Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

CFM files, lot M 88, “Signing Ceremonies in Europe”

No. 984
United States Minutes of the First United States-United Kingdom Foreign Ministers Meeting, Paris, May 26, 1952, 9:45 p.m.¹

secret
SCEM MIN 1

Paris, May 26, 1952, 9:45 p.m.

Participants:

• US.
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Jessup
  • Ambassador Dunn
  • Ambassador Gifford
  • Mr. Perkins
  • Mr. Stabler
• UK
  • Mr. Eden
  • Sir Oliver Harvey
  • Sir Pierson Dixon
  • Mr. Roberts
  • Mr. Shuckburgh

[Here follows discussion of rubber, the Tripartite Declaration, the Saar, Israeli claims, the Soviet note, Spain, Trieste, the Korean armistice talks, and Dutch New Guinea.]

Egypt

23. Mr. Eden said the UK had urged the Egyptians over a long period to talk to the Sudanese but that up until the present moment the Egyptians had refused on the basis that Sudan was under the Egyptian crown and therefore there was nothing to talk about. Mr. Eden said he thought Hilali deserved great credit for his decision to consult and said the UK had done what it could to urge the Sudanese to accept the Egyptian invitation.² Mr. Eden said word from Cairo indicated that Mahdi had dropped the conditions and that a Sudanese delegation would be arriving in Cairo in the next few days. The result of the consultations would be that either the Sudanese would receive an offer from the Egyptians which would release the UK from its pledges, or alternatively the Sudanese would reject Egyptian sovereignty and Egypt would then have a better understanding of the realities of the Sudan situation. Mr. Eden thought the Egyptians would offer the Sudanese delegation money which would be firmly rejected. Mr. Eden said that the UK Defense Minister had informed the Egyptians that the UK was prepared to deliver equipment to the Egyptian armed forces. The UK was now looking for this equipment and he referred to the fact that Egyptian armed forces were quite friendly to the UK. The present danger was frustration on the part of the younger officers who did not like Farouk. Mr. Eden believed prospects for settlement appeared to be better than ever before and expressed satisfaction that the talks had not been broken off by a rejection of the UK formula on Sudan. He seemed satisfied by the Egyptian “reply” and thought the third formula offered some hope, although it might still be open to misinterpretation.

24. The Secretary said that consultation between the Egyptians and Sudanese was of utmost importance and significance and the US felt this was a step in the right direction. However, the problem of King Farouk’s title and the UK attitude toward it still remained. The UK on one hand felt it could not consult the Sudanese concerning the title until prior guarantees were received from the Egyptians. The Egyptians on the other hand demanded recognition of the title now and when approached regarding consultation, rejected it. The result was an impasse. The important thing was to find a solution not an obstacle. One possibility for avoiding an impasse was the UK’s undertaking to consult the Sudanese now without prior guarantees. The consultation should be done in such a manner as would be designed to bring about acceptance of the title in a pre-self-determination period on a basis which would in fact safeguard Sudanese rights. The consultation should not be carried out by the Sudan Administration and the Secretary suggested the consultation be done by some British person or persons so eminent and detached that the British public, the Sudanese, and even the Egyptians, would be impressed by the sincerity and objectivity of the consultation. The Secretary emphasized that in our view time was the important factor and that the King and Prime Minister’s position would become increasingly difficult if no settlement were reached.

25. Mr. Eden thought that the present Egyptian-Sudanese consultation plus a generally improved atmosphere reduced the urgency of this situation but said he would consider the Secretary’s suggestion and see whether such consultation might not be a good way to proceed if the Cairo consultations got nowhere. Mr. Eden emphasized repeatedly that the UK would not “sell the Sudanese down the river” and that it could not push the Sudanese into a situation where they could be exploited by the Egyptians. The Secretary said the US fully supported the Sudanese right to self-determination and that we would not agree to any settlement which compromised that right. However, we thought the UK could use its great influence with the Sudanese to bring about a desired solution with respect to the title. Mr. Eden thought it would be necessary to await the November elections in the Sudan before consulting the Sudanese but agreed when the suggestion was made that it might be possible to consult with a representative group of Sudanese established for this purpose.

26. Mr. Eden believed that a problem which was more important than the title affecting the Sudan and Egypt was the Nile waters and hoped some agreement on this could be worked out. Mr. Eden also reviewed the strength of feeling in the UK over the Sudan (he said it was second only to the feeling concerning the Naval command in the Atlantic) which made a solution to this problem particularly difficult. Finally, Mr. Eden admitted he also had difficulties with the Sudan Administration and said he realized that they had been “naughty”.

27. The Secretary ended by saying that in our view this was the critical point in the Egyptian situation. He realized that what we suggested was hard for the UK but if the situation deteriorated, the result might be worse.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, Southeast Asia, and Tunis.]

1. Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden were in Paris to attend the signing ceremonies of the European Defense Treaty on May 27. For documentation concerning the U.S. attitude toward the establishment of the European Defense Community, see vol. V, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.

   This meeting took place in Ambassador Dunn’s residence.

2. The Egyptian Prime Minister, Hilali Pasha, had extended an invitation several days earlier to Sayed Sir Abdul Rahman el Mahdi Pasha, the leader of the Sudanese UMMA (Independence) Party, to send a delegation to Cairo to exchange views with the Egyptian Government regarding the Sudan’s political future. (641.74/5–2652)