respective Houses in order work out common recommendations.

(d) No one present, including Shah seemed to have any idea that Majlis wld move more rapidly than Senate. Shah was therefore astonished when he heard late in afternoon that Majlis in secret session without further consultation with Senate had decided by vote 52 out of 65 that Mosadeq was their preference to succeed himself. Ala was of opinion Senate would follow Majlis’ lead, particularly since Shah had indicated it was important that two Houses not disagree.

3. While I was talking to Ala, Bayatt, Pres pro tem of Senate in absence Taquizaden who had gone abroad, telephoned Ala stating that Senate had made its decision and he was preparing to convey document setting forth Senate’s decision to Shah. Bayatt was unwilling give Ala gist decision by telephone but said effect was to place responsibility on Shah.

4. Ala seemed distressed at developments which had resulted in expression Majlis in favor Mosadeq. He said he was afraid that Shah wld be heavily censored by opposition; that he wld be accused of weakness, and that he wld lose considerable prestige. I laughed and said two other people wld also probably be blamed—he and I. He wld be accused of failing sufficiently to encourage Shah to take action, and I wld be charged with failure to intervene with Shah against Mosadeq. I said that I had been placed under great pressure by various groups “to use my influence with Shah” to prevail upon him to dismiss Mosadeq. My apparent failure to intervene with Shah to extent desired wld certainly be construed by many members opposition as support for Mosadeq. Ala asked if in my opinion retention of Mosadeq wld be harmful to Iran. I said that I thought that so long as Mosadeq remained in power there was little chance of settlement of oil problem and in absence of such settlement Iran wld continue to deteriorate finan and polit. Ala asked if in my opinion Brit wld be willing again to negot with Mosadeq. I said I cld not speak for Brit but I thought that British, wld be willing to negot provided Mosadeq wld make it clear that he had altered his position re possible terms settlement. I was confident Brit wld not negotiate with Mosadeq unless they had reason believe previous attitudes expressed by him had undergone change. Ala said he wld try persuade Mosadeq now that latter had won polit victory to be more reasonable re oil problem. I replied I afraid that no amt persuasion wld have effect. It seemed to me Mosadeq’s ideas on settlement were permanently fixed.

5. Following my conversation with Ala I saw Middleton, who showed me several telegrams which he had sent during last two days to London. Considerable part of Middleton’s information apparently came through new President Majlis, Imam Jumeh. According to Middleton’s information:

(a) Imam maintained that he had told Shah he was in favor Qavam and Shah had indicated Qavam would be acceptable to him. On morning July 6, just before Shah had met members of two bureaus Shah had had private conversation with Imam during which he had insisted that Majlis disclose its inclination regarding Prime Ministership immediately, and although Imam had argued that haste in matter would be in favor Mosadeq, Shah had taken position that country could not remain in suspension and that decision should be taken without delay. Therefore, Imam could give no interpretation to Shah’s instructions other than that Shah really wanted Mosadeq returned as Prime Minister. Same interpretation apparently was placed on Shah’s subsequent words by others present and also by Majlis who voted overwhelmingly for Mosadeq. (Similar impression obtained today from this Embassy’s sources).

(b) Shah had also intimated to Imam Jumeh that it not impossible both Brit and Americans were really in favor reappointment Mosadeq. In response to Jumeh’s inquiry regarding British attitude British had reassured him on this point.

(c) On evening July 6, according to sources considered reliable, caucus of Senators opposed to Mosadeq was interrupted by appearance of Human, Deputy Minister Court, who personally is extremely anti–Mosadeq. Human in apparent distress told Senators that Shah had asked him to request them to vote unanimously for reappointment Mosadeq. When Senators in anger asked Human why His Majesty had sent such a message Human said he could not answer, he was merely acting on instructions of Shah.

6. While I was talking to Middleton, Senator friendly to British Embassy by telephone that despite pressure brought by Shah on Senators to follow lead of Majlis Senate had resolved that since Mosadeq had already announced outline his program and since Senate had not had opportunity to study it, Senate did not believe it should make any recommendations regarding reappointment Mosadeq until it had learned more about it. On my return to American Embassy I found our political section had received identical information regarding temporary decision of Senate.

7. We are inclined believe there was sufficient sentiment in Senate against Mosadeq to give it courage not to vote today in his favor but Senate not bold enough to vote against him in face Shah’s desire that it follow lead of Majlis. Senate therefore followed typical Persian expedient of procrastinating and gaining time by taking action indecisive character.

8. Although it difficult to draw conclusions from present complicated situation, we are reluctantly coming to conclusion that Shah has been taking different attitudes when talking to different people; that he is not happy with Mosadeq but distrusts Qavam such extent that he would prefer that Mosadeq stay on rather than that Qavam become Prime Minister and that he has not enough moral courage frankly to say that he is opposed to Qavam. I am somewhat at loss to understand how after all my statements to Shah he could still intimate that Americans (and now even British) might be secretly supporting Mosadeq. Undoubtedly one reason has been inability of Middleton and me to give any definite assurances as to what our respective governments would be willing to do to assist successor to Mosadeq to survive financial crisis which he would inherit or to facilitate solution oil problem. There is also possibility that Shah is trying to transfer some of blame for his own inaction to shoulders British and Americans.²

9. We have heard from various sources that Queen Mother’s anger against her son for “his weakness” has reached new heights and that Princess Ashraf, who returned to Tehran yesterday, is so furious at what has happened that she has suffered “heart attack”.

Henderson

1. Transmitted in three sections; repeated to London.
2. Ambassador Henderson reported on July 8 that the Shah had decided the previous day to reappoint Mosadeq Prime Minister without waiting for the Senate to express its inclination. Accordingly, he summoned Mosadeq and informed him that he was initiating measures to rename him Prime Minister. (Telegram 108; 788.13/7–852)