Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111
No. 184
United States Minutes of the Fourth United
States–United Kingdom Ministerial Talks, London, British Foreign Office,
June 28, 1952, 12:30 p.m.–1:30 p.m.
MTL USUK–4
Present:
- United Kingdom:
- Mr. Eden
- Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
- Sir William Strang
- Sir Pierson Dixon
- Sir Roger Makins
- Mr. Scott
- Sir James Bowker
- Mr. Allen
- United States:
- Secretary Acheson
- Ambassador Gifford
- Ambassador Jessup
- Mr. Perkins
- Mr. Nitze
- Miss Kirkpatrick
- Mr. Battle
- Mr. Ringwalt
- Mr. Palmer
[Here follows discussion of a British observer to the Pacific Council, United Nations facilities in Japan, relations between the United Kingdom and Egypt, and the problems associated with the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization.]
With regard to the Iranian situation, Mr. Acheson said that the present indications are that August will be the most likely month for Mosadeq to resign, although he had seen a telegram this morning from Ambassador Henderson indicating that Mosadeq was still maneuvering to stay in power.1 In view of the possibility of a change in Government, however, Mr. Acheson felt that it was desirable that the US and the UK should get their thoughts in order as soon as possible so that they would be prepared for any contingency. He thought that the most important questions before us are: (1) the nature and composition of the management agency; (2) the relationship of the agency to NIOC; (3) the duration, quantities and terms of settlement; (4) financing of the Iranian Government during the interim period before the flow of oil is resumed; and (5) whether we should encourage the Shah to believe that the UK is really ready to act quickly if he takes action.
Sir Roger Makins agreed that these were the most important points in the situation. He had talked over most of these matters with Mr. Nitze and told him as much as he could at the present time of UK thinking.
… He [Eden] felt that the US should be given all possible information regarding the UK plans. On the financial question, AIOC has cash available. He had thought at one time that it would be logical for the company to make an advance to a new Iranian Government to help it out of the difficult financial situation in which it would find itself. During Mr. Middleton’s recent stay in London, he had maintained, however, that no new Iranian Government could accept such an arrangement without incurring a severe risk of falling. This made this situation more difficult.
Sir Roger Makins said that he understood from his conversation with Mr. Nitze that the US is trying to get itself into a position whereby it would be ready to advance funds to help out a new Iranian Government. While there was probably nothing that the UK Government could do toward extending direct assistance, there [Page 408] might be other ways in which it could help, particularly by relaxing some of the present economic and financial restrictions on Iran.
Mr. Eden asked Sir Roger if he did not feel that the company could extend financial assistance. Sir Roger was doubtful and pointed out that quite aside from the question of the Iranian Government’s financial needs, the oil industry itself would need a considerable amount of money to get it back on its feet again.
Mr. Nitze stressed that the important thing is for the US and the UK to get together and coordinate their positions. The US appreciates that the British need to retain flexibility in their tactics. It is also important that no hint regarding any conversations between us should become known to the Iranians. Given these points, however, he felt that we need a better understanding than we have at the present time of what the British views are on the “substance” and “tactics” of an oil settlement.
Sir Roger Makins felt that the British had already brought us as much up to date as they could at this time regarding their thinking on “substance”. He added that “tactics” could not be definitely decided until the nature of the Government with which it would be necessary to deal were known.
Mr. Eden felt that it is important to keep the US fully informed. Although maneuverability is essential from the British point of view, we must keep in close touch on the oil settlement and financing problems. This is particularly important in view of the possibility of a change taking place by August. He suggested that further conversations, similar to those which have been going on in the past, should be held in Washington to assure that the US is kept up to date. Mr. Acheson agreed with this procedure.
Before leaving the subject of Iran, Mr. Eden reverted to the question of financing. He said the Foreign Office was in constant touch with AIOC on the question of financial aid for Iran. He would like to see the aid handled in this manner, but he was inclined to think that a new Iranian Government would probably not accept it from AIOC. As regards Mosadeq, Mr. Eden thought that he would probably not retire gracefully from office,.…
[Here follows discussion of the situation in Trieste.]