Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111
No. 987
United States Minutes of the Second
United States–United Kingdom Ministerial Talks, London, British
Foreign Office, June 24, 1952, 3:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m.
MTL USUK–2
Present
- United Kingdom
- Mr. Eden
- Sir William Strang
- Ambassador Stevenson
- Sir Oliver Franks
- Sir Robert Howe
- Sir James Bowker
- Sir Pierson Dixon
- Mr. Roger Allen
- United States
- Secretary Acheson
- Ambassador Gifford
- Ambassador Jessup
- Mr. Perkins
- Mr. Nitze
- Mr. Battle
- Miss Kirkpatrick
- Mr. Palmer
Mr. Eden reverted to Mr. Nitze’s question in the morning session asking what decision the British would like to see emerge from the Sudan Assembly. He felt that when the Assembly met, it should express its opinion regarding the relationship of the Sudan to the Crown of Egypt. The answer which emerged might not be the answer the British want, but at least they would know where they stood.
Sir Ralph Stevenson was doubtful that the Egyptians would agree to putting the title to the Assembly but felt they should be encouraged to cooperate.
Mr. Eden said that he felt that it was necessary to throw the question into the Assembly and to encourage the Sudanese to give as close an approximation as possible of what the Egyptians want.
Mr. Acheson said that our interest in the problem derived from its effect on the peace and stability of the Middle East. We have no mission except to help the UK bring about a settlement. We are [Page 1820] very disturbed that if the problem continues and talks break down, there will be serious trouble in Egypt which will spread to North Africa and the rest of the Middle East. We all hope this won’t happen, but it might. He felt that a positive approach must be taken to the problem rather than simply encouraging the Sudanese to express their uninhibited views. . . . He felt that anything which could be done should be done to guide them in making a responsible decision. He noted that the British were contemplating encouraging and broadening the consultations between the Egyptians and the Sudanese and also that they were thinking of the possibility of bilateral talks between the UK and Egypt on the question of the Constitution. He wondered whether there was not a possibility of merging these two ideas and the discussions would thus become three-power talks. He felt that everything possible should be done to help bridge over this problem of the interim period. If a positive program could be developed we would be glad to pitch in and help. He wondered if there were not a program which would move more in the direction of a settlement than simply leaving the matter to the decision of the Sudanese.
Mr. Eden asked his advisers whether it would be possible to expand the discussions in this way.
Sir Robert Howe said that he thought it would be difficult to obtain a united Sudanese voice. The only satisfactory way of doing so is through the Sudanese Assembly. Other means have been tried, but they have always been unsuccessful.
Mr. Eden wondered whether it would not be possible to work through the same body of Sudanese with which the Constitution was discussed.
Sir Robert Howe thought that the Sudan administration could reconstitute the Constitutional Committee. This had consisted of the members of each of the political parties, with a British Chairman and a British Secretary. He doubted, however, that the Sudanese would agree to discuss the question of the Constitution in a three power forum. They would undoubtedly take the line that they are perfectly satisfied with the Constitution as it stands and that they do not want to see any changes made.
Sir Ralph Stevenson did not think that the Egyptians would be likely to agree to such a procedure unless there were prior recognition of the King’s title through an agreed formula.
Sir Robert Howe asked whether it would not be possible to suggest to Hilali that he put forward the Egyptian views regarding the Constitution for the Sudan and then try to marry the two approaches.
Sir Ralph Stevenson said that the main difficulty is the fundamental one of getting the talks started without recognition.
[Page 1821]Sir James Bowker pointed out that the Egyptian decree regarding the Constitution for the Sudan was not a detailed Constitution but only a statement of certain basic principles.
Mr. Eden thought that an offer to discuss the whole question could be attractive to the Egyptians.
Mr. Acheson said that if it were not for the problem of the title, the British might say to the Egyptians “here is a constitutional proposal for the Sudan which has been submitted to both of us. Now let’s discuss it. Afterwards we can discuss it with the body which drew it up. Since the whole question of the title is tied up in this problem, could we not discuss that at the same time?” Mean while the British could try to persuade the Sudanese to take a more forthcoming point of view with respect to the title.
Sir Ralph Stevenson said that the British had tried before to persuade Hilali to negotiate without a formula, but he continues to insist on one involving recognition.
Mr. Acheson suggested that perhaps it might be well not to mention specifically that the question of the title would be discussed.
Sir Ralph Stevenson felt that the Egyptians were nevertheless certain to insist on a formula.
Mr. Acheson asked whether, irrespective of the possibility of a blow-up in Egypt, the end of the road is not that the Egyptians lose the Sudan and the British lose their base at Suez.
Sir Ralph said that he would not go that far. For a long time the Egyptians have not taken an active interest in the Sudan. Nevertheless, their officials still continue to occupy their positions and the Egyptian flag still flies side by side with the British. He thought this state of affairs could go on for some time and that there would not be an abrupt break.
Mr. Acheson thought that there was a point beyond which this could not go.
Mr. Eden said that of the three formulae which Hilali had sent him through Amr, the third was not very far away from what the British might be able to accept.
Sir Ralph Stevenson recalled that the British wanted to add the words “provided the Sudanese agree” to the portion of the formula which referred to Farouk’s use of the title.
Mr. Gifford recalled that the British had insisted on adding this phrase because the Egyptians had made it clear that they would interpret the formula as meaning British recognition of the title. He seemed to recall that if it had not been for this interpretation, the Foreign Office felt that it could have accepted the wording.
Mr. Eden confirmed that this had been the case. He felt that the British should leave the question of a formula in cold storage as long as possible.
[Page 1822]Sir Ralph Stevenson agreed, pointing out that the Egyptians are almost certain to interpret the formula as meaning recognition. At the same time, they will not agree to consultations with the Sudanese. They take the line that the British pledges to the Sudanese have nothing to do with them and that they were made improperly, since the British had no right to give such pledges without the consent of the Egyptians in view of their position as a co-dominus. He added that the Egyptians have not gone so far as to say that they will not talk unless the British recognize the title, but they have made it clear that recognition must emerge from the negotiations.
Mr. Nitze thought that it might be easier to get the Egyptians to change their interpretation of the formula. As an alternative, the British might try to persuade the Egyptians to enter discussions by undertaking to do their best to create the necessary pre-conditions for eventual Sudanese acceptance of the title.
Mr. Eden said that it was necessary to be very careful about this matter and that the British could not use pressure toward this end. He could not say he would try to persuade the Sudanese to accept Egyptian rule.
Sir James Bowker said that the use of pressure would have a bad effect both in the United Kingdom and in the Sudan. It might, in fact, have exactly the opposite effect in the Sudan from what it would be hoped to achieve.
Sir Robert Howe said that the Sudan administration had always given the Sudanese a free opportunity to express their views on the King’s title. The Sudanese asked, however, why should they accept the title. They have nothing to gain from it and are already well along the path toward deciding their own future. They have great contempt for the Egyptians and do not forget that it was the Mahdi’s father who threw the Egyptians out of the Sudan. It was a great accomplishment to get the Mahdi to send his representatives to Alexandria in view of all this.
Mr. Eden said, and Mr. Acheson agreed, that it was important to get the Egyptians working with the UK in the Sudan.
Mr. Eden indicated he felt that perhaps the draft communication to the Egyptian Government could be improved on. He wondered if it would be well to try to get Mr. Caffery to support it with the Egyptians.
Sir Ralph Stevenson seemed doubtful and pointed out that it was only intended as an interim reply.
Sir James Bowker said that what the British want to do is to get talks going with the Egyptians on the question of the Constitution. He did not have in mind negotiations, but simply talks. The British were encouraged by the conversations which SAR’s representatives [Page 1823] had had with the Egyptians. He thought they might have opened the eyes of both parties to the fact that the question of the title is not a simple one. Conversations between the British and the Egyptians might, however, lead to a new agreement setting forth anew the relationship between the two powers, and in this way fill the legal void brought about by the Egyptians’ termination of the 1899 Agreement.
Mr. Eden said that the Foreign Office would re-draft its statement and give it to the Secretary before Thursday’s meeting in order that he might examine it and see whether he thought that it was something which the United States Government could support.
Mr. Acheson agreed to this procedure.
[Here follows discussion of the situation in Iran.]