Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

745W.00/6–1752

No. 985
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, June 17, 1952.

Subject:

• Anglo-Egyptian Question: A Proposed Further Approach to the British on the Sudan Question

Discussion:

Since your meeting with Mr. Eden on May 26 in Paris there have been almost no developments in the Anglo-Egyptian question. This is due in part to the lack of new proposals, in part to the continued stalemate on the Sudan and in part to the habitual summer doldrums in Egypt. The Egyptian-Sudanese (Mahdi) talks have now recessed and the Sudanese delegation has returned to Khartoum. The Egyptian Foreign Minister has informed Ambassador Caffery that the Sudanese “gave the impression that they were definitely sympathetic to the Egyptian point of view”.¹ The Acting Governor General of the Sudan, Sir James Robertson, on the other hand has informed the Foreign Office in London that he doubts that the Sudanese delegation has been persuaded to accept Egyptian sovereignty and that in any event other groups in the Sudan have a powerful voice. While there is no definite information as yet, it appears that there is an inclination within the Egyptian Government to prolong and possibly extend the scope of the Egyptian-Sudanese conversations. Rumors circulating in Cairo regarding next steps include the possibility of a meeting between the Mahdi and the Egyptian Prime Minister, the sending to Khartoum of an Egyptian delegation, headed by the Egyptian Minister of Interior, and a visit to Egypt of Sayyed Sir Ali Al Mirghani Pasha, the head of the Khatmia and opponent of the Mahdi.

It does not appear that your suggestion regarding British consultation with the Sudanese has been given the attention in London it merits. This may be due partly to a misunderstanding of the nature of the proposal and partly to a definite reluctance on domestic political grounds to do anything which might subject the present government to an attack in Parliament in which probably both Conservatives and Labor would join. You will recall that Mr. Eden informed you of the strong feeling in the UK regarding the Sudan and of Parliamentary difficulties. He also stated to me that the government could be brought down if there were the slightest suggestion that “the Sudanese had been sold down the river”.

The Sudan still remains the principal obstacle to the commencement of negotiations. On the one hand, the Egyptians continue to demand recognition of King Farouk’s title without further ado; on the other, the UK insists on consultation with prior guarantees, but is loath, nonetheless, to undertake consultations. There may be two reasons for the latter attitude: 1) fear that the consultation would produce the right answer, thereby opening the way for attacks in Parliament, and 2) fear that it would produce the wrong answer, thereby making the situation with Egypt worse.

The British probably believe that they can stretch out their present contacts with the Egyptians throughout the summer, particularly since there is a possibility that the Egyptians will have further talks with the Sudanese.

It may well be that the British hope to drag out the Sudan question until elections are held in the Sudan and the new Parliament is installed, which may be the latter part of this year. In that event, the British would say that any decision regarding the title would have to be made by the Sudanese Parliament.

It is also believed that the British consider that the Egyptian elections now set for October will not take place. In this connection there seems to be a difference of opinion between the UK and the US regarding 1) the urgency of the situation and 2) the ability of the Hilali Government to survive.

Recommendations:

I. That you speak to Mr. Eden along the following lines:²

(a) I have given considerable thought to the Egyptian situation since our talk on May 26 and Mr. Byroade has told me of his conversations with you on June 9.³ It occurs to me that the suggestion which I made to you in Paris on May 26, regarding consultations with the Sudanese, may not be entirely understood and may be viewed with some apprehension because of your domestic political situation. It might be useful if I clarified some of the points of this suggestion.

(b) We do understand the difficult political situation which you have described and I want to assure you that we have no desire to make this situation more difficult.

(c) It was precisely because of our desire not to make the situation of the government more difficult but at the same time to prevent an Anglo-Egyptian impasse that the suggestion regarding consultation was made.

(d) In essence, this suggestion was that the UK undertake consultation with the Sudanese now without prior guarantees from Egypt to determine whether Farouk’s title can be recognized within the framework of self-determination by the Sudanese. It was suggested that consultation not be carried out by the Sudanese administration, but by a specially selected British person or persons. It was our idea that the person or persons selected be of such stature and such objectivity that he would inspire confidence not only in the UK, but also in the Sudan and even in Egypt. It would be hoped that this consultation would result in a UK offer to support recognition.

(e) It was not intended that the UK use any coercion with the Sudanese or that recognition in any way compromise self-determination. It was our idea that if the UK could explain the reasons for consultation, the meaning and intent of recognition and the guarantees to be sought before recognition, and make clear its reaffirmation of self-determination, the Sudanese might be willing to acquiesce.

(f) If consultation should come up with the right answer, critics in Parliament could be answered by reference to previous pledges which stated that any change of status in the Sudan would only be agreed to after consultation with and approval of the Sudanese. If the Sudanese do not agree, the pledges would not have been fulfilled and the British Government would not move from its present position.

(g) As things stand at present, we do not know if the Sudanese would or would not accept the title. The only way to find out is consultation and this the UK is unwilling to do.

(h) The US for its part finds it most difficult to go to the Egyptians more than it has regarding the Sudan for we cannot say with full conviction that the Sudanese will reject the title. If consultation were carried out, we would be in a better position with the Egyptians regardless of the answer, assuming, of course, that every genuine effort were made to make the Sudanese understand why the consultation is being undertaken.

II. In the likely event that Mr. Eden indicates that it would be a mistake to make any move regarding the Sudan until the results of the Egyptian-Sudanese talks are known, it is recommended that you take the following lines:

(a) We believe that the Egyptian-Sudanese talks are most important and significant, although we do not know what if any results have been achieved.

(b) We think it important that encouragement be given to the extension of these talks. The UK for its part may wish through the Sudan administration to urge other Sudan political parties to enter into contact with Egypt in the same manner as the Mahdi’s delegation. Obviously, wider Sudanese representation would be desirable, since all points of view would then be represented and no one party could claim that its interests were being overlooked or compromised. We realize that this may be difficult, but we think it is worth a try by the Sudan administration. We, for our part, will be glad to tell the Egyptians of our hope that they will continue and expand their contact with the Sudanese.

(c) It may be desirable at some point to consider the possibility of a UK–Egypt–Sudan Round Table Discussion. We recall that this was suggested by the UK both in June and October 1951. We realize that this would have to be carefully handled, since such a suggestion at the present time might compromise the possibilities of further bilateral contact between the Egyptians and Sudanese.

III. If Mr. Eden’s comments on I and II, above, reveal a wide gap between the UK and US views, you may wish to suggest a joint appraisal by our two embassies in Cairo:

Since there appears to be a difference of opinion between the US and the UK regarding the urgency of the situation and the strength of the Hilali Government, it might be useful for the two embassies in Cairo to undertake another joint appraisal. Mr. Eden will probably agree that this exercise, both in Egypt and Iran, has been useful. Since it has been six months since the last appraisal on Egypt was prepared, this might be a good time to have another joint look at the situation.

1. Ambassador Gifford reported from London in telegram 5793, June 18, not printed, that the Foreign Office had told him that it had information to the effect that the Mahdi’s representatives in the Egyptian-Sudanese talks made no commitments to the Egyptians, that they declined to accept Farouk’s claim to be King of the Sudan, and that the Sudanese had tried but failed to secure Egyptian acceptance of the Sudan Government’s constitution. (745W.00/6–1852)
2. At this time, Secretary Acheson was preparing for his trip to Europe and Brazil, which began on June 22, to honor invitations from Oxford University where he was to receive an honorary degree, from Mayor Reuter to lay the cornerstone of the American Memorial Library in Berlin, from Chancellor Figl to visit Vienna, and from Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura to come to Brazil. In addition to fulfilling social engagements, Acheson and his party planned to conduct high-level policy discussions with his various hosts on a wide range of topics. One of the most important subjects for consideration in London was Egypt; for the minutes of the U.S.-British meetings, see infra and Documents 987 and 988.
3. Assistant Secretary of State Byroade was in London on June 9 to conduct an exchange of views with Foreign Office officials and with Foreign Secretary Eden on a wide range of Middle East problems. (611.41/6–952)