Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

611.86A/6–154: Telegram

No. 1463
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State¹

secret
niact

Jidda, June 1, 1954—9 p.m.

493. Had some four hours with Prince Faisal at Taif today. He was exquisitely courteous throughout except for brief lapse into softly put sarcasm near end.

As I had requested appointment I opened by saying I had looked forward to opportunity talk to him of highlights Istanbul Ambassadors conference;² I had too one highly secret matter of which I wished speak with him alone; and I hoped he would wish speak as frankly with me re Saudi-American relations as in his view they had developed since I had seen King and him in Riyadh just one month ago (mytel 167, May 3 from Dhahran).³ I had I added been disturbed at what I had heard on my return of growing anti-American feeling at Riyadh (mytels 489, May 29 re Buraimi⁴ and 492, June 1 re Point IV).⁵

Department should know I had carefully considered just what I should say. I was seriously apprehensive he would—as in substance he did after two hours exposition on my part—tell me not only that US had failed Saudi Arabia as a friend in Buraimi dispute but also that Saudi Arabia no longer felt need of Point IV. Consequently in my exposition of strategic, Palestine and aid policies recommended to Department by Istanbul conference I interpolated full anticipatory rebuttal of reported Saudi criticism our positions on military and economic aid and on our support of Turk-Pakistan pact and military aid to Iraq. My over-all frame was tremendous struggle between our western world and Communist Russia.

Faisal followed me carefully. his few questions were well taken and I then answered and I listened with few interruptions for next hour. His frame was philosophic i.e., that nations like individuals must act in accord dictates their national or self-interest. He stressed that he did not question necessity our world policy of cooperation with Britain; two countries had highly important common interests; but as one result small though it was on world plane Saudi Arabia was loser.

Consequently—and here was his touch of sarcasm—Council of Ministers last night after considering USG reply (Deptel 337, May 29)⁶ to Shaikh Yussef’s last representations re Buraimi dispute (Mytel 489, May 29) had decided it would no longer trouble USG with its small problems but instead would henceforth handle them to best its ability itself.

Our ensuing discussion was brief but during its course Faisal made two further important statements. According my notes (only two of any importance I took during whole conversation) they were substantially as follows:

1. “As to Point IV the Councils decision was to dispense with their further services not because they have not been doing their work well. The decision has been sent to the King for signature”. I asked: “Why then dispense with their services?” He answered: “Because of the new policy of Saudi Arabia not to bother the US Government”.

2. “As to the military mission this matter has not come to Foreign Office. You should continue to handle it with Prince Mishaal.” Substance of my reply was that if and when it did come to Foreign Office I hoped he would again discuss matters fully with me; I had not found discussion with Prince Mishaal helpful.

Wadsworth

1. Repeated to London and Dhahran.
2. For documentation on the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul, May 11–14, see Documents 210–212 and 824.
3. Not printed; it reported the King’s complaint that the United States was following a policy of neglect toward Saudi Arabia, especially in the case of the Buraimi dispute. (780.022/5–354)
4. Not printed. (780.022/5–2954)
5. Not printed; it reported some Saudi Arabian disaffection with the size of the Point IV program. (786A.5 MSP/6–154)
6. Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 1565.