Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111
No. 986
United States Minutes of the First
United States–United Kingdom Ministerial Talks, London, British
Foreign Office, June 24, 1952, 10:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.
MTL USUK–1
Present:
- United Kingdom
- Mr. Eden
- Sir William Strang
- Sir Oliver Franks
- Sir Pierson Dixon
- Mr. F. K. Roberts
- Mr. Denis Allen
- Mr. Roger Allen
- Sir Roger Makins
- Ambassador Stevenson
- Sir James Bowker
- Sir Robert Howe
- Mr. Harrison
- Mr. Cheetham
- United States
- Secretary Acheson
- Ambassador Gifford
- Ambassador Jessup
- Mr. Perkins
- Mr. Battle
- Miss Kirkpatrick
- Mr. Hooker
- Mr. Palmer
[Here follows discussion of ratification of EDC, NATO, the German agreements, the Soviet note, Berlin, the Saar, and Trieste.]
Egypt
Mr. Eden referred to the conversations which recently took place in Alexandria between representatives of the Mahdi and Egyptian Government. He said that these discussions were now in a deadlock over the question of the recognition of the King’s title. There had recently been an optimistic account in the London Times of the Sudanese attitude on this question but this optimism was not warranted. The indications are that the Sudanese are not prepared to accept the title and this raises the question of what the British should do next. As long as the Sudanese and Egyptian Governments were talking, the British had wanted to remain quiet. He did not want to say anything definite to the Egyptian Government at this time about the 3 alternative texts which had been presented to him by Amb.1 He was thinking instead of referring to the draft constitution for the Sudan which the Sudan Government has submitted to the Co-Domini and of suggesting that the two Governments discuss this matter to see if they can decide on how the question of the constitution could be handled. The object of the discussions would be to try to reach agreement on the question of the constitution and not to handle the question of the title. He hoped that such talks might help to narrow the gap. He thought that Hilali had done a courageous thing in inviting the Sudanese to Cairo, but he did not think that there had ever been any possibility of the Sudanese accepting the title. The main accomplishment of the conversations has been to bring a note of realism into relations between Egypt and the Sudan. The difficulty is, however, that no Egyptian Government can dare agree to anything which does not settle the question of the title. It is a matter of importance that there should be close and friendly relations between the 2 peoples in view of their proximity and their joint interest in the Nile. The Egyptians appear to want to find some way of regaining their legal [Page 1815] rights in the Sudan. Legally they have no leg to stand on as a result of their denunciation of the 1899 Agreement.
Mr. Acheson said that if it is true that some settlement of the problem of the King’s title is necessary to solve the Anglo-Egyptian problem, what happens next? We seem to be in a circle.
Mr. Eden said that there is a time element involved. If the British can get the Egyptians to sit down and discuss the constitutional problem, it will be possible to hold elections in the Sudan by autumn. It has always been the question of the interim period about which the British have differed with the Egyptians. The elections will result in a wholly Sudanese Assembly. To that Assembly could be put the question of whether the Sudanese wish to recognize the King’s title. Mr. Eden doubted that Hilali intended to consult with other parties in the Sudan. He seemed to think that if SAR accepted the title, the others would fall in line. The British did not agree that this would be the case. They would like to encourage the Egyptians to consult with other parties and segments of Sudanese opinion and persuade them that the question of the King’s title should be put to the new Sudanese Assembly.
Mr. Acheson asked what the limits of the interim period were.
Sir James Bowker said that the period involved is from now until the Sudanese decide on their own status. This might be an extended period of time.
Sir Oliver Franks explained that what the British want is to see a sovereign representative body taking the decision.
Mr. Nitze asked if there was any agreed British view as to what decision they would like to see the Assembly take. Do they hope it would or would not recognize the King’s title?
Sir Robert Howe entered the room at this point and was asked by Mr. Eden to explain about the legislature which would be set up in the Sudan under the new constitution. Sir Robert said that it would consist of 2 chambers, a Senate and a House of Representatives. In internal matters, the legislature would have “more or less complete powers”. Certain functions are reserved to the Governor General, notably foreign affairs, the Southern Provinces and the Civil Service. The Governor General is empowered to suspend the constitution if there is a breakdown in constitutional processes, imminent financial bankruptcy or a breakdown in law and order.
Mr. Acheson asked if this were the final constitutional act for the Sudan.
Sir Robert Howe said that it was not. The final act was reserved until later. He recalled that Mr. Eden had stated publicly that HMG looks forward to the Sudanese achieving full self-government by the end of 1952 and thereafter taking steps looking forward toward self-determination.
[Page 1816]Mr. Eden asked how long this interim period is going to run. It seemed to him to be stretching longer and longer. Would the representative assembly pronounce on the question of the King’s title during the interim period?
Sir Robert Howe said that it was the only body competent to do so.
Sir Ralph Stevenson expressed the hope that the Egyptians could be persuaded to cooperate in the steps leading toward self-government and self-determination.
Mr. Acheson asked how the Egyptians were likely to react.
Sir Ralph Stevenson doubted that they would be brave enough to accept an invitation to discuss the constitution. They don’t like the constitution and they will undoubtedly take the line that the Egyptian constitution is better. What the British must do is to give the Egyptians a chance to participate and to urge them to assist in bringing the Sudan to self-government.
Mr. Acheson asked whether, assuming that the Egyptians agree to participate in the conversations on the constitution, they would agree to the title being put to the Sudan Assembly.
Sir Ralph thought it would be very hard for them to do so publicly. The present Government cannot identify itself with such consultations. The talks between the Egyptians and the Sudanese have been a big step forward and it is for this reason that the British Government has been encouraging them. The more Sudanese groups which talk to the Egyptians the better.
Mr. Acheson asked what the British thought the probable decision of the Assembly would be.
Sir Robert Howe thought that if the Assembly were composed as the result of free elections, the chances were pretty much against Sudanese acceptance of the title. Almost all the tribes would be opposed, as would the South. The political parties would be divided almost equally.
Sir Ralph Stevenson said that the Sudanese kept asking in Alexandria why the Egyptians attach so much importance to this question of the King’s title. They seemed to feel that if it were so important to them, they must have something more in mind than titular sovereignty.
Mr. Eden said that for a long time the British had not known what the outcome of the conversations in Alexandria had been. Since the return of the Sudanese delegation to Khartoum, however, it had become quite apparent that they would not accept the title.
Mr. Acheson asked if the trend in the Sudan were adverse to the Egyptian aspirations.
Mr. Eden said that he felt that only insofar as the question of the title was concerned.
[Page 1817]Sir Robert Howe agreed and said the Sudanese recognized the need for close and friendly relations with Egypt.
Mr. Acheson asked what happens next in Egypt if there is no solution to this problem.
Sir Ralph Stevenson said that he doubted that the Government could survive beyond autumn. A caretaker Government would then probably take over, headed perhaps by Sidky or Maraghi. He did not think that this would in itself bring about a deterioration of the situation, since he did not think that any Government would risk a reoccurrence of the January 26 riots merely for the sake of the title. He felt that the situation would remain fairly stable, particularly if the British make constructive suggestions.
Mr. Acheson asked if the Wafd would be likely to come back in power if elections were held.
Sir Ralph Stevenson said that it depended on how they were rigged. He recalled that at the time of the last elections, Sidky had helped the Wafd return to power. He did not think that Sidky would make the same mistake again.
Mr. Eden reverted to the question of conversations with the Egyptians. If the Egyptians could be persuaded to come in and to cooperate in working out the remaining constitutional steps in the Sudan, then they could talk about the holding of fair elections in the Sudan preparatory to putting the question of the King’s title to the Sudanese Assembly. He hoped that the US would find it possible to help in persuading the Egyptians. It seemed only sensible that since the constitution had been sent to both Co-Domini for comment, they should consult regarding their reactions.
Mr. Acheson asked what the situation would be if the Egyptians did not accept the Sudanese constitution.
Mr. Eden said that the present constitution permits the new constitution to be put into effect within 6 months unless both Co-Domini signify their disapproval of it. He went on to say that the British had also been thinking of the possibility of a supervisory election body to assure free elections to the Assembly. Such a body might consist of representatives of the UK, Egypt and the Sudan with a neutral chairman. He asked Sir Ralph Stevenson what he thought the chances were of getting the Egyptians to agree to participate.
Sir Ralph Stevenson doubted that the Egyptians would accept such a proposal. In many respects, the Egyptians are prisoners of their own tactics. He nevertheless thought it was worth trying.
In reply to Mr. Eden’s question, Sir Robert Howe thought that the Sudanese would agree to participate in an election supervisory body. He went on to say that he understood that in the conversations between the Egyptians and the Sudanese in Alexandria,
[Page 1818]Hilali had said that he wished to recover Egypt’s legal position in the Sudan from which Egypt had barred itself by its termination of the 1899 Agreement.
Mr. Eden said that he wanted to make it clear that the Sudanese feeling against the acceptance of the King’s title was not the result of any doing of the UK. The UK had been trying to encourage a meeting of the minds between the Egyptians and the Sudanese and there would have been no conversation in Alexandria unless the UK had urged the Sudanese to go.
Sir Ralph Stevenson said that there was profound mistrust on both sides between the Sudanese and the Egyptians.
Mr. Eden said that the Sudanese also look at 22 million pound surplus which they have in their treasury and ask why they should share this with an Egypt which is on the verge of bankruptcy.
Mr. Acheson asked whether the British thought that the situation would not deteriorate in the fall.
Sir Ralph Stevenson said he did not think it would. The police were being strengthened by the anti-riot equipment which was being furnished by the U.S. If there were simultaneous risings all over Egypt, it might be beyond the Government’s control but he did not think that this was a likely possibility. He thought any caretaker government would probably concentrate heavily on the problem of the redistribution of land, thereby diverting attention from the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
Mr. Acheson said that if the Egyptians could deal with disturbances with their own forces, it would be better than the British doing it.
Sir Ralph Stevenson agreed. It was difficult to foresee the end of the use of British force in such circumstances. There are a quarter of a million foreigners in Egypt. Protection of this large number creates a frightful problem. It would not be possible for the military forces to bob into the Delta and bob right back out again. However, even the mere knowledge that the British were prepared to take such action in the event of necessity is. a deterrent to trouble.
Mr. Acheson said that the use of British force in the Delta would have consequences in the rest of the Middle East which would be incalculable.
Sir Ralph Stevenson said that there was no question of the use of such force unless the situation were out of control or unless such forces were asked for by the King or Egyptian Government. He did not think that there was much possibility of the latter. The King had told him after the January 26 riots that he would never ask for British troops because it would brand him as a quisling, but [Page 1819] that if the situation ever got beyond his control he would let Stevenson know.
Mr. Eden thought that it was not likely that the situation would get out of control and Sir Ralph Stevenson agreed, adding that he thought that January 26th had taught the Egyptians a lesson.
It was decided to adjourn the meeting and to take up Egypt at the beginning of the afternoon session.